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ABSTRACT 
 
 In the last years Turkish society has gone under major transformations. Since the 
Ottomans acknowledged that their Muslim identity was the main reason of their 
backwardness, the social compromise was never maintained again. As a result of 
Ottoman Empire‟s numerous defeats by the West which it always despised, Ottoman 
authorities had to make a choice by acknowledging either the issue was Islam itself or 
the believers. Thus, Ottoman authorities defined that the issue was Islam and accepted 
that its dominance on the administration should be reduced. This way Ottomans got 
under an extensive modernization period which extended their life remarkably. 
Following the fall of Ottoman Empire, young Turkey was founded from its ashes and 
carried on the westernized reforms. Atatürk also saw the issue with Islam and 
implemented a series of reforms in the lead of Republican People‟s Party to eliminate 
Islam from all spheres of social and political life. However, this was not welcomed by 
the majority of the society and in the first free elections in 1950; society showed its 
desire for a change and elected the opposing Democrat Party with an overwhelming 
majority which followed a moderate policy towards religion. In the following years, as 
the welfare state declined, Islamist parties were able to gain a remarkable ground in 
Turkish politics. The most important of those was Welfare Party as it was the first 
Islamist party that was elected with the majority vote. During its 15 years of existence 
Welfare Party was the main actor in social polarization. Even though it was a party 
which was elected by majority, its acts that praised Islamic values were perceived as 
anti-laic by the governing elite and the party was closed in 1998. However, its social 
base never gave up their fight. In 2002, this time Justice and Development Party became 
the address of Islamist circles by receiving the approval of almost half of the population. 
Since then the party is being the voice of the society which rises against status-quo. 
However, party‟s radical acts in the recent years also drew a contra-opposition against 
itself which blames the party with being dishonest in its acts, having a secret agenda of 
Islamizing the country and gradually heading for a civil dictatorship by suppressing the 
opposite voices.  
 This thesis presents an overview on Islamism, politicization of Islam, Turkish 
democracy, social polarization starting from the Turkish acceptance of Islam until the 
present day in the first two parts and argues the effects of political Islam on Turkish 
society on the basis of social polarization at the last part through using empirical data 
from primary and secondary sources. 
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RESUMO 
 
        Nos últimos anos, a sociedade Turca teve as suas maiores transformações. Desde 
que os Otomanos reconheceram que a sua identidade Muçulmana era a principal razão 
da sua relutância, o compromisso social nunca mais foi mantido de novo.  Como o 
resultado das numerosas derrotas do Império Otomano pelo Oeste, que sempre foram 
despresadas, as autoridades Otomanas tiveram que fazer uma escolha; ou o 
reconhecimento do próprio Islão, ou os seus crentes. Então, as autoridades Otomanas 
decidiram que o Islão e o seu dominio naadministração deverião ser reduzidos.Esta 
decisão dos Otomanos conseguiu um longo período de modernização, que alargou 
consideravelmente a sua existência. Após a queda do Império Otomano,  a jovem 
Turquia foi fundada sobre as suas cinzas e trouxe consigo reformas ocidentalizadas. 
Ataturk também viu a saída com o Islamismo e implementou uma serie de reformas no 
governo  do Partido Republicano do Povo, para eliminar o Islão de todas as esferas da 
vida social e politica. Contudo, isto não foi bem visto pela maioria da sociedade e, nas 
primeiras eleições livres em 1950, a sociedade mostrou o desejo de uma mudança e 
elegeu na oposição o Partido Democrático com uma preponderante maioria, que seguiu 
uma politica moderada na religião. Nos anos seguintes, como o estado de bem-estar 
declinou. Os partidos Islamistas conseguiram ganhar um remarcável terreno na politica 
Turca. O mais importante de todos, foi o Partido do Bem-Estar, que foi o primeiro 
partido Islamista que foi eleito  com maioria de votos. Durante os seus 15 anos de 
existência, o Partido do Bem-Estar foi o principal portagonista na polarização social. 
Ainda que fosse um partido eleito com maioria , os seus actos que pregavam os valores 
Islamicos foram entendidos pela elite do governo como anti-laicos, e o partido foi 
encerrado em 1998. Contudo, as suas bases sociais nunca deixaram de lutar. Em 2002, 
nesta altura Partido da Justiça e Desenvolvimento , tornou-se o lugar dos circulos 
Islamistas, pois receberam a aprovação de quase metade da população. Desde então o 
partido está a ser a voz da sociedadecujas origens são contra o status-quo. No entanto, 
os actos radicais do partido nos últimos anos também delinearam uma contra-oposição 
contra si próprios com os erros  dos seus actos desonestos, tendo uma agenda secreta de 
Islamização do país e,  gradualmente  encabeçando  uma ditadura civil para supressão 
das vozes da oposição. 
 Esta dissertação apresenta uma visão do Islamismo, politização do Islão, 
democracia Turca,  polarização social partindo da aceitação do Islão pelos Turcos desde 
os presentes dias,  nas primeiras duas partes e argumentos dos efeitos da politica 
Islamica na sociedade turca, com base na polarização social, na última parte,  atraves de 
dados empiricos de fontes primárias e secundárias. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 Development of the western society through the geographical expeditions and 
industrialization between 15
th
 and 19
th
 centuries gradually led to the nationalist 
movements. Modernized and socialized communities of the West started to raise their 
voices against their repressive kings and followingly completed their experience 
through several revolutions that promoted the indispensability of equality, freedom and 
people‟s sovereignty all over the world. Thus, these claims became the most important 
element of social and political life in the West following the 19
th
 century. These ideas 
resulted with the decline of the empires based on land and promoted the national 
consciousness which led to the rise of different national elements and people‟s claim of 
their rights from their rulers. The claims gradually caused the empires to decline and the 
nation states to rise. One of the most affected empires from the nationalist ideology was 
Ottoman Empire. 
 As a result of the unstoppable decline of Ottoman Empire which possessed the 
Caliphate institution as the representative of the Islam world; Ottoman authorities 
desperately put the intellectuals in charge of finding the reason of their backwardness 
and a solution in order to come over their frustration about it. This situation divided the 
intellectuals in two as of the ones that justified the reason of regression by relating it to 
Islam itself and the ones that justified the reason with the Muslims. This disaccord 
reflected to the society in time and has taken the shape of a social conflict. The 
authorities used their preference to the side that considered Islam itself as the problem 
and decided to implement a series of reforms in order to meliorate the empire. Deciding 
the nature of reforms was not easy for an empire which had such a diverse society under 
its command as the reforms should appeal to all segments of the society. Because the 
reforms aimed to transform and westernize the society step by step in order to find a 
solution which could be a cure for the regression, Islamist circles which have always 
strived for reliving the bright times of Islam during the united Islam state period and 
were expecting to retain the status-quo to this end got disappointed with the decision. 
Thus, sultan‟s modernization efforts resulted with disaccord of the society on Islamism 
and westernism axes. While these ideologies were puny voices under Ottoman Empire 
rule, they gradually transformed into the voice of millions. 
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 Islam‟s role issue have been the subject of heated debates and even conflicts 
since 1839 Ottoman Imperial Edict of Reorganization and especially the declaration of 
republic until the present day Turkey‟s political, legal, social, cultural spheres. There is 
no doubt about indisputability of Islam‟s place as it played a very important role on 
majority of the former Turkish societies and the society of Turkey at present throughout 
the history. This stands as a sociological fact. 
 It is obvious that Islam started to arise as a problem for the governing elite as an 
outcome of the westernization moves. As a matter of fact it is still an unresolved 
problem on some circles‟ perception. There is still not a credible explanation for how 
Islam which is a basic fact of the Turkish society for hundreds of years became an issue 
and why this subject triggers polemics and both sides accuse each other when the state 
affairs, politics, press, universities and intellectuals come across with Islam.  
 This is a very important question and it is quite difficult to answer. Each 
segment considered the issue from their own sides and tried to find an answer 
accordingly but it is clearly seen that the debates are not conducted on a steady basis. 
The answer of this question is hidden over the analysis of Turkey‟s westernization 
experience. The issue has sides which concern both westernists and Islamists and these 
elements are closely related to the ideological molds of both sides. However, not much 
attention was attributed to the ideological dimension of the westernization process; not 
much analyzes were conducted on the social, psychological, philosophical and political 
extent of the process; most of the times westernization policy was taken as the single 
source and the situation was tried to be explained through westernist perspective. On the 
other hand, also Islamists approached the situation solely on the basis of religious faith 
rather than a wider view that took the social facts of the Turkish society and the Islam 
world and thus they could not reach beyond presenting reactive responses. But there is a 
certain thing which is the fact that westernists has always seen Islam as the symbol of 
primitiveness and backwardness since the 1839 Ottoman Imperial Edict of 
Reorganization and believed that Islam should be kept away from political, legal, social 
and cultural life in order to modernize Turkey; and the opposite side intensely withstood 
this mentality. Thus, this situation established the basis of the westernist-Islamist 
conflict and the debates on the conflict continue by getting more severe each passing 
day as neither side step back.  
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 Following the failure of Ottoman Empire, founder of modern Republic of 
Turkey, Atatürk, embarked to modernize the young country according to needs of the 
globalizing world. He was also thinking that it was Islam itself what caused the decline 
of the state and implemented the reforms to that end. Islam was completely eliminated 
from the Turkish social and political life through the carried reforms that envisaged a 
Turkish nation which was purged from the Islamic values in the public space and 
modernized. The first steps taken to this end were the abolishment of Caliphate and 
implementation of the laic set of rules in the constitution. This was also a reasonable act 
considering that the nationalist ideology was still the dominating ideology in the world.   
 The mentioned conflict has reflected more or less to each field, caused the 
political parties to form two opposite blocs; for example it brought first DP, then AP 
and followingly the political parties which put the Islamist rhetoric to the center of their 
politics such as MNP, MSP, RP, FP and finally AKP respectively. It also caused the 
same dual settlement in the education system and the imam-hatip schools which provide 
religious education were implemented against the laic public schools as a result of the  
high demand from the society. However, nobody asked why these schools that were 
implemented as vocational schools at the beginning turned into competitors of the laic 
public schools as nobody asked why the opposing parties were emerged. Rather than 
questioning the reasons, these types of transformations were tried to be answered 
through the allegations such as threatening laicism, swerving from the laic reforms or 
upraising Shari‟a.  
 However, it should have been thought that it might be the outcome of a 
sociological fact if Islamist parties rise; structure of the education system changes and 
religion schools get demanded. In other words, it should have been thought that if the 
developments were an outcome of the requisition of the people to call Islam out which 
was eliminated from the social life by the governing elite. Since its foundation, the 
republican has never handled this situation sociologically and even the academic circles 
that should handle the subject objectively cannot give up their persistent attitude and 
continue on approaching on the subject ideologically. In the final analysis, imam-hatip 
schools and the political parties which showed a positive attitude to the Islamic 
demands of the society, even if it was abused by some parties, were depoliticized 
through military interventions and imam-hatip schools were rarefied. 
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 Islamism‟s milestone has been RP in Turkish history. RP was able to attract a 
more various partisan audience compared to the previous Islamist parties. It received the 
support of religious conservative burghers and indigent migrants that lived in the slums 
of the principal cities as well as freelance business owners, conservative intellectuals 
and substantial industrialists. In 1994 local elections, RP doubled its votes and it 
acquired the mayoralties of biggest six cities and the half of the others. Followingly, RP 
acquired the most seats in 1995 general elections. Its electorates were reflecting a great 
mass of people who were expecting social and economic reforms until the ones who 
were striving for the establishment of Shari‟a law. Constitutional Court presented a 
closure case against the party with becoming the focus of anti-laic acts. As laic state 
system envisages control of the state over religion, the debates transformed into the 
debates about if an Islamist party should take place in the political system or not. The 
concerned laics made up disaster scenarios while the supporters of the party strictly 
opposed the closure and claimed that the case that was presented was undemocratic. 
However, the result was predictable when the concerns of the political elites were taken 
into account. Even so, as the party was successful on transforming its party grassroots to 
a social movement, Islamist parties never got affected by the closure cases.  
 Global extensity of the Islam based politics was also another determiner of the 
success of this movement. RP was closed in 1998 and its leader was banished from 
politics for five years. Only a few days later another Islamist party was formed that was 
called FP and had the support of the same diverse mass of electorates. Not much later, 
FP was also closed, but its partisans stayed linked to its invisible movement. This was 
the period which marked the greatest transformations in Turkish history. As it was 
revealed in the last days of FP, the party cadre was gradually dividing in two as of the 
young reformers and old traditionals. Thus, following the closure of FP, this time two 
parties emerged. Old cadre founded SP, while young cadre founded AKP which is one 
of the main actors in this study. 
 Islamist movement strives for bringing people together on a common ideology 
that has social and political targets. Islamism is only the main genre that all participants 
embrace. Islamist movement in Turkey embraces people from different ideologies who 
have contrasting objectives. Organization method of RP has a significant importance on 
party‟s success. The cultural values that form the base of this process are not new. What 
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is new is its power of enacting people. This situation can directly be connected to the 
urban living conditions, because as a result of the migration new slum neighborhoods 
arose in a very short time. Inhabitants of these new neighborhoods were the people that 
came from different backgrounds and faced challenging urban problems upon their 
arrival. The new solidarity styles which were based on the familiar cultural values have 
triggered the community feeling in each neighborhood and enabled the community to 
become a political power. RP‟s success was based on its influence on these local 
communities. 
 Following the RP‟s closure, two powerful actors arose in Turkey. AKP and 
Gülen Movement have been the most spoken elements of the political agenda during the 
last ten years. Practices and the ideology that AKP exhibits since it came into power in 
2002 plays an extremely important role over the social changes and causes major 
transformation on social and political life. AKP represents a political structure which 
carries the middle class to the center, bring Islamic opposition with the system and 
invite the system to acknowledge this. In other words, AKP tries to resolve the Islam-
state conflict through a different style by opening space for Islam‟s representation 
within the democratic system and in the public space. Considering its efforts, AKP 
makes an example for the rest of the Islam world and therefore tackles to be a leader in 
the region as a part of the Great Middle East Project.  
 However, AKP transforms into a reality besides being the subject that marks the 
last years by settling to the center of many public debates such as education or dressing. 
The Islamists/religious conservatives are getting mobilized in the lead of AKP. 
Therefore, it bears more importance than being a political power for its supporters. 
 Another very important movement which was successful on mobilizing the 
people is Gülen Movement. The movement reorganizes as a religious civil society and 
takes place in the public space by transforming into a sociological actor which brings 
the critics accordingly. The movement emphasizes religion‟s place in public space and 
tries to answer the current identity crises. Thus, religion‟s characteristic that is closed to 
the public is gradually left and religion‟s reflection to life gets obvious. This reflection 
leads to religion‟s rise as a social phenomenon based on social relations. However, as 
this civil religion concept evolves; it brings the competition over the political society 
and ideological grouping in the cadres of civil services in order to assure the future of 
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the people that make a part of this mobilization. This is the main reason of Gülen 
Movement‟s organizations based on tolerance through encouraging the conservative 
intellectuals to take part in resolution process of the social conflicts. However, an 
Islamic movement‟s active presence in the social projects is criticized by the laic circles 
which are concerned about the movement‟s so-called secret Islamization agenda.  
 Religion experiences great transformations in Turkey‟s modernization projects. 
However, there are several issues of modernization in this process. One of them is the 
issues related to the definition of modernization according to the modernist theory 
which excludes the importance of religion in the social life. Thus, Turkish revolution 
makes a good example of the steps taken with the concern of practicing the modernist 
identity through conducting a religion engineering campaign that aimed to modernize 
religion perception of the society. However, state‟s efforts completely ignored Islam‟s 
and society‟s demands and strived for building a religion perception that would answer 
the needs of the political power. The other issue is the arbitrary practices of religion. In 
the final analysis, even though AKP and Gülen Movement seem to be different from 
each other, they are actually intertwined together.  
 All these incidents show that Islam is still seen as an issue and therefore Islam 
debates focused on religious reactionism still take place continually. Everybody can see 
that these debates continue under the shadow of the ideological conflicts rather than the 
scientific researches. In exchange, society gets confused for not being provided with an 
open-minded perspective. 
 It is not possible to ignore laic Kemalist regime‟s intolerance on any kind of act 
that would raise the Islam‟s credibility in the public space which could have been 
perceived as fascistic and antidemocratic by the Islamist/religious conservative circles. 
It is true that the laic regime‟s fighting method with the anti-laic focuses and placing 
that “whomever is not Kemalist is anti-laic” perception is not democratic, however 
mentioning a same kind of stigmatization against anybody that is concerned about the 
anti-democratic practices of governments and political parties as pro-coup and atheist is 
obviously the same mindset with what Islamists claim to suffer. Thus, last events 
proved that it was the system which is faulty rather than the ideologies as the system is 
based on forced impose of the official ideology of the current political power. However, 
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when a party which embraces liberal values does the same thing, both party and the 
ideology loses its terms and become illegitimate.  
 Considering the polarization in Turkish social and political life gets more and 
more dangerous as it endangers the integrity of the society and the state, the sides of the 
conflict should come together under scientific platforms and search for the ways to 
provide a social compromise. In this respect, what should be done by those social 
segments is to accept the reality; strive for assuring Islam‟s place in social, political and 
cultural structure of Turkey to be known correctly by everybody and to be accepted by 
the society through cleaning it from any prejudices and ideological evaluations while 
leaving the belief dimension of the conflict to the own decisions of the people. In case 
this is done, the conflict between the Islamist and laic, elite and people will be 
eliminated and thus an important step will be taken through the resolution of the 
problem. 
  The subject of the thesis is political Islam in Turkey and polarization of Turkish 
society in relation to the prominence of Islamism. In the study Islamism‟s evolution on 
Turkish society from its beginning till the present day, Islam‟s situation at the 
republican period, Islam‟s place in globalizing world, perception of Islamism by the laic 
elites and the state, Turkish political system and contribution of the Islamist parties to 
the polarization, polarization focuses in the Turkish society, recent political disputes, an 
overview of social clusters, bases of social polarization and the results of the 
polarization in Turkish society will be handled, some points of view, opinions, remarks 
and critics on Islam which is carried out on the press and the public opinion will be 
reflected. At the last part of the thesis, primary and secondary empirical data will be 
used. 
 The main objective of the study is to show that even after that many years of 
being debated and many years after the foundation of the republic, the Islam debates are 
still done under ideological prejudices. Therefore, the conflict became a subject that 
challenges social compromise through causing the society to get polarized more and 
more each passing day. However, disingenuous nature of the Islamist parties that has 
played a very instigating role on polarization of the society should also be taken into 
account besides the strict attitude of the laic state against Islamist circles. Rise of 
Islamism as a result of series of incidents, emergence of a moderate political Islam 
 8 
 
definition during the Cold War period, global decline of nationalist social democrat 
ideologies, persistent attitude of the Islamist political parties and showing all the 
opposers as Islam‟s enemy while not hesitating to reflect this in any condition brought 
the Turkish society to a dead-end in our day.  
 In the light of all this information, this thesis aims to provide an understanding 
of Turkish Islamist perception by providing an overview of Islamist history, arguing the 
Turkish democratic system and its weaknesses and finally making an analysis of the 
polarization that long Islamist history caused in Turkey through evaluating the empirical 
data that was collected. 
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CHAPTER 1 
METHODOLOGY 
  
 This thesis is the result of a three-year investigation period, initiated in 
September 2010, as part of the Masters program in History, International Affairs and 
Cooperation, held at the University of Porto. 
 Main purpose of this thesis is to provide information on evolution of political 
Islam in Turkey along with its consequences on the society. In the recent years Turkish 
society polarized more than any time before. This thesis expects to find answers to why 
there is a social compromise problem in Turkish society, how political Islam contributes 
to polarization, what the contributions of political parties to this polarization are and 
what should be done for reaching social compromise.   
 Theme of the thesis is “Political Islam and Social Polarization in Turkey”. 
Political Islam has always been a prominent ideology among Turkish society since 
1950‟s. However, prominence of Islamism has gradually polarized the society. 
Polarization of the society is not a new thing; polarization of Turkish society has its 
roots back in the 19
th
 century. Modernization efforts of Ottoman Empire divided the 
society in two as ones blamed Islam for their backwardness and ones blamed Muslim 
society. But, as Ottoman authorities also found blaming Islam completely and importing 
innovations from the West immediately easier rather than blaming Muslims and get 
involved in a never-ending sociological project in a pragmatic attitude was a breaking 
point for Turkish Islam as this attitude became definitive on deciding the official 
ideology of Republic of Turkey. Second wave of Islamism is the period starting with 
1950‟s and reaching the present day. However last 10 years of this period is more 
important than the rest. In 2002 AKP was elected through obtaining majority of the 
votes with a liberal rhetoric, but this liberal identity was forgotten following the 
elections and AKP embarked to implement its biased democracy which was basically 
provided for its own partisans. In this sense, the society was polarized more and more 
since 2002 and in the recent years this transformed into an uprising.  
 Main objectives of the thesis are providing a better understanding on 
cosmopolite demography of Turkey, identifying conflicts of the society in Turkey, 
providing a better understanding of political Islam, investigating rise of political Islam 
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and perception of people, providing an overview of Turkish politics, inspecting the 
effects of globalization on spread of conservative thought, discussing effects of political 
Islam in Turkish society by taking immigration, education, cultural conflict and women 
rights variants into consideration. 
 While some of the specific objectives are providing a better understanding of the 
cosmopolite demography of Turkey, identifying characteristics of the low culture and 
high culture, questioning role of politics on the conflict, questioning effects of internal 
immigration, discussing moderate Islam and arguing if Turkey is forced to be an 
example for region countries, investigating vernacular networks and their contribution 
to political Islam. 
 In this thesis, above-mentioned issues will be the main subjects to be explained. 
This thesis has four chapters.  
 First chapter is methodology part where the theme, purposes and methodology 
will be explained. No data will be used in methodology.  
 Second chapter provides a historical perspective over Islamism which handles 
the period since Turkish acceptance of Islam until the present day. Political 
development theories are used in order to explain the historical perspective. No data will 
be used in second chapter. 
 Third chapter provides an overview about political Islam in Turkey during 
republican period. As it is understood from its title, this chapter covers a history starting 
with declaration of republic in 1923 and ending with closure case of AKP in 2008. This 
chapter is quite important as it provides an overview of steps that led to polarization of 
Turkish society and will be reviewed in six parts providing information about Turkish 
Islamist parties, Turkish nationalism, effects of globalization, 1980 coup d‟etat, Turkish 
democracy culture, AKP period and Gülen Movement. Data from newspaper articles 
and magazines will be used in this chapter.  
 Fourth and last chapter constitutes the main idea of this thesis. This chapter will 
handle research questions as what is social polarization, why there is social polarization, 
what is the extent of polarization, what is the source of polarization, what are the 
consequences of polarization. Empiric, qualitative and quantitative data will be used 
from primary and secondary sources in this chapter. Newspaper articles about the main 
incidents will be analyzed. Study A that consists of the results of a public poll in Turkey 
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about polarization, Study B that consists of a survey that was organized by the author 
about political attitudes and Study C that consists of two interviews that were done with 
two Turkish females which represents either of the poles. 
 Now information about empiric data sources will be provided: 
Study A 
 Authored by Bekir Ağırdır, this report is based on the data and findings of a 
survey conducted in April 2010. It aims to take a snapshot of polarization. Turkey is 
going through by elaborating on differing values and viewpoints that various electoral 
groups and social clusters have with regard to daily political debates and to make sense 
of this snapshot. Survey report was published as a series in the daily Radikal Newspaper 
between June 13 and 17, 2010. A total of 6482 interviews were conducted in 41 
provinces, 328 districts and 1116 villages of Turkey. Survey report is available at 
http://www.konda.com.tr/tr/raporlar.php  
 
Study B 
 The survey consists of 24 multiple choice questions on various topics related to 
demographic features of the participants and political Islam. All data collected was 
processed by www.esurveyspro.com. Even though basic statistical data of the 
participants was collected and processed, a crosstab report could not be provided as the 
free account did not allow retrieving such kind of information. Considering the survey 
was conducted between 13.07.2012 and 02.08.2012, some data may have altered due to 
the social changes in Turkey during the last one year. The response option of survey 
was set to anonymous multiple answers in order to protect participant‟s privacy and 
provide convenience for those who respond in a multi-user environment. Survey was 
responded by 160 people that allow us to analyze the Turkish society roughly through a 
10 % standard deviation if solely the quantity of participants is taken into 
consideration.
1
 The survey was prepared and run only in Turkish and later translated to 
English. All questions were designed as mandatory; therefore none of the 24 questions 
were skipped by participants. 
 As this report was submitted through social media and emails, the prerequisites 
to respond were having access to a computer, having internet connection, owning 
                                                 
1 Türker Baş, Anket Nasıl Hazırlanır, Nasıl Uygulanır, Nasıl Değerlendirilir (How is a Survey Prepared, Applied and  
Evaluated), Ankara: Seçkin, 2002 
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account on social media or having email address as well as being literate. Besides, 
participants who shared their opinion were mainly the group which is dissatisfied with 
the political environment in Turkey and mainly the people that identify themselves as 
laic social democrats whose political preference is predominantly CHP. Therefore, this 
report cannot be considered as 100 % accurate to the reality of Turkish society.  
 It is believed it is also important to state that before the survey website was 
discovered, this survey was attempted to be conducted in paper format based on one-on-
one meetings. However, approximately only 20 % of the people which were asked a 
one-on-one meeting accepted to meet. As there was not enough data to use from the 
meetings that were intended to be done, an online poll was seen as more trustworthy. 
Therefore, it can be assumed that 80 % of the participants in a small seaside holiday 
village that consists of 83 housings and approximately 166 individuals (if it is supposed 
that each house has 2 inhabitants) in northwestern Turkey where the majority of 
population are holidaymakers from different regions preferred not to share their political 
opinion with an alien. Moreover, their attitude also may be related to their reluctance for 
discussing politics during their holiday season.  
 Majority of the participants in the survey consist of middle aged, urban, 
democrat, Muslim males between 45 and 59 who are graduated from a public higher 
education institution on social sciences and work as employees. Almost three quarters 
of the participants are CHP electorates that are not satisfied with the current AKP 
government. Majority believe that religion should be under control of the state. A major 
part of the participants consider that political Islam is a system that politicians 
implemented in order to orient the society in their interest. More than three fourths of 
participants think that Islam in politics does not assure freedoms while more than half of 
the participants do not want to see religious items in public space. A major part of the 
participants think that Islamism is a threat for Turkey. Majority have never participated 
in political activities. Almost all participants say that they make friends from different 
opinions, but in the meanwhile they think that Islam causes conflict in Turkish society. 
Half of the participants think that media does not assist liberal thought. Majority 
partially practices their religion, thinks that their freedom is restricted by the society 
which is not tolerant. A major part of the participants think that social environment is 
the most important factor in influencing lifestyles. 
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 Full information of the survey is available in the annexes. 
 
Study C 
 Study C is based on the interviews conducted in Istanbul during July of 2012. 
No video was taken, only voice recorder was used. Authorization form was signed by 
both participants. Both participants are females. Participant 1 represents laic circles; 
participant 2 represents religious conservative circles. Both interviews were done at 
cafes for comfort of the participants. Subject 1 participated to the research alone while 
Subject 2 was accompanied with her sister. Overall atmosphere was positive. Subject 1 
was much more relaxed while providing answers compared to Subject 2. Off the record, 
Subject 2 mentioned that she was a member of AKP‟s youth branch while Subject 1 was 
not affiliated with nowhere at the moment. 
Subject 1 
26 years old, lives in Istanbul, master‟s student, born in Istanbul, attended school in 
Istanbul, no imam-hatip background, Turkish, and Caucasian. 
Subject 2  
27 years old, lives in Istanbul, German teacher, attended school in Istanbul, no imam-
hatip background, Turkish, and Caucasian.  
 Full information of the interviews is available in the annexes. 
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CHAPTER 2 
ISLAMISM FROM THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
2.1. AN OVERVIEW OF TURKISH PERCEPTION OF ISLAM 
 
Religion, which is as old as humankind, is an important determiner in 
construction of a culture according to Durkheim sociology. Turkish believed in variety 
of religions in different locations since beginning of their history in Central Asia. Yet, 
changing religions often based on their location played an important role on their social 
life. Eventually, Islam became one of the most important values of Turkish society. As a 
matter of fact, there are historical, cultural and actual dimensions that should be studied 
to understand importance of religion in Turkish history. 
 All religions which affected Turkish history should be taken into account on the 
basis of social structure. There are two opinions about Turkish pre-Islamic religious 
beliefs; one defends that Turkish were Shamans while the opposing supports that 
Turkish always had a monotheistic belief. However, both of them are far from 
exhibiting a certainty. Yet, another opinion which defended that Turkish adopted Islam 
without resistance was refuted by recent researches.  According to this false statement, 
non-Sunni beliefs were claims to disintegrate Turkish society.
2
  
 Islamic world strives for returning back to its glamorous days. Therefore, an 
investigation of Turkish history should be done to understand where the mistake was 
done. Turkish were the protectors of Islam until their decline against the West. 
Ottomans realized that something was wrong following their technological, cultural 
decline and several military defeats and implemented western style alterations; however 
they never considered Muslim identity as the problem.
3
 It was 19
th
 century when 
Ottomans realized that the issue was actually their identity. While some intellectuals 
saw the fault in Islam itself, some others blamed followers. This was how two 
ideologies came into question for the first time: Westernism and Islamism. Those 
ideologies manifested basis for laicism versus Islamism debates. Eventually, modern 
Turkish republic was founded by ones seeing Islam as the issue. Even though 
                                                 
2 Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, Türkler, Türkiye ve İslam (Turks, Turkey and Islam), Ed. 10, İstanbul: İletişim, 1999, p. 20 
3 ibid., p. 24 
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westernists were overwhelming ones, aggression never ended between two groups. At 
the present time, Turkey seems to be uncomfortable with representation of Islam by 
some fanatic circles and hopes this identity would get weaker through its admission to 
the EU.
4
 However, because of inadequate education about Islam, debates can only carry 
on limited to certain aspects. 
It is widely accepted that Turkish adopted Islam starting from 900 A.D for its 
mystic character. Neither Turkish accepted Islam under pressure nor transition process 
have been without issues. This transition was consequence of a complex social 
structure. Islam spread among Turkish step by step and eventually it was adopted as 
state religion by Karakhanids for the first time. Adoption of Islam by Seljuqs, who were 
successors of Karakhanids, marked a milestone in the Turkish history. According to 
ancient documents, Islam spread very superficially among nomads, Arabic tradesmen 
and Sufis; but they had a great impact on conversion of Turkish.
5
 
 Sunni-Seljuq evolution has been a constituent for Sunni canon law, ulema 
religiousness and Sufism.
6
 Sufism was used for society‟s embracement of Islam and it 
was assumed that Sufism complemented Quran and Shari‟a.7  As Sufism evolved, 
range of unknown in religion was broadened and extent of science shrank. This 
narrowed the area of political science and fostered society not to question. 
Seljuqs passed through great transformations after accepting Islam in 
Transoxiana at 11
th
 century which assured Turkish possession in Middle East and 
proved their power to claim caliphate for Sunni Muslims. This incident marked state 
building era of the Western Turkish. Following Karakhanids and Seljuqs, Sunni Islam 
was also acknowledged as official state religion of Ottomans. Ottoman sultan became 
the highest representative of Islam through possession of caliphate and thus state and 
religion were integrated. 
There are two aspects that should be considered on Turkish religious perception; 
Sunni and non-Sunni Islam. In time, Transoxiana became the center of Sunni Islam and 
accordingly it became official religion of all Turkish states following Karakhanids.
8
 
However, nomad communities started to follow flexible heterodox Islam on the 
                                                 
4 ibid., p. 20 
5 ibid., p.p. 30-36 
6 Anthony Black, Siyasal İslam Düşüncesi Tarihi: Peygamberden Bugüne, (The History of Islamic Political Thought 
from the Prophet to the Present), Ankara: Dost, 2001, p. 191 
7 ibid, p. 195 
8 op. cit. Ocak, p. 41 
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contrary of settled communities as it was more suitable to their lifestyle. Heterodox 
Islam did not arise systematically as Sunni Islam did; it originated from a mixture of 
pre-Islamic religions, Islam and social conditions which explains its non-systematic 
nature. One of the most important features of heterodox Islam was its harmony that 
integrated many different beliefs. Because of its flexibility, it was even suitable to use 
for spreading Islam in the West. 
Sunnism evolved as equal partner of militarist political power and it integrated 
with society and sociopolitical system.
9
 In course of this integration, Shari‟a was used 
as a guideline to transform society in an ethical way. It was seen as moral law which 
was believed that its orders were set by God and were not debatable.
10
 
Sunni Islam was always dominant in the structure of Turkish states because of 
its systematical frame. Naturally Islam itself has a political character as being evolved 
as a political theory during the Abbasid reign. Turkish states pursued this structure as it 
was seen as a legitimacy source on governmental and international relations and 
acknowledged domination of Islam in reconciliation with a traditional understanding.
11
 
Sunni Islam‟s systematical structure and rationality directed Turkish to accept this sect 
officially. It lived its brightest period during the Ottoman reign, however advance in 
religion was only limited to needs of the empire. Ottomans remained tolerant to all 
kinds of beliefs until Safavids converted to Shi‟ism officially and became rival of 
Ottomans. In the following years, Ottoman Empire applied strict policy against non-
Sunni beliefs. Nevertheless, non-Sunni popular Islam has always been present 
unofficially among the people. 
 Maverdi was the first person to declare that worldly and spiritual powers were 
different from each other. Also he formed the legal basis of sultan-caliph idea by 
defending that the spiritual tasks also could be managed by the actual ruler instead of 
the caliph.
12
 
 As there was only one caliph, there was also only one sultan who was military 
and political leader of Islam.
13
 This idea caused extensive effects that were seen in 
                                                 
9 op. cit., Black, p. 128 
10 op. cit., Ocak p. 131 
11 ibid., p.p. 61-68 
12 op. cit., Black, p. 139 
13 Bernard Lewis, Historians in the Middle East, London: Oxford University, 1962, p. 52 
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Ottoman sultan‟s claim of caliphate along with his political and military leadership.14 In 
that respect, religion was sunk into politics in Turkish states. Consequently, because 
religion scholars and sultans were in close relationship; Islam did not experience a 
conflict between religion and politics like in Europe.  
 According to Islam, all emperors were subject to Shari‟a which clearly was 
abused by the Ottoman Empire; moreover loyalty to the dynasty was seen equal to 
loyalty to Islam. Vassal‟s desire of engaging to their emperor was a typical Ottoman 
tradition, because it was considered that state would collapse if emperor failed. 
Therefore, reformists tied their hopes to a reformist sultan which explains how the 
Turkish revolution established the most laic state in the Islam world. 
 One of the most important reforms in the Ottoman state was the introduction of 
laic customary constitution known as Ottoman Constitution of 1876. This way, two 
sources of law were introduced by integrating laic and Shari‟a laws which were both 
applied by same courts. Multi-ethnic nature of Ottoman Empire has been effective on 
introduction of new laws as the entire society was subject to them on the contrary of 
religious laws. There is no other example of introduction and consolidation of laic laws 
under a code of law by sultan‟s advice in Islamic world. The law aimed decreasing 
pressure on society and penalizing crime effectively. Some historians state that Ottoman 
law was fair and liberal compared to the feudal laws in Europe at the period.
15
 
 Albeit law and Shari‟a were integrated to be a unique system, actually law 
contradicted with Shari‟a in many ways. Therefore, Heyd stated that “many religion 
scholars were against the laic law as a principle”.16 Ottomans made a synthesis of 
religion and politics at their brightest times; once they started to have failures, this 
synthesis started to get criticized and tension between religious and laic elements 
emerged at this point for the first time.
17
 Some religious scholars advised that Ottoman 
state should attach itself to Shari‟a in order to gain its former power. Moreover, an 
anonymous author stated: “who believes that sultan has the right to ban what is 
permitted and to permit what is banned in religion is faithless, because God is the only 
                                                 
14 op. cit., Black, p. 145 
15 ibid., p.p. 295-299 
16
 Ulrich Heyd, The Ottoman Ulema and Westernization in the Time of Selim III and Mahmud II, Scripta 
Hierosolymitana, Vol. 9, Jerusalem: Magnes, 1973, p. 203 
17 op. cit., Black p.p. 303 
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determiner”.18  Reorganization of relation between land owners and Christian 
community might be the reason of ulema‟s unwilling attitude towards laic law as 
reactions were expected from circles that were benefiting from feudal system.
19
 Besides 
all these, integration of religion and power affected intellectual life in a negative way, 
because ulema blamed people who expressed independent opinions with infidelity. This 
was the result of dynasty‟s increasing dependency on Sunni orthodoxy as its legitimacy 
source. 
 The decline period between 16
th
 and 20
th
 centuries marked start point of 
Ottoman political thought.
20
 Switch of international commercial routes to oceans and 
military defeats dealt another blow to Ottomans. Those defeats caused deep wounds in 
Ottoman Empire as economic and social integrity depended on conquests. 
 Islamists strived for declaration of orthodox Sunni Islam; impose of Shari‟a to 
society and they followed a method which aimed to decrease state‟s central authority 
while reformists emphasized their desire for protection of social privileges and classes. 
These two tendencies constituted the base of current conflict between laics and 
Islamists.  
Ottoman ideology struggled to make a choice between sultan concept that was 
dominant among different societies and the sultan concept that was caliph of Muslims.
21
 
In the 17
th
 century, Ottoman society defended that it was necessary to return back to the 
basics of Islam to stabilize the empire again. Ulema were put in charge to reintegrate the 
society in such an atmosphere, but ulema preferred to fight against laic implementations 
and anything against Shari‟a instead. Even an edict was submitted in 1696 dictating 
public and private affairs to be organized according to Shari‟a.22 With the beginning of 
westernization, modernist and radical Islamist movements triggered great tension 
between intellectuals in Islamic world.
23
 Nevertheless, Islamists could not avoid the 
change of balance of power in favor of westernists. 
                                                 
18 op. cit., Heyd, p. 204 
19 op. cit., Black, p. 303 
20 ibid., p. 355 
21 ibid., p. 378 
22 op. cit., Heyd, p. 379 
23 op. cit., Black, p. 380 
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 Caliphate was especially important for Sunni Muslims, because it was a title 
granted to the emperors of Islamic states.
24
 This title was standing for protection of 
Islam, proxy to Mohammed and maintenance of worldly actions relevant to Islam 
among other responsibilities of emperors. It was an institution formed by Abbasid reign 
to resolve governance depression of Sunni world. At that period, leaders of Islamic 
world reviewed legitimacy of power to prevent possible anarchic occurrences and 
eliminated separatist actors. However by the end of Islam state, this title was received 
by all emperors in Islamic world.
25
 Legitimacy and confidence issue that arose after 4 
Caliphs era turned caliphate to a problematic institution. Foundation of new sects was 
influent on this conflict as each sect adopted different perceptions; however caliphate 
was main source to legitimize power. 
 When Ottoman Empire was founded, caliphate had already lost its meaning a 
long time ago as all emperors were receiving the title. Position retrieved its importance 
when Selim 1
st
 brought relics of Mohammed to Istanbul and continued to retain it as a 
political tool. Nevertheless, disputes continued as Ottomans did not attribute much 
attention to the position. Caliphate became an international issue when Ottoman Empire 
undertook protection of all Muslims through 1774 Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca. 
Government and religious authorities disagreed for the first time at Ottoman Imperial 
Edict of Reforms and as a result, caliphate was conceptualized as protector of Islam 
rather than protector of believers.  
 Caliphate gained a holy chairmanship status similar to papacy except the ability 
to intervene worldly affairs by the 4
th
 clause of Ottoman Constitution of 1876.
26
 This 
marked placement of a distinction between worldly and spiritual affairs which was 
basically a characteristic of the Western laic system for the first time. In this sense, it 
would be true to say that Ottoman religious idea was influenced by Western thoughts. 
 Ottoman caliph was acknowledged by different Muslim communities as all 
Muslims should be dominated by a leader according to religious regulations. However, 
Arabs were an exception to this acknowledgement as they believed that caliphate was a 
right extorted from them. This assumption was enough to create a controversy between 
two nations. 
                                                 
24 Mümtazer Türköne, Siyasi İdeoloji Olarak İslamcılığın Doğuşu (Islamism’s Rise as a Political Ideology), İstanbul: 
Nesil, 2011, p. 181 
25 ibid., p. 182 
26 ibid., p.p. 189-191 
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 Occasionally Muslims outside Ottoman Empire were approaching to the caliph 
to request help on different subjects, but responsibility of the caliph to assist co-
religionists eventually politicized religion by promoting his political power.
27
 Those 
requests were legitimizing power and providing prestige for Ottoman Empire in global 
arena which actually transformed the caliph into a factor of international relations.  
 Ottoman caliphate was more respected among other Muslim communities 
overseas because it was seen as a shelter against Western imperial powers. Caliphate 
became an important subject in foreign diplomacy during Abulhamid 2
nd‟s reign as 
imperial states were blaming Ottoman Empire with provoking Muslim communities 
under their sovereignty. Forasmuch, pan-Islamism was serving for this idea under 
command of caliphate. Even though pan-Islamism was not practiced, there would still 
be a solidarity dominated by Ottomans; after all, caliphate was a political tool only for 
vassals while pan-Islamism was a propaganda tool towards entire Islamic world.
28
  
2.2. EVOLUTION OF ISLAMISM 
 
 Islamism emerged as an outcome of Islamic issues and problems of the epoch, 
including fast social change, transformations in traditions and traditional family 
perception, evolution of media and emergence of new conservative intellectual elite. It 
arose indifferently from any other ideology and transformation was realized through 
same way as in the West. In this part, developments which paved the way for Islamism 
will be handled. 
 
2.2.1. Developments which Paved the Way to Islamism 
  
 Islamic world faced Europe originated developments such as the industrial 
revolution, geographical explorations and globalization after the 18
th
 century. Not only 
technology but also the social structure, political organizations, life styles and people‟s 
understanding of life advanced at this period. 
                                                 
27 ibid., p. 180 
28 Selim Deringil, “2. Abdülhamid‟in Dış Politikası” (Abdülhamid 2nd‟s Foreign Policy), Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete 
Türkiye Ansiklopedisi (Encyclopedia of Turkey from Tanzimat to Republic), Vol. 2, İstanbul: İletişim, 1985, p. 306 
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 Advance of enlightenment idea forced people to understand that they were main 
determiners of their lives which formed the path for French Revolution and nationalism. 
Effect of religion and fatalism in people‟s lives decreased when advancement idea 
proved that humanity was thriving. Besides, science replaced spiritualism with 
positivism as Comte mentioned in his book “The Catechism of Positive Religion” that a 
religion which depends on positive science could rescue humankind.
29
   
 Fast urbanization and industrialism brought new issues of mass psychology. On 
the contrary, spread of mass communication has emerged an intellectual community that 
influenced people with nationalist and socialist ideas. Unfortunately Turkish reformers 
misinterpreted socialist acts in Europe and labeled those ideas harmful which resulted 
with a defense against western influence.  
 The 19
th
 century Islamic world was introverted because of its domestic crisis; 
forasmuch positivism was providing an advantage to the West. Besides, the West 
studied Islamic world through Orientalism and used it as an advantage against them. As 
Islamic world never experienced an enlightening or industrialism period, they failed to 
resist industrialized West and lost their sovereignty one after another. These incidents 
forced Islamic world to modernize. Advance in press and broadcasting enabled easier 
information exchange and changes in political organization also attracted Islamic 
communities as they had the possibility to indicate their discontent.  
  In this chaos, structure of modernization started to be debated and resulted with 
an outcome of two main thoughts that were either taking all structure of the West or 
combining tradition with western elements.  
 First modernization act in Ottoman Empire was 1839 Ottoman Imperial Edict of 
Reorganization that implemented major changes in social, spiritual and political life. On 
the other hand, Ottomans needed to follow balance policy towards the West because of 
Russian threat. This policy forced Ottomans to follow a series of reforms which paved 
the way to western intervention to internal affairs. Main aim of these reforms was 
assuring solidarity in empire; however some reforms caused political reactionism and 
harmed solidarity.
30
 Media was one of those reforms that caused political reaction by 
spreading Western ideologies. As democratic thoughts spread and written language got 
simplified, defending social rights became easier for intellectuals. 
                                                 
29 op. cit., Türköne, p.180 
30 ibid, p. 78 
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 Another important reform, 1856 Ottoman Imperial Reform Edict which 
acknowledged wider rights to non-Muslims, became subject to protests and eventually 
merged social and spiritual organization at state level. Imposing laic implementations 
empowered Shari‟a as a reaction that affected legislation process and Islam turned to be 
an opposition tool against modernist circles that were requesting decrease of Islam in 
political power.
31
  
  1839 Ottoman Imperial Edict of Reorganization was an important step in 
process of Ottoman Empire‟s transformation to a modern state.32 All Ottoman citizens 
were considered to be equal before law, an impersonal order started with adoption of 
this edict and 1856 Ottoman Imperial Reform Edict has been a supplementary element 
by assuring the equality between Muslims and non-Muslims.  
 This transformation was realized under ideological influence of the West and 
rise of nationalist ideologies in Western Europe created the need of forming a national 
unity in Ottoman Empire. In this sense, neo-Ottomanism was suggested. Even though 
Ottoman Empire‟s bureaucratic institutions were based on religion, generation of an 
equal Ottoman society was intended by this ideology.
33
 
 Western imperialism sharpened differences between ethnical and religious 
groups. Division of labor among religious groups and the conflict it caused precluded 
rise of a land based ideology. Because Europeans were trading with non-Muslim 
communities in Ottoman Empire, they were demanding more privileges for them and 
this resulted with failure of Ottomanism policy on attaching non-Muslims to state. On 
the contrary, non-Muslims‟ loyalty started to shift in favor of Europe. 
 Neo-Ottomanism idea emerged at this period.
34
 This ideology was reconciling 
Islamist reaction, which was a reaction against Ottoman Imperial Reform Edict, with 
modernity. Neo-Ottomans expressed the emotions of a group which was complaining 
for losing their prestige.
35
 This way, laic reorganization policies contributed to creation 
                                                 
31 loc. cit. 
32 Haldun Gülalp, Kimlikler Siyaseti: Türkiye’de Siyasal İslam’ın Temelleri (Identity Politics: Bases of Political Islam 
in Turkey), İstanbul: Metis, 2002, p. 26 
33 Roderic Davison, Nationalism as an Ottoman Problem and the Ottoman Response, Edited by W. W. Haddad & W. 
Ochsenwald, Nationalism in a Non-National state: The Dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, Columbus: Ohio Uni., 
1977 
34 op. cit., Gülalp p.p. 27- 28 
35 Şerif Mardin, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought, Princeton: Princeton Uni., 1962, p. 163 
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of a Muslim collective identity.
36
 Main element assuring unity in society was Islam 
according to neo-Ottomans and therefore western values were tried to be expressed 
through Islamic values. Besides, rational ideas and Islam were tried to get associated by 
taking philosophical values from the West. 
 Islam formed ideological perspective of a political project in neo-Ottomanism 
philosophy.
37
 However neo-Ottoman thought was aiming to express feelings of Muslim 
society, it pioneered continuation of reforms and modernization of the state as it was 
supporting modernization. Even though Abdülhamit 2nd was considered to be a 
fundamentalist by laic circles, he contributed more to modernization of the state than his 
antecedents in this context. His Islamist ideology should be considered as a state 
ideology. 
 Ottoman Empire started to split at the end of 19
th
 century and neo-Ottomanism 
lost its significance. Following Russo-Ottoman War in 1877, majority of Christian 
population was withdrawn from Ottoman territories due to loss of a great part of its 
European territories. Thereupon, Arabs which were neglected for a long time came into 
question. 
 Pan-Islamism is an outcome of this process and Caliphate was started to get used 
effectively again at this period. It is also possible to see the support to Ottoman Empire 
given by Muslim communities under colonial rule of Western countries in this period. 
But, as pan-Islamism was insufficient to represent Ottoman society as a whole, it also 
failed to form integrity.  
 Islamic world faced very serious identity issues in the 18
th
 and 19
th
 centuries. 
Being frontier to Europe, Ottomans were one of the societies that got extremely affected 
by those changes. As Muslims were forming majority of Ottoman society, they were 
vulnerable against such kind of transformations and considering Islam was in every 
sphere of life, acceptance of a modern theory was challenging. This conflict caused a 
social disorder and secession followed till present day. As a conclusion, an 
incompatibility became inevitable between modernization process and state ideology in 
long term.
38
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2.2.2. Islamism as an Ideology and Politicization of Islam 
 
 Different opinions get into relation once different layers of society communicate 
at a point in history and different opinions are first steps in forming ideologies. When 
the limits of human mind and acts are questioned, ideology emerges. Ideology is the 
idea of modern times and an outcome of industrialism. According to Geertz, ideology is 
a system of symbols or symbolic maps created for people to explain their socio-political 
environments. Religion also contains the same symbolization system with ideology and 
both provide a social integration mechanism.  
 Although Ottoman Empire did not go through same processes as the West, its 
geographical position and cultural proximity caused it to be influenced by modern 
thought and create individual ideologies. This process is called acculturation which 
means transformation of original cultural patterns of different societies through their 
excessive interaction with each other. Effects of acculturation can be seen in both 
interacting cultures. When different layers that are isolated from each other get into 
touch through globalism, two cultures influence each other and they both start to 
transform.
39
  
 Islamism is considered to date back to the beginnings of 2
nd
 Constitutional Era 
of Ottoman Empire, but modern Islamist idea emerged especially after 1930‟s as a 
reaction against aggression of imperialist states. A legitimacy issue arose with the 
arrival of western ideologies to Islamic societies. People‟s desire of contributing to 
decision making process has weakened monarchy which was acknowledged by 
traditional Islam. The biggest reason of this manifestation was advance of media and 
rise of intellectual society. Islamism was a socio-political theory that arose at the point 
where legitimization efforts turned to be unsuccessful. 
 It referred to reorganization of Muslim society, foundation of modern structures 
and ideas adequate to needs of the age by Ottoman Empire. However, it became a 
negative synthesizer at colonized Islamic communities by being identified with anti-
imperialism.    
 Even though Islamism is an outcome of traditional Islamic society‟s 
confrontation with ideology, traditional Islam still exists in context of religious values. 
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Main difference between Islamism and traditional Islam is the change in legitimacy type 
of religion as a result of acculturation. In Islamist ideology, Islam is acknowledged as a 
world view like in western ideologies which resulted with its perception according to 
the needs of modern era and transformation into a more concrete frame.
40
 Traditional 
Islam adopts traditional values of religion which defends the idea of God and sacred 
laws that its followers can only practice but not discuss, while in Islamism main 
elements of Islam can be discussed and even transformed according to the needs of 
era.
41
  There is a God centered explanation in Islam, as Islamism is based on human 
nature.
42
 Distinctively from traditional Islam, Islamism competes with philosophical 
thoughts instead of other religions. While it competes, it absorbs useful sides of them, 
because the acceptance of Islam as a philosophical reference provides a political 
movement formed in national identity frame to be in touch with other dominant 
movements. According to Islamists, Islamization of society should be the outcome of a 
social and political activity.
 43
 
 Many social scientists still believe that modernism‟s outcome should be laicism. 
According to this thought, modernism period decreases effect of religion all around the 
world; but rise of Islamism proves that this is not accurate.
44
 Even though it is believed 
that Islam is not suitable for modernization, Turkey makes an exception in the Islamic 
world by embracing modernism and Islamic elements together. 
 Though, it should be stated that laicism is not a model particular to Judaism or 
Christianity, because substantially religion and social life should not be considered as 
independent from each other. Only the different methods that some societies adopted 
were effective on decrease of religion in social life. However such kind of a break point 
was not realized yet. Even though Turkey is the most suitable Muslim country for the 
Western model, laicism was implemented by force because of the social nonconformity. 
Thus, it is possible to see also a great social opposition against this system that is still 
considered to be eliminated by urbanization and industrialization. In the meanwhile 
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Turkey still suffers from its anti-laic society. Nevertheless, Ernest Gellner states that 
“Islam is unique among other religions and Turkey is unique in the Muslim world”.45 
 Islamism‟s political interpretation currently represents an ideology that was 
studied by many Islamist intellectuals. But usage of Islam as an ideology is not 
something particular to our time, thus Islamist modernists also made such attempts in 
the 19
th
 century. The most important of those was neo-Ottomans. But Kemalist regime‟s 
oppressive nature, strived for taking Islam under control. Islamism could open a space 
for itself only after 1950‟s when nationalism lost its significance. These efforts resulted 
with Islamists‟ possibility to have a voice in politics increasingly after 1980‟s. 
 
2.3. WESTERN NATIONALISM VERSUS ISLAMISM 
 
 Ottoman intellectuals found nationalism idea based on race inappropriate for 
their society. 19
th
 century Ottoman intellectuals tried to form an Ottoman nation that 
could meet their demands. Once felt this necessity, they discovered Islam nation and 
started to form an Ottoman nation around homeland idea they have taken from the 
West. Western nationalism is an idea that was formed as a result of transformation 
experienced on religious principles following enlightenment which makes it a laic idea 
as other ideologies. But as Ottoman state never passed through enlightenment, religion 
was transformed into a nationalist ideology and permuted the space that enlightenment 
covered up in the West with Islamic idea. Intellectuals applied to Islam brotherhood 
when they understood that they needed to take approval of the society.  
 Nationalist idea in Islamist nationalism is an acculturative ideology; however it 
does not have any discrepancy from western nationalism. Ottomans differ from other 
Muslim societies with not ascribing other missions to Islam such as jihad.
46
 
Nevertheless, it can be said that Islamism evolved under pressure of laicism in Ottoman 
society. 
 Islam‟s use as a political ideology in1979 Iran Revolution drew international 
attention. This was beginning of a period when Islam was started to be identified with 
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state and politics concepts in today‟s world.47 Another feature of this revolution was 
start of an “Islamic revival” period.  
 Another idea emerged at the same time was “defiance to the West”. This idea 
resulted with a quest for “Islamic state” which turned to a totalitarian politic ideology. 
Under those circumstances Turkey has a significant importance by having the closest 
relations with the West. Muslimhood in Turkey carries marks of a journey from East to 
West and has a diverse historical root. 
 Turkish Muslims have always been vulnerable against cultural influence from 
either the West or the East for being close to both. Western influences forced Turkey 
into a westernization process and exposed to major socio-cultural transformations. 
Identity dispute became more apparent again in republican era by strict laic ideology. 
Islam was pushed out of public sphere as a result of this. A new type of Muslimhood 
left to personal conscience that can be called as “Kemalist Muslimhood” emerged at the 
end of this process and caused a new identity depression. 
 Result of Islam‟s withdrawal from public space resulted with introvertion of 
religious understanding and formation of a parochial Islam. Parochial sheiks started to 
teach religion secretly in this period. But these people who were trying to teach religion 
had an obvious disinterest towards knowing in what kind of a world they lived in. In 
1950, because of DP‟s soft attitude and migration to cities, urbanization started. 
However migrants carried out the village Muslimhood to city instead of adapting to 
urban life. As a result of this, neighborhood culture was transformed into religious 
communities. 
 This urbanized community got into touch with other Muslims and criticized 
traditional Islam understanding. As a result of that, they contradicted with traditional 
Islamist community. New generation Islamists have seen Islam not only as a religion 
but also as a political, economic and social model and were labeled as puritanical. This 
Islamic revival that was disconnected from its past, have entered under command of 
ideological inclinations. The weakest points of Turkish Muslim intellectuals are lack of 
historical consciousness and insufficient knowledge of Western civilization.
48
  
 Challenging tests are waiting for Muslims in Turkey which intend to be 
westernized. Muslims should be aware that paralyzed ideologies would not serve to 
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escape from this situation. Turkish Muslimhood became the slave of its past for not 
facing it yet and seeks consolation in dream of living Islam‟s golden age. Complex and 
jealousy against the West turned into hostility as a result of that. Muslims can only put 
their advantages forward once they overcome their complex. 
 
2.4. THEORIES OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND ISLAM 
  
 Theories of political development have a significant importance in terms of 
evolution of Islamism. In this thesis, evolution of Islamism is being explained in three 
theories which are modernism, radicalism and postmodernism. First, modernism will be 
handled. 
 
2.4.1. Modernism 
  
 Between Ottoman Reorganization Period and World War I, Muslim intellectuals 
started to be interested in Europe. In the meanwhile, European states started colonialism 
and the states that were affected from nationalism started to split from Ottoman Empire. 
 Modernism in Ottoman Empire started as an outcome of its westernization desire 
and it was the only Muslim state that made reforms for this purpose at the time. 
Reforms that were carried out created a synthesis between traditional and modern states. 
Some intellectuals saw European laic laws and modern technology as the main point to 
reach success and many reforms were conducted one after another. In this sense, 1839 
Ottoman Imperial Edict of Reorganization has been the most comprehensive reform 
movement and Islamic world faced a reform movement which adopted European 
political thought for the first time. The main purpose of this reform was to show 
motivation of liberalization to Christian minorities and request assistance from the West 
for the ongoing rebellion in Egypt. Another reform which was important regarding  
rights of minorities was 1856 Imperial Reform Edict. This edict assured limitation of 
Shari‟a with individual space by reforms made in legal structure. 
 These reforms resulted with emergence of an equal Ottoman society and a social 
system based on citizenship was adopted.  However, the group, which objected laicism 
and defended that state could not exist if religion‟s importance would decrease, opposed 
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reforms.
49
 Nevertheless, some other intellectuals did not ignore that Islam was also 
important for unity, but they defended that main important element is Turkish nation 
considering that state existed before Islam.
50
 On the other hand, Ottoman officials and 
sultan defended that reforms were licit as future of the state was in question. 
 Ottoman Empire pioneered the first great scale movement in Islamic world by 
integrating West‟s individualism, constitutional governance and representative 
democracy principles with Islamist idealism. Islamic political thought and western 
political thought got into interaction and became systematical starting with neo-
Ottomans period.
51
 Neo-Ottomans defended that spreading ideas was a basic human 
right and the only way to strengthen people through education was political 
newspapers.
52
 Freedom became a main value for this generation. 
 Islam‟s diplomatic language and West‟s diplomatic language were considered as 
the same by neo-Ottomans. Moreover, neo-Ottomans also used Quran and hadith scripts 
to support the idea of constitutional democracy. For example, “”Difference of opinion is 
God‟s favor in my society.” hadith of Mohammed and “Then, forgive your people and 
take their opinion in all affairs.” sentence from Al-Imran section of Quran were 
introduced as arguments that backed up parliamentary system.
53
 Those incidents caused 
political values of the past to be questioned. Considering that basic aim of neo-
Ottomans was to adopt parliamentary system that was ordered by Islam, they can be 
considered as first true Islamic modernists. Neo-Ottomans were defending that Shari‟a 
rules also could be altered according to the needs of time
54
 and that God did not plan 
everything in advance.
55
 However, neo-Ottomans broke away from western style 
laicism, because their homeland idea was significant to an Islamic multi-ethnic society 
rather than the ethnic society understanding in Western idea.
56
 But nevertheless they 
still defended that state and religious affairs should get separated, religion is not the 
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determiner of laws and religion would become corrupted if it interacts with state 
affairs.
57
 
 People‟s struggle in class and nation identities frame throughout modern period 
resulted with welfare state model in central countries, socialism in semi-periphery 
countries and progressive state model in periphery countries. This way, class identities 
were dominated by national identities and national development was seen as the 
common target.
58
 Nation states strived for legitimatizing national unity for economical 
benefit and commitment of citizens to the state. Eventually failure of this system 
accelerated passage to postmodern state concurrently with globalization. National 
economies lost their domestic integrity with advance of globalization and this caused 
deterioration of worker class and emergence of an outsourced production system. 
 
2.4.2. Radicalism 
 
 In order to integrate society against separatist ideas, Abdülhamid 2nd tried to use 
caliphate. However, because this strategy failed against non-Muslim communities, 
Turkism was promoted and Islam lost its importance in politics. Turkism later 
transformed into a bold nationalism by Kemalist ideology which became official policy 
of modern Turkish republic. 
  World War I revealed the perception which considers the West as superior on 
social and political aspects is incorrect.
59
 Turkish Revolution that took place between 
1920 and 1924 was important at least as much as 1917-1921 Russian Revolution even 
though Western researchers did not show much attention to it. A state that calls itself 
laic was formed for the first time in Islamic world through this revolution.
60
 
 Groups such as Young Turks and Committee of Union and Progress, which were 
against autocracy in Ottoman Empire, emerged in Abdülhamid 2nd term. Those groups 
forced Abdülhamid 2nd to carry out reforms in order to found a Turkish nation-state. 
Abdülhamid 2nd and his supporters defended that liberalism can only be based on 
Islamic values.
61
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 In any case, a strong link between nationalism and laicism was established in 
this term. However many intellectuals defended that Islam was also a very important 
aspect in the formation of Turkish national conscious.  
 As the result of failure of Ottoman leaders, Ottoman Empire fell and roots of 
new Turkish nation-state were laid in Atatürk‟s leadership. Passage of sovereignty 
unconditionally to Turkish nation brought the end of caliphate institution. However 
surprisingly Sunni cannon law complies with European revolution doctrine at this point; 
both sources mention obtainment of sovereignty by force. In this situation Turkish 
nation took their sovereignty by rebellion.
62
 
 Even though Atatürk abolished sultanate by declaring republic, he remained 
indecisive about abolishing caliphate institution. But when Islamist circles started to 
push caliph to hinder reforms, this institution was also abolished. Atatürk tried to fill the 
social gap left from Islam through his implementations, but this failed and created the 
risk of emergence of two conflicting societies as laic and conservative.
63
 Nevertheless, 
Atatürk‟s aim was not to eliminate Islam as a religion; what he strived for was 
redefining relation between religion and state in frame of Islam.
64
 Eliminating Islamic 
values from state governance through reforms brought Turkey closer with Western 
civilization. Religion was declared as a personal space and was entirely excluded from 
governmental structure. Moreover, army implemented strict measures on prevention of 
Islamist parties to participate in politics. 
  
2.4.3. Postmodern Identity Politics and Development Concept 
  
 Relation between decrease of class conflict and postmodern life formed 
distinction cultural identities and new social movements.
65
 Classes lost their 
significance and left their place to status conflict which became main anxiety of society. 
Therefore race, gender, ethnicity and religion were the main elements of identity 
politics. Identity politics is basically a formation beyond classes. In this sense, Islamism 
should be also considered as an identity politic. 
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 Because Islamism is an ideology which defines itself as anti-Eurocentric, it arose 
as a criticism of Western civilization in Turkey as well as in the world. It is possible to 
see the effect of underdevelopment in Turkey. Thus, an impatient revolutionism 
followed reformist optimism and a submissive atmosphere dominated when it was felt 
there was no hope for revolution.
66
 Although, there was a possibility to break off from 
global system through socialism before 1980, this possibility was eliminated in pos-
1980. Global system theory proved that it was impossible for national units to escape 
from capitalism on their own. 
 The ones attributed attention to post development rather than development itself, 
refused modernism theory and this tendency emerged as Islamism in Turkey.  
 According to “cadre school” which arose in 1930‟s, obtaining national 
independence from capitalist order and state‟s undertaking of development were 
accepted as conditions of development. Another aspect of this school was its opposition 
to Islamism. 
 Western civilization gets criticized because of its ambition for economic growth 
and resisting to West is taken in a cultural frame in Islamist literature. While 
industrialism was accepted as the main circumstance of development in Islamism, 
Islamist literature defends that taking industrialism concept as granted is an indicator of 
surrendering to the West‟s cultural imposition. Islamism accords with postmodernist 
idea in this sense.  
 Another point that they accord is about not accepting what is told 
unconditionally. Postmodernism does not consider wisdom as a trusted source of 
information the same way as Islamism does. Truth can be relative according to both 
ideologies. In this sense, both of them accept that what is unknown can only be 
explained by faith. 
 Islamist authors emphasize that Islamism is not conservatism or traditionalism. 
Islamism is a response given to modern issues.
67
 Therefore, modernism and laicism get 
criticized by Islamists for not actualizing what they promised. 
 Islamist author İsmet Özel correlates capitalism and consumption with idolatry, 
because people started to worship money and politics even though they quitted 
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worshipping idols.
68
 Besides, he asserts that technology is influenced by Western 
corporations which determine the trends on technological progress to make profit for a 
certain group in society.
69
  
 Islamists also criticize the West for their ambition to seize nature by forgetting 
that human being is also a part of it.  In this context, increasing popularity of Islamism 
can be explained with crisis of modernism. If Islamism derived from crisis of 
modernism, the reason of its popularity especially among intellectuals is the critic 
against modernist values such as industrialism, materialism and laicism.
70
 In this 
context, Islamism asserts that materiality is not the only purpose in life and social issues 
would diminish by decrease of consumption through adoption of Islamic lifestyle. 
Considering this, it can be said that postmodernism was an outcome of periphery‟s 
uprising against center.  
 Islamist critic assumes that humanitarian values are abandoned only in rational 
societies and defends that standard of value should shift from materialism to virtue. 
Therefore, it bases excess consumption and environmental pollution on rational society 
and suggests virtue as antidote of consumption mentality. However, it is also an 
incorrect assumption to believe that Islamic state promises wealth; this is based on an 
incorrect hypothesis which suggests that it is possible to reach the objective that was 
promised by capitalism through Islam.
71
  
 Differently from Marxism and capitalism, Islamism refuses development 
paradigm completely and isolates itself from elements as the West and capitalism. In 
fact, Islamist ideology is not against entrepreneurship, profit and market economy; it is 
only against monopoly capitalism. According to this, real conflict in the market is 
between liberalism and monopoly. Islamism gives the same struggle against any 
inequality on economical, social and cultural issues.
72
 In this sense, as in consideration 
of liberal market the same as with equality and freedom, there is the idea of protecting 
citizens against suppressive state policies in criticizing modern state to support civil 
society. 
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 According to Islamist author Ali Bulaç, as modern state does not give free space 
to its citizens, it also ignores different identities through nationalist practices.
73
 Thus, 
Bulaç defines nationalism as formation of a nation out of nothing.74 According to him, 
modern nation state is totalitarian as it attempts to create a monotype society by 
collecting all powers under the same roof.
75
 
 It is not possible to practice Islam in modern state, because God‟s willpower 
materializes through community, not the state.
76
 Therefore, it means Shari‟a actually 
materializes through civil society. Islamists defend that modern state seized civil society 
by abrogating Shari‟a.77  
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CHAPTER 3 
POLITICAL ISLAM IN TURKEY DURING THE REPUBLICAN 
PERIOD 
 
3.1. A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF TURKISH POLITICS AND 
 POLITICAL  ISLAM 
  
 As there are a variety of movements that can correlate with political Islam in the 
world; political Islam, moderate Islam and Islamism terms often replace each other. 
Despite their different features, social structures and conditions, Islamism arose as a 
common value of unsatisfied Muslim societies which were in search of a solution. But it 
is not clear why the solution was sought in Islam. Even though Islamism may have 
different forms such as moderate or radical, their common point is their confidence in 
Islamic morality for being a solution to their issues. 
 Religion is shaped in a way that generates a cultural code in many aspects of life 
and concept of being devotional is perceived accordingly.
78
 Therefore, place of being 
Muslim in Turkish identity code should be analyzed very well. Turkey‟s recent history 
exhibits a character that both conflicts and corresponds with modernism. The ideologies 
including Islamism which existed in Turkish modernism period adopted some aspects of 
western approach. Westernism constitutes a common axis in Ottoman and Turkish 
politics. Therefore Islamism means a struggle and effort to have a place in 
westernization tendency in Turkey. 
 It is important to study the period which started with DP government in order to 
understand Islamism in today‟s Turkey. But to understand emergence of Islamism and 
its ideological composition, last period of Ottoman Empire should be taken into 
consideration. 
 Main motivation of developments in the last period of Ottoman Empire was 
rescuing the empire. For that reason Islam transformed into a very political form during 
Abdülhamit 2nd‟s reign. In this period, government followed an Islamic policy to assure 
social harmony. It took radicalism under control by using caliphate institution and 
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reconciled it with Islam perception of elite class. Thus, Ottoman nation was integrated 
politically and religiously in a certain way. Ottoman period Islamism was a state 
orientated act unlike republican period.
79
 
 On the other hand, emergence of Islamism in republican period was an outcome 
of reactions that were accumulated for a long time against republican revolution and 
request for revision of republic. This way, Islamism was wrapped into a nationalist form 
because of its commitment to state while it preserved its conservative attitude. 
 Islamism handles requests of audiences in an adversary manner because of their 
emergence as a social movement in republican period while it does not conflict with 
existence of state. 
 Political Islam, which Turkey experienced through adoption of multi-party 
system in 1960, gained acceleration especially after 1991 Gulf War. This period, which 
political Islam arose as an alternative and powerful socio-political movement, was 
concluded by September 11 attacks. This period is also important for Turkey as it lead 
to precise victory of AKP in 2002.  
 Usually Islamic world is taken as it is a different region that does not fit in any 
general social norms and concurrency of Islam and modernity is a long ongoing debate. 
According to classical sociological theory, modernism should proceed together with 
secularism and culture relying on religion should eventually get vanished in a 
modernizing society. According to this theory, Islamic world is an exception as 
importance of religion does not tend to decrease in Muslim societies. Interestingly, 
Turkey is the only country which is also accepted as an exception to this previous 
situation. In other words, Turkey is the only modern and secular country of Muslim 
world which is an “exception within an exception” with Gellner‟s expression. However, 
accuracy of this assumption is debatable. In fact, Turkey is not much different from any 
other society; studying incidents from historical perspective would be explicable. 
 There are two important conditions to comprehend political Islam and the 
situation in Turkey. One of them is effect of globalization. According to the example of 
Turkey, political Islam is a tool to provide advantage by keeping up with globalization 
rather than a resistance and means an effort of building a solidarity network devoted to 
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it.
80
 Other condition is the parallel course of Islamism with other intellectual global 
movements. Islamism as a factor of social identity is a philosophical reference point for 
people that are conservative and a tool that can transform the society. Those two 
perspectives should be taken into account while studying how Islamism gained such 
popularity. 
 Dominant rhetoric of Islamist MSP, which was led by Necmettin Erbakan and 
founded as an independent political party in 1970, was development and 
industrialization. Thus, this statement of such kind of a traditional-Islamist party was 
not consistent. The same way, statements of SP that focused all the debate on turban 
issue were not reliable. 
 However, 1990‟s turned out to be a decade that suddenly arguments of Islamic 
movement got rendered, main concept of rationalism got questioned and contemporary 
civilization became a problematic. In such an environment traditional knowledge was 
exalted instead of modern values and Islamism achieved a political success. Moreover, 
nation-state idea became outdated by criticism of modernism and movements that were 
expecting to constitute political unity around different identities gained importance. 
According to that, Islamism can be considered as a product of globalization.  
Following the end of Cold War by fall of USSR, East-West conflict left its place 
to a definite North-South conflict and absolute claim of Northern countries on the 
wealth of South became obvious. After all, the excuse “prevention of communism” 
became history. Thus, USA stated that its intention was to establish a “New World 
Order” on the date that Gulf War started.81 
Passage of leadership of anti-imperialism to Islamist movements marked the 
most important result of Gulf War. From then on, fundamentalist Islamism has taken 
over the place of communism for the western alliance. Despite its loyalty to the West, 
Turkey‟s strategic importance increased after Cold War period and Turkey was assigned 
to leadership role of Islamic world by USA. It was planned that Turkey would build 
relationships with Middle East rather than the West and be a role model for region 
countries. Although this project was very welcomed by Turkish-Islam synthesizers; by 
the beginning of Gulf War; government sensed a “New World Order” was coming and 
worked to be able to stay in western alliance. For that reason, ruling ANAP eliminated 
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its Islamist staff which pushed those to the opposition and united them under Islamist 
RP. In this environment, RP grew rapidly. 
Through elimination of Soviet Bloc, world economy united under a single 
market and NATO devoted itself to protect its members‟ interests from possible threats 
of the South. However, the order that new system would bring was not certain. Two 
different theses were suggested about the new system. Fukuyama‟s thesis was 
suggesting that the competition between social and political systems came to an end and 
world would be led through liberal democracy. Other and more realistic one was 
Huntington‟s “Clash of Civilizations” thesis.82 According to that thesis, North and 
South were different and they would never approximate to each other. 
Albeit the political race during Cold War, competition instigated economic 
development, but economical disparity grew and a social disorder arose in globalism 
era. The ambiguity in political arena ended by September 11 attacks, USA has taken the 
global cop role on its own and plan called combat with terrorism became USA‟s 
national security strategy. This incident eliminated the slightest possibility of a new 
Islamist state. In this aimlessness, Islamist circles started to base their argument on 
liberalism and human rights which led them to political victory. 
 While Islamism was one of authentic identities, after September 11 it became the 
weaker pole of bipolar world. Actually it can be said that clash of civilizations does not 
exist and whole situation consists of legitimating a simple hegemony project by an 
excuse as terrorism.
83
  
   
3.1.1.  Nationalist Modernization: Kemalism 
 
 Islam‟s position against westernization movements left a great mark on Ottoman 
Empire‟s last period. Following Ottoman Empire‟s failure, modern Republic of Turkey 
was founded at the end of World War I. This state uncompromisingly followed a 
positivist westernization policy and aimed for Turkization and modernism. With 
foundation of republic, religion and Islamism were otherized and were imprisoned to 
personal space, because republican regime took laicism as primary condition of 
modernization. Thus, dual policy that was trying to maintain balance between the West 
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and Islam in Ottoman period was abandoned.
84
 With the change of regime, state got 
detached from its Ottoman past but remained Ottoman socially and culturally. 
Republican regime increasingly augmented its domination over religion in order to 
consolidate national conscious. 
 In this context; Islam, which existed in politics and at every aspect of life during 
the rule of Ottoman Empire, was eliminated by a project which was based on French 
laicism. This project was named “Kemalism” and formed a cultural identity which 
replaced Islam with laicism in a sense. Despite that this identity was accepted 
reluctantly by majority of people who attached importance on Islamic values and 
defined themselves as conservative while it was adopted by the elite circles such as 
intellectuals, bureaucrats, soldiers, politicians and great capital groups eagerly.   
 Main goal of the new identity was creating a secular and Western culture that 
was refined of Islam which was controlling an important part of life. This identity was 
also an uprising against the system that took whole society under control and did not 
acknowledge individualism. Thus, it is widely known that Atatürk himself had a rebel 
spirit. 
 State worked stringently until 1950 in order to sell this new identity, which was 
adopted by elite circles, on people. But 1950 elections showed that people clearly were 
stuck on their traditional identities. Therefore political system is constituted on the axes 
westernizing and traditional ideologies. Struggle for obtaining power continues ever 
since between two ideologies.  
 Today, Turkey exhibits an aspect as it could not complete its evolution and stuck 
between the West and traditional east while society dissolves in basis of laics and 
Islamists. In this sense, laics represent intellectuals who support getting westernized 
without Islam and governing elite at the center while Islamists represent conservative 
society which forms majority of the Turkish population that desire to modernize with 
Islam. This disunity in Turkey, where formation of a classless society was aimed, 
remains as greatest handicap in modernization path.
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 Reform movements that started in Ottoman period lay underneath the conflict 
which Turkey experiences today. Ottoman leaders realized that only hope to rescue 
Ottoman Empire from falling down was to conduct western style reforms and they 
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brought improvements to comply with this. But this suggestion divided society into two 
as westernists that aimed to copy the West and Islamists who were thinking that 
returning back to basics of Islam would resolve the situation. These fiery debates were 
carried to the republic with fall of Ottoman Empire. Turkey selected an identity 
according to desire of westernists in republican period and this situation disappointed 
Islamists. Cadre that carried on national struggle by using Islamist ideology until 1924 
adopted a new radical westernist ideology and closed era of one thousand years which 
was driven by Islam. This implies that Republic of Turkey clearly adopted a regime that 
Islam did not have an active role. However, Kemalism could not avoid transforming to 
enlightenment despotism. 
 This transformation is the most important milestone in Turkish history after 
Turkish adoption of Islam.
86
 Turkish state irreversibly adopted western identity with 
foundation of republic and radical alterations in the system were made. This was 
something that was never seen before in history. As part of this transformation these 
alterations were implemented; 
 Sultanate was abolished in 1922, 
 Republic was declared in 1923, 
 Caliphate was abolished in 1924, 
 Madrasahs were closed to comply with Code on Unification of Education and all 
education institutions were transferred to Ministry of National Education in 1924, 
 Islam was officially taken under state control by foundation of Presidency of 
Religious Affairs in 1924, 
 Sufism was pushed underground by closure of dervish lodges in 1925, 
 The article “Official religion of Turkish state is Islam.” was eliminated from the 
constitution in 1928, 
 Resources that served for Islamic foundations were blocked by transfer of 
foundations under state control in 1936.
87
  
 A great part of reforms were done between 1922 and 1925. As a result of these 
reforms, Islam was limited to private life and gained a more conscientious aspect. 
Islam‟s individualization resulted with its withdrawal also from politicians‟ lives.88 
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 Besides, state did not settle with this and made efforts to transform perception of 
religion into a Western Muslimhood by interfering to its confidential and cultural areas; 
it tried to form a reformed and civilized Muslimhood project which fit into westernized 
Turkey. In this context, state embarked upon forming religion up to its will by ordering 
projects to professors at Faculty of Theology of Istanbul University to shape mosques in 
a way that look alike with western churches, investigations on implementing azan in 
Turkish and organizing Quran recitals in Turkish.
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 As a result of all these reforms, conflict which existed since Ottoman period 
between laic nationalist state, laic elite and Muslim majority reached to a hate extent. 
Society lost its trust upon state and leaned to conservative parties that had an Islamic 
rhetoric. That‟s the main reason for DP‟s accedence to power. Following DP‟s election, 
usage of Islam for political interests became one of the most debated topics. But even 
though Kemalist elite lost its place in power, it has always kept state under strict control 
through army which caused a negative effect on democratization. 
 On the other hand, Islam‟s repression to underground by the closure of dervish 
lodges caused arbitrary practices on Islamic education.  This legislation caused Islamist 
circles to realize that how much they were lagging behind. Main reason of this lagging 
was their perception of the Western civilization only with its imperialistic side. 
However, even though they realized their backwardness, they started to yearn for good 
old times of Islamic state rather than improving themselves. As the matter of this fact, 
new communities and tariqahs emerged and a puritanical community Muslimhood was 
adopted.  
 Another result was ignition of radical Islam by radical laicism. These 
movements took their power from Kemalism‟s oppressive environment. Ethnocentric 
separatist movements and fears for possible Islamist movements were also based on this 
environment. One of the most desperate results of this action have been transformation 
of Islam, which produced its own political, cultural, social, legal, artistic and economic 
institutions and values that built a high urban culture during imperial period, to a 
popular Islam perception which demonstrated superstitious features and lacked a refined 
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manner through Islam‟s deprival of its supporting institutions with declaration of 
republic which eventually caused rustication of Islam in time.
90
 
 Turkish identity and nationalist idea started to develop against separatist acts of 
Arabs and Balkan nations. Turkish nationalism also emerged as a reaction to decline of 
Ottoman Empire against imperialism like other ideologies. This new ideology replaced 
Turkish and Muslim elements with non-Muslim elements. Nationalist idea started with 
Young Turks movement and kept on during Independence War. As a result of this 
ideology, a new Muslim middle class emerged.  
 Kemalism identifies Turkish nationalism as an ideology based on land. In its 
official definition, Turkey stands for geographical land and Turkish people stands for 
people living on this land.
91
 This definition is significantly different from a classical 
definition of nationalism and moreover it shows similarity with previous Ottomanism 
concept. Both of them are outcomes of an effort to unify different ethnical elements. 
The most important difference of Kemalism versus Ottomanism is the exclusion of non-
Muslims. 
 Even though emergence of nation-state is a result of 19
th
 century Ottoman 
modernization; Kemalism realized establishment of Republic of Turkey as a radical 
disengagement from Ottoman Empire. In this context, state was reestablished by taking 
its power from Turkish nation. Kemalist ideology is anti-imperialist and western. The 
reason that it was disengaged from its Ottoman past was Ottoman Empire‟s failure as a 
puppet to imperialism. Therefore this disengagement is an anti-imperialist act according 
to Kemalism. 
 Islam was quitted to be used as a political tool after Kemalist revolution. 
Kemalist administration perceived Islam as a threat and placed it under control of laic 
state. Following Sheikh Said rebellion against integrity of state, reforms accelerated, 
any separatist factor was eliminated and Turkey transformed into a unified nation which 
strived for reaching level of Western civilization. 
 According to Kemalist idea, crucial element of modernization was 
westernization and Islam was desired to be taken under control of the state because it 
was involving contradistinction against some values of modernism.
92
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 Main target of both Islamism and Kemalism has always been to reach the level 
of Western civilization. Besides, all those ideologies contain a Turkish centralism. 
According to this thought, Turkish states and Islam always had same values as the West 
and it was important to readopt what belonged to Turkish. 
 The extreme thesis in Kemalist historiography helped legitimating 
westernization by attributions made to pre-Islamic Turkish elements.  This situation 
is actually a common characteristic of third world countries. Thus, western and non-
western elements conflict with capitalism‟s globalist tendencies which show themselves 
in existence of both globalist and relativist elements together in Western culture. It is 
expected to westernize from non-Western countries while they are considered that they 
do not have necessary qualification to be Western. This creates confusion in third world 
countries and they usually tend to protect their self-respect and authenticity claims while 
getting westernized. The same situation is also in question for Turkey. Turkey has 
obliterated its Ottoman and Islam past, completely entered into global civilization but 
defended that this civilization was not enforcement.
93
 But Turkey‟s westernization 
could not reach a complete success due to unequal evolution of capitalism worldwide. 
This situation caused emergence of critical movements and a new type of Islamism has 
risen among those. 
  
3.1.2.  Islamic Opposition to Kemalist Modernism 
 
 Even though Islamist opposition shares same modernist assumptions with 
Kemalism, the method it follows became an alternative to secular nationalism. Differing 
from Kemalist laicism‟s rhetoric that defends suppression of Islam, Islamist modernists 
assumed that Muslim communities can also get modernized. 
 Islamist modernists assume that acceptance of modern values would not spoil 
authenticity as elements of Western civilization originate from Muslim world. Islamist 
MSP‟s and its then leader Necmettin Erbakan‟s opinions confirm that. 
 Also MSP refused to see modernism and westernization as the same like other 
modernist Islamists. Even though Turkish nation lost its connection to Islam, they 
continued to consider Turkish society as Muslim which resulted with Islam‟s inclusion 
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to the ideology that legitimized political power after settlement of the regime. Extreme 
nationalist rhetoric was also refused at that period. Therefore, an uncertainty emerged. 
 Radical Islamist movement that was formed in 1980‟s questioned modernism 
itself altogether. That started arguments on what kind of an attitude should be adopted 
towards modernism in Turkish political life and authenticity arose as an alternative 
against western modernity in the aftermath of this period.  
 Reason of RP‟s success was its possibility to merge two concepts of Islam, 
which are the concept that suggests an alternative to Kemalism and the concept that 
refuses modernism and hence Kemalism, in the same movement. The factor that 
brought these two movements together was their opposition against Kemalism. This 
opposition took its power from Kemalism‟s decline in an environment that globalization 
rose and nation-state lost its significance.
94
 
 Kemalism‟s decline is a result of globalization. Marxism and nationalism have 
universalized the experience of Europe, but western protective ideologies lost their 
validity due to globalization. Therefore, also Kemalism lost its validity as it was 
accepting Western civilization as a universal model. But, Islamism on the other hand 
refused Western ideologies as they were ignoring authentic identity and projected itself 
as local, authentic and anti-imperialist. In this sense while modernist Islamism in 19
th
 
and 20
th
 centuries was aiming to unite western modernity and Islamist authenticity in 
the same frame, current critical Islamism refuses supremacy of Western civilization.  
 However it is also a fact that putting an authentic identity claiming to be 
different from the West causes regeneration of Western orientalism. It does not matter 
which ideology is adopted, ideology of the weak is always obliged to progress in the 
frame that the strong set.
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 Masses, which live in rural areas or in slums of cities, manifest their political 
and social demands with an Islamic identity in today‟s Turkey take their power from 
this rustic popular Islam.
96
 These circles bring popular Islam out as an opposing identity 
against the ruling elite. 
 Popular Islam ideology, which was produced by periphery against laic 
understanding, was used by the right wing political parties which were in expectation of 
                                                 
94 ibid., p.p. 36-37 
95 ibid., p. 40 
96 op. cit., Ocak, p. 125 
 45 
 
political power and this way religion was made an instrument of politics by making 
concessions from laicism in Turkey. Besides, by access of 2
nd
 or 3
rd
 generations that 
migrated from rural and settled in cities into leadership positions in education, politics, 
and bureaucracy; Islam that was eliminated by reforms again gained ground in public 
space. This is the situation that laic circles characterize as political reaction. Majority 
that was not heard since the single-party period demand their rights now. Their struggle 
with laic circles is for not losing benefits they gained since now; if this struggle would 
be conducted in a democratic frame, its contribution in democratization process of 
Turkey is inevitable. 
 Even though this opponent society is not as qualified as Ottoman period, it 
started to reproduce popular Islamic culture at the present day. Popular Islam which 
demonstrated a rustic feature for a long time, entered in a re-scientification process by 
the rising education levels of Islamist circles.  
 At the present day, there is still a society that wants to keep Islam out of scope in 
modernization programs intended for the future of Turkey; mistake of Kemalist elite 
lies herein. Even though Kemalism became successful in the period it emerged, it could 
not keep this success and lost its sustainability in changing global conditions. Kemalism 
rightfully kept Islam responsible of what devastated Ottoman Empire became; founded 
the republic which adopted positive values by terminating Islam‟s political, social and 
cultural existence and declared itself as the official ideology. However its precluding 
attitude against Islam‟s conservative manner, transformed into an ideological struggle 
that necessitates reconciliation of both sides. At the end of this struggle it will be 
possible to see a Turkey that absorbed democratic values. 
 
3.1.3. Place of Islamist Parties in Turkish Politics 
 
 Islam‟s revival is one of the most important events occupying world agenda 
recently. Especially 1979 Iran Revolution is the most important incident that symbolizes 
this revival. This incident also accelerated researches made by the West in order to 
understand about its effects to themselves. 
 Revolution has also attracted attention to Turkey and conceived different results 
according to attribute of the societies which it was discussed. While this incident turned 
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to an anti-reactive Islamophobia in laic society, it conduced to various initiatives to 
redevelop Islam and expose their identity in conservative society.  
 Starting with establishment of republic, Islamic idea has stayed under strict 
control of the state until 1950. That‟s why; conservative society endeavored to live their 
religion in secret. As a result of pressure of the new regime, this disappointment turned 
into indignation. Conservative society tried to preserve traditional structure rather than 
improving popular Islam under this pressure. Today‟s conservative intellectuals are 
mostly individuals who took Islamic education in the country side as a result of 
traditions being more untouched there.  
 Kemalism‟s strict policy over religion reduced following admittance of political 
opposition to the parliament in 1940‟s. Following this period, Islamism and nationalism 
integrated and became an official policy. 
 Giving Islam the place it deserved in political regime came into question in 
1947. CHP took steps that could be considered as appeasements to its policy such as 
supplying exchange for pilgrims, implementation of religion lessons in primary level, 
introduction of imam-hatip schools and opening a faculty of theology in Ankara 
University.
97
  
 As it was stated several times in the study, transition to multi-party period in 
Turkey has a significant importance as it enabled desperate circles to raise their voice 
for the first time. In this part of the study, a closer look will be taken into 
implementations of different parties in the Turkish history between 1950‟s until the 
present day. 
 
3.1.3.1. DP and AP Period 
  
 1950 elections brought DP, which was using Islamic rhetoric, to the power. 
Besides DP, many conservative organizations were formed at that period. Thus, people 
started to show their discontent against imposed reforms by Islam. DP followed a 
strategy to satisfy both laic and conservative circles and did not refuse laicism even 
though it embraced a different laicism perception. Not following such kind of a policy 
has been a disadvantage for CHP. 
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 DP did not adopt Islamism as an ideology but it anticipated to construct an 
identity integrated with Islam instead of imposed laicism during single-party period. 
Islamists did not get satisfied with DP‟s steps in this matter, but these steps that DP 
took, lead to transformation to an era that left a mark in Turkish politic history by 
extending Islam‟s mobility. Islamic circles formed their social base through some 
organizations thanks to flexible policies of DP. In this sense, Islamic circles had the 
possibility to guide their youth through imam-hatip schools, state dormitories and study 
rooms. This situation shows importance of civil society in politics. ÇYDD, which is 
considered to be pioneer in this topic and aims to raise laic persons, only started its 
practices in 1990. This situation proves how early Islamist circles acted to organize. 
 Traditional values remained warm because no other ideology emerged that 
changed cultural values of the society during republican period. Desired transformation 
was imposed through reforms and education system following foundation of republic. 
Different circles in society showed different reactions to those innovations and circles 
that could not keep up with evolving society developed a conservative worldview.
98
 
Economic and social problems have a great role in this opinion. 
 Economic, social and political issues that anti-Islamist Marxist intellectuals 
brought up in agenda have shown that moral based Islam is insufficient in those issues. 
Therewith conservative intellectuals started to develop themselves and discuss those 
issues. The most important of those was the political dimension of Islam. Eventually as 
a result of giving a high importance on this subject, Islamist intellectuals neglected 
other aspects of Islam; perceived and influenced society to perceive Islam as only a 
political regime. This generates an obstacle on evolution of an healthy Islamic thought.  
 Along with that, Islamic idea still could not evade from a defensive psychology 
towards laic society in Turkey and that is why it could not prompt its creative side yet.
99
 
The most important reason of that is inexistence of a settled freedom of opinion and a 
quality Islamic idea breakthrough where Ottoman Empire‟s central militarist structure 
was influent. Attempts to evolve Islamic idea have been obstructed by traditional 
conservative society. Same kind of obstruction also keeps going in modern Turkey.
 Today, Kemalism which is formed of five basic principles is accepted. Laicism, 
which is one of those values, means surrounding daily practices by state and ignorance 
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of regional differences in Kemalist ideology. However, while French laicism has an 
anti-religious nature, Anglo-American style secularism aims to protect religions from 
state and approves organization of social relations based on religion to encourage social 
solidarity.  
 According to Yavuz and Esposito, laicism and nationalism project played a great 
role in Islam attain an opponent language and ideological dimension. On the other hand, 
Islamic revival was an internal dialectic of Kemalist ideology. Avoiding differences 
have always been a principle of Kemalist state. 
 The thought lying under this system was imposing the idea that state knew what 
the best was for its people and CHP would protect Islam from foreign effect.
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However, with transition to multi-party period in Turkey state policy against religion 
was moderated. As a part of this transition, religion lessons entered in curriculum of  
public schools, azan that was sung in Turkish until then started to be sung in Arabic, 
limitations on theological education in public schools and worshipping were removed, 
construction of new mosques was approved. However, DP opposed to political Islam 
and any objection against state‟s laic nature. 
 DP supported the change on 163
rd
 clause of penal code. Previous form of the 
code was proposing a penalty for acts which were aiming to change social, economic, 
political and judicial system based on religious principles and beliefs. Objective of this 
code was to maintain state control on religion and to prevent any kind of Islamic 
movement to loosen this control. DP approved the change as “punishment of any group 
or subject that uses religion for political or personal benefit” in 1953. As a result of this 
change, state‟s control over religion increased and religion based protests became 
subject to suppression by the state.
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 DP was closed by 1960 military coup and AP was opened followingly. AP also 
tried to maintain a synthesis between laicism and conservativism as its pioneer DP and 
followed an anti-leftist policy that aimed to integrate nationalism with religion. Policies 
that were followed during Cold War period strengthened conservative nationalist 
ideology. Islamist intellectual Necmettin Erbakan wanted to enter the parliament from 
AP quota, but his request was rejected by Süleyman Demirel which postponed his 
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admittance to the parliament to 1969. He was considered as a person defining Islam‟s 
role in Turkish politics.  
 Necmettin Erbakan hoped to change and benefit from election system by 
gathering all religious movements and communities under his leadership.
102
 His attempt 
resulted with his prohibition from politics for 5 years according to the 163
rd
 clause of 
penal code. He always mentioned that he was against the format of laicism in Turkey, 
defended that current system was governing with arbitrary practices on Islam and 
suggested that laicism should assure religious freedom and alterations should be done 
on constitution to that end.  
 In 1965 elections Süleyman Demirel, who was a sympathetic name for 
conservative society, was elected as a prime-minister from AP. 
 
3.1.3.2. MNP and MSP Period 
 
 Islam got politicized especially in some certain periods after 1970‟s. This 
situation was grounded both on political developments in the Middle East and reactions 
that laicism caused.
103
 Thus, because laicism prevented Islamist circles to join 
mainstream party organizations and express their opinions there, these circles had to 
establish parties that eventually politicized Islam‟s representation.  
 Thus, political Islamist movement which had to perform politics under the roof 
of central right parties such as DP in 1950‟s and AP in 1960‟s as an outcome of strict 
laic system of Turkish state was able to establish its own political party, MNP, in 1970 
as a result of changing global conditions, decline of nation-state idea and weakening of 
Turkish state‟s central authority. Quest of forming a new party started as an outcome of 
the competition between industry magnates and SMEs in 1968. Following rejection of 
his application for presidency to Union of Chambers by AP, Necmettin Erbakan 
established MNP as a reaction.
104
 SMEs had possibility to get organized as a result of 
this process. Party was stating these opinions in its declaration of establishment: 
“Our glorious nation! Today is the day that missile is launched to settle our great nation 
which was walking through the most supreme orbit of human history with its faithful and 
adherent identity to God which upheld the right and ignored the evil, back to its supreme 
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trajectory, which various efforts to derail it preponderated, after a long period. MNP is this 
powerful missile that is launched to lead our nation to light after troublous and dismal days, 
and settle it to its bright historical trajectory.”105 
 These opinions which formed the party program, constituted main ideology of 
successor parties which were established or implemented to be established by 
Necmettin Erbakan and his companions under the roof of a movement called National 
Opinion. This backlash of Erbakan marked a very important milestone in Turkish 
politics; a party which adopted Islamism as its formal ideology was established for the 
first time in modern Turkey at pos-Ottoman period. Moreover, this act caused a duality 
in conservative central right-wing which led the way to formation of two different 
ideologies. MNP was not an extension of AP and religious conservative ideology; as we 
can also understand from its declaration of establishment, MNP was an Islamist party 
which did not acquiesce to laic and modern ideals of Kemalist Turkish republic and 
clearly manifested its desire of reverting back to Ottoman ideals which were determined 
by Shari‟a. In this context, by this disunion an Islamist wing was established which 
formed official ideology of MNP, MSP, RP, FP and SP while official ideology of AP, 
DYP, ANAP and AKP is religious conservativism.      
 MNP was closed down on March 12
th
, 1971 by constitutional court as per the 
code of political parties which was prohibiting usage of religion for political purposes 
and carry on anti-laic operations. Roots of a great hassle were established with the 
decision of this closure which reached till our day. Conflict between constitutional court 
and Islamist parties radicalized both sides and claim that Islamists pose a threat against 
laic Turkey got repeated with each closure case. Islamist politics reached till our day 
through succession of closed parties with new ones. MSP was formed as successor of 
MNP and by alliance of İskender Paşa Community which is a branch of Nakshibendi 
Lodge with Nur Community; it received support from major part of religious 
communities. 1973 elections brought MSP to a key point and it consistently made a part 
of government following this date. Besides, movement capacity of Islamist circles in 
public space were promoted by assigning people that shared same ideology to the key 
points. This expansion in public space represents the training period of people that were 
supported by Islamic circles starting with ANAP term in pos-1980 period.  
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 The most important transformation that MSP generated in Turkish politics was 
beginning of Islamist opposition‟s existence with its own elite staff and socio-economic 
base individually. In this sense, MSP undertook representation of a second axis against 
Kemalist elite and became a tool for assuring participation of traditional circles actively 
into politics, resolving identity issues of these circles, fixing socio-economic 
deprivations that industrialism caused and besides all, legitimizing Islamic political 
ideology in laic political system.
106
 
 Conservative nationalism transformed into Islamic ummahism also in Turkey at 
the same time with all Muslim societies in the same period. In this context, MSP and its 
successor RP showed efforts to form a Muslim union that otherized the West.  
 
3.1.3.3. RP Period 
 
 Islamist movement had trouble in identifying itself in the system between 1980 
military coup and RP‟s achievement of mass support while it faced system‟s rivalry 
despite ANAP‟s support. But in this process Islamists realized their power gradually. 
Another effect that played role in evolution of Islamist wing was the circles which 
migrated to cities and were seen as new conservatives of urban life having a voice in 
politics. Religious traditions that play role in solidarity of migrant society are very 
important. New urbanized societies that were in identity crisis formed their new life by 
putting Islam in the center of their lives. These circles saw Islam as a salvation in the 
rapidly changing social life.  
 After 1980 military coup, ANAP came into force under Turgut Özal‟s 
assistance. Özal adopted Turkish-Islam synthesis which combined Turkish nationalism 
and Islamic values. This doctrine rejected political Islam while embracing Islam as a 
moral source. This philosophy proved that Islam could exist together with nationalism, 
democracy, Kemalism and capitalism at the same time. Turkey met with capitalism 
through Özal and reforms started. 163rd clause of Turkish Penal Code was eliminated. 
As a part of this liberalization, private television and radio channels were established.
107
  
 An entrepreneur class arose in Özal period which became one of main purposes 
of economics and foreign policy. Özal believed that any restriction against freedom of 
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thought would trigger fanaticism; therefore he was moderate towards religious 
education at schools. Veiling in public space was permitted but this attitude was 
criticized by laic society as it was perceived as a threat towards the state. However, 
ANAP lost its power following Özal‟s decease in 1993. 
 First step for the Islamist wing that got organized and founded a party in RP 
term was taken by MNP/MSP. But the community which Islamist parties attracted was 
the migrants that came from rural in pos-1980 period. People that were devoid of their 
communities or tariqahs because of migration reorganized by using social possibilities 
that RP provided. RP‟s success augmented laic-Islamist conflict. Each election that RP 
won was perceived as a victory against laicism and this became an element of self 
confidence for Islamist circles. 
 RP was established during Erbakan‟s political ban and was accepted to the 
parliament in 1991. Following his release Erbakan was elected as prime-minister and 
debates on political Islam became more feverish. 
 Islamist movement transcended masses that migrated from rural and saw Islam 
as a unifying element in RP axis. While percentage of votes that RP got in 1987 
elections was 7.1 %, it climbed up to 21.5 % in 1995 elections and RP caught a higher 
success than any other central left and central right party. This situation shows that 
people were seeing RP as the main opposition. This result was quite remarkable as it 
showed that RP could also interact with the circles which were beyond party‟s social 
base.
108
 Erbakan‟s efforts to attract electorate base of ANAP had a great impact on RP‟s 
success. As a matter of fact, Erbakan introduced his party as true follower of Atatürk, 
true defender of laicism, collaborator of Turkish Armed Forces and right party to take 
ANAP‟s place following Özal‟s decease in RP congress in 1996. Even though these 
statements were not welcomed by radical Islamist circles in the party it was clear that 
this moderate policy had an impact on former ANAP electorates. 
 Victory of RP in 1995 elections caused a chaos in political area, because the 
other elected parties did not tend to form a coalition with RP. Only six months later 
DYP and RP managed to form a coalition government. DYP leader Tansu Çiller was 
criticized by followers of her party for forming a coalition with anti-laic RP. Tansu 
Çiller stated that even though she still sided with laicism and did not like RP, she 
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believed that only way to provide social reconciliation was to accept RP as a part of 
Turkish political life.
109
 These words of Tansu Çiller were pointing out an important 
reality: Turkey was polarized between laics and Islamists rather than leftists and 
rightists from then on. Following this, RP was finally able to acquire a central position 
in the parliament. However it needed to tame its rhetoric and give certain appeasements 
in order not to be eliminated by a military coup which drew reaction from its 
electorates. The most important appeasements were approaching Israel to sign a military 
agreement and discharging military officials because of religious reactionary acts. 
 RP again polled a remarkable amount of votes in 1996 local elections. As RP 
was feeling more comfortable as a result of its success, it started to put its Islamist 
identity forward and implement cultural projects. One of those was to build a mosque in 
Taksim Square in Istanbul which was identified with democracy struggle. This move 
had a great impact and was heavily protested by laic circles. On the other hand right 
after the elections, a mortal traffic accident happened in Susurluk which revealed 
complex organizational relations between mafia and state and proved that state was 
using former rightist militants as a tool in domestic and external political relations. This 
situation also transformed into a protest of some social segments which acted with 
democratic concerns in a little while. But Erbakan assumed a hostile attitude with an 
expedient behavior against protesters which obviously did not constitute a part of his 
electorates and insulted them who were demanding justice by mentioning that they 
looked like performing a tribal dance. After this statement of prime-minister, police 
started to apply arbitrary restraint against protesters.   
 However, RP was successful at introducing itself as a party which defended civil 
society against state and periphery against center. They formed people‟s assemblies in 
the system which they called as direct democracy in order to show how affiliative they 
were. However, according to the observations of anthropologist Navaro-Yashin, these 
assemblies were formed in a serious hierarchic structure where no women participants 
existed. Self-governing was definitely in question in this context. Anthropologist Jenny 
B. White also shares same opinions while she adds that hierarchic structure transformed 
civilian institutions into the tools of social control.
110
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 RP reached this success through the support that it provided for indigent people. 
Islamist movement founded its organization by “being voice of silent audiences” pledge 
which is a widely used argument of central right parties that is generally intended to the 
dissatisfied audiences and assistance that was provided from conservative social 
networks.
111
 
 Following 1995 elections, RP established its own administration mechanism 
with sources that came from municipalities during its short coalition government with 
DYP. Humanitarian assistance such as fuel aid, nutrition aid, vocational courses that 
were provided to indigent people both by party organization and local authorities 
created a satisfied electorate audience. Especially inhabitants of slums formed electorate 
audience of RP.  
 RP‟s this communication success bothered laic society and Turkish Armed 
Forces considered some incidents which occurred at different locations as religious 
reactionary acts and issued a memorandum as a measure in National Security Council 
on February 28
th
, 1997. Focus of this report was the acts against laicism. One of the 
allegations that took place in the memorandum was behaviors against dress code of 
1934. Upon that, RP had its supporters who lived in Islamist quarters of Istanbul 
arrested at cost of protecting its interests.
112
 Even though RP compromised its ideology 
with anxiety of losing its position, restraints against it did not decrease. Eventually a 
closure case was prosecuted against RP charging it with violation to constitution. RP 
was persuaded to leave political power estimating that it could decrease tension with 
this step, reinitiate democratic process and even push army to the wall in case of 
winning elections.
113
 But, RP was closed by constitutional court with allegation of 
constituting a threat against laic system and Erbakan was banned from politics 
followingly. Unfortunately Islamist circles were left alone during February 28 period by 
nationalist and conservative circles which they collaborated for many years.
114
  
 Following this period, another report determining guidelines of the governance 
was published by National Security Council. Aim of this report was to decrease the 
effect of Islam in Turkey. This incident once more proved influence of the army on 
politics.  
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 In 1998 ANAP began to implement guidelines in the leadership of Mesut 
Yılmaz. İmam-hatip schools were closed, turban was banned at schools and universities 
and some of the businessmen were arrested for financing Islamic organizations in this 
context.
115
 Also a bill of indictment was prepared against MÜSİAD aiming its closure 
for its anti-laic acts. 
 At the same year, ANAP was accused of corruption and its place was taken by 
DSP in the leadership of Bülent Ecevit. Despite its success, new government could not 
resist economic crisis and a snap election was run in 2002. Winner of this and next two 
elections was the new AKP lead by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. 
 Even though FP was founded as RP‟s successor; party was having a discrepancy 
because of the conflict between traditional and reformist groups. However, FP 
committed itself to fit in the democratic molds from then on.  FP attempted to 
change the 312
th
 clause of Turkish penal code, which was organizing crimes against 
republican regime, claiming that it was limiting freedom of expression when Erbakan 
faced the risk to be sued in the eve of April 18
th
, 1999 elections. It was clear that they 
wanted to change the clause only when the code threatened themselves as they did not 
have any attempts to change it before.
116
 FP once more showed that it could not be 
democratic no matter how much it struggled. They only were remembering existence of 
democracy when exclusionary policies of laic order were committed against them. This 
actually marks one of the distinctive features of Islamist parties which is demanding 
freedoms only for their supporters and disregarding them for the rest of the society. 
Eventually end of FP was also the same with its pioneer RP. In 2001, a closure case was 
opened against FP with same reasons and it was closed consequently. 
 
3.2. EFFECTS OF GLOBALIZATION ON ISLAM AND 
 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF TURKEY 
 
 In the Cold War period Islam became a global policy tool through the efforts of 
USA in order to surround USSR. Therefore, several projects involving Islam have been 
propounded. In this part, an overview of these projects, USA‟s Islam policy, geostrategy 
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of Islamism, Turkish political Islam in the globalizing world and Islam in Cold War 
politics will be handled. 
 
3.2.1. Geostrategy of Islamism 
 
 Evolution of Islamism also depends on geostrategic factors besides ideological 
factors. Iran Islamic Revolution forms an example on failure of the Islamist model.
117
 
Even though this incident was seen with different expectations by the Islamic world, the 
result has been a somewhat autocratic and so called democratic regime. Therefore the 
revolution was perceived as a threat by the Arab nationalists and laic circles in Turkey. 
These states condoned Sunni fundamentalism in order to fight against the revolution but 
they became the victim of this policy. Islamism played a separatist role rather than a 
unitive role in the Muslim societies.  
 If the socio-cultural relations are taken into consideration, these relations are 
relatively individual in Turkey than other states in the region. There were no 
movements which were capable to transform into social movements in Turkey until 
1980‟s, but after this period networks got more organized and formed mass movements 
such as RP.  
 States adopted a dichotomic attitude towards Islamist movements in 1980‟s. 
While the state tried to establish control over Islamist movements, on the other hand the 
duty to Islamize the society was given to the state itself. This situation occurred by the 
trial of a moderate Islamist party to get integrated with the political system in Turkey 
and religion was defragged with the state by appointing Islamists to key positions. This 
transformation gets evident with Islamist rhetoric and increase of Islamic elements in 
the legal system. 
 In this context, compulsory religious education lessons were taken into academic 
program for primary and secondary education in 1972 and Turkey became a member of 
OIC in 1980. However because of the article regarding laicism in the constitution, only 
partial compromises could be given in Turkey. For instance some universities allowed 
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the use of turban while some others did not and only Islamic worldview was taken into 
consideration in religious education books.
118
 
 Islamism‟s transformation is also realized through political and social activities 
organized by the state. RP‟s and AKP‟s social base are good examples to prove that. 
But eventually Islamism is far from providing an economic or social solution to the 
societies. 
 
3.2.2. Islam in Global Politics 
 
 Nationalist and Islamist politics that USA supported in the global politics 
continued following the fall of USSR. The global politics of USA after the fall of USSR 
was determined by the “Clash of Civilizations” thesis of Samuel Huntington. It was 
estimated that USA could only get stronger against a competitor. Therefore, new 
competitors were created namely the Islamic world and far eastern civilization.  
 Attacks of September 11 were the perfect opportunity for USA to start 
implementing its plan. Huntington did not want the rise of liberal thoughts and 
especially laicism in Islamic world. Only a limited democracy understanding was 
desired as it was appropriate for the interests of USA. Thus, as Muslim populated 
countries could not object western imperialism, they also would not be able to escape 
from western domination. 
 However, Turkey was presenting a threat against the project as it embraced 
laicism and liberal thoughts. Therefore, Huntington desired Turkey to leave the western 
values that Atatürk created and cooperate with the Islamic world. This anxiety was 
based on the thought of Turkey‟s risk of constituting a role model for the region 
countries and decrease western hegemony in the region as it embraced laic and 
democratic regime model based on sovereignty and independence principles.  
 Clinton saw Turkey as one of the most influential countries of 21
st
 century and 
stated that it was necessary to preserve its laic and democratic structure in order to use 
Turkey as a defensive post if Islamic world would surrender to radicalism.  
 However, this policy was changed at the presidency of George W. Bush and 
Turkey started to be seen as an assault base rather than a defense post. Turkey, which 
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USA wanted to use as a weapon against radical Islam, was desired to get transformed 
into a moderate Islamic model to draw less attention from the Islamic world.  
 Thus, a moderate, West supported model was implemented against the radical 
political Islam which was dominant in the region countries and considered USA as the 
devil. Of course Turkey needed to step back from its laic and democratic values in order 
to implement this model in Turkey along with the countries such as Egypt and Iraq. 
This model was successfully imposed in Turkey through the alliance of some political 
groups and support of some tariqahs and Islamist groups.
119
 However, as this model 
completely contradicted with laicism, it also caused Turkey to get isolated as the result 
of reactions it took from the Islamic world because of its alliance with the West.  
 In this sense, even though moderate political Islam was functional for the 
Islamic world, it did not create expected results in Turkey. 
 
3.2.3. Turkish Political Islam in the Globalizing World 
 
The authors seeing center-periphery relationship as the main secession axis in 
Turkey dwell on the elements such as lifestyles, culture and ideology in their studies. 
Those authors consider that center is represented by Kemalism; therefore the society 
opposing this ideology has been isolated in cultural and political level and was pushed 
to the periphery. According to this theory, Islam is a contra-elitist movement which tries 
to rise against Kemalist elite. The power battle between republican elitists and Islamists 
is also visible in habitat, cultural codes and lifestyles. 
Actually, RP really presented itself as civil society‟s party against the state. 
Nation states declined all around the world and states just organized their economies 
lost power against globalization at the end of 20
th
 century. Effects of globalization led to 
ethnical separatist movements and religious revival movements worldwide. 
Political Islam can be understood based on globalization and post-modernism. 
This approach rejects religious regression contra economic growth thesis and defends 
that Islam is not against globalization. Thus, globalization has a big role on Islamist 
revival in Turkey as Islamism promises different things to the people from different 
categories. RP was in the appropriate structure for populism which means action against 
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status quo by some parts of indigent, middle class and wealthy population.
120
 RP was 
successful in uniting those classes against Kemalism by Islamist movement. 
Turkey experienced an economic growth dependent on import substitution for 
industrialization in pos-1960. Islamist opposition represented small and independent 
business owners which were under extinction in this period. Also electorate of the first 
conservative party, MSP, was formed from tariqah supporter conservative people and 
owners of small businesses.  
According to the authors that see Islamism as a conservative political movement, 
Islam functions as an ideology which utters the reaction of small enterprises after 
Turkey‟s integration to worldwide market. However, this situation lost its effect in 
current Islamist platform; on the contrary, conservative investors grew and opened up to 
the world by using potential of globalism.  
Political Islam caught an efficient ground with decline of classical worker class 
and rise of entrepreneurship in Turkey. Nevertheless, small entrepreneurs complain 
about lack of support from the state accompanied with an anti-statist discourse, but they 
mention that any kind of support would be accepted gladly.
121
 Majority of Islamist 
employers rise among small-scale entrepreneurs.  
Apart from the small entrepreneurs, division of capital class as center and 
periphery is visible between the two businessman associations in Turkey. While 
TÜSİAD, which is supported by inveterate, modern and laic society, appeals to the 
large-scale enterprises that are supported by the state; MÜSİAD appeals to small and 
medium scale enterprises arose with free market which did not find support from the 
state. Especially MÜSİAD represents the new part of capital circle which supports 
political Islam and rises from the periphery. According to the speech of Islamist circles, 
interests of rentier capital that is close to political power and small-scale entrepreneurs 
are conflicting. So that, RP blamed rentier circles for being overthrown despite its 
success in 1995 elections. The same way, also MÜSİAD hold rentier circles, which 
clamored laic regime was under threat, responsible of RP‟s take down and interruption 
of democracy in its economy report.  
 According to Islamist economist Mustafa Özel, the rentier circle formed a 
monopoly by sheltering under Kemalism and exploited domestic market. He also 
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denotes that competitive and export oriented industrialists object to Kemalist ideology 
and support RP‟s Islamic liberalism.122 This statement clarifies the support that RP took 
from workers class. The statement, which defined supporters of Kemalist ideology as 
exploiters, could unite the winners and losers of neo-liberalist structure after 1980 with 
the advantage of globalization under a common identity poliics.
123
 Populist rhetoric of 
political Islam especially attracted small-scale businessmen just immigrated to cities 
which were searching opportunities to climb up in social hierarchy. According to a 
research made in 1993, small-scale entrepreneurs combined Islamic trends and liberal 
manners under government policy in social subjects. The same way, grassroots 
opposition was also supporting Islamist party rather than social democrats.
124
 RP was 
encouraged by this and aimed to unite workers and small-scale entrepreneurs under a 
common roof. 
   
3.2.4. USA’s Islam Policy 
 
 USA‟s politics on the Middle East region has always affected Turkish politics in 
large scale as Turkey was a very important ally. USA‟s Islamic world strategy was a 
plan which was called “Green Belt” and was developed for anti-communist propaganda, 
but this strategy was not abandoned after post Cold War period. 
 Even though moderate Islam attribution was considered as incorrect and 
separatist by the political scientists, this strategy was significant to the countries that did 
not support terrorism, but carried out a democratic Islamic model in USA‟s point of 
view. Therefore, USA continued to support Islamic parties in Turkey and the world. But 
ironically even though the parties came into power by elections, they were still seen as 
terror sympathizers by USA. Thus, there is no other country that passed through the 
same kind of political experience. But eventually USA‟s insistence on such a system for 
Turkey led to corruption in Turkish politics rather than improving democracy in other 
countries.
125
 Actually this process should be seen as Islam‟s democratization rather than 
defining it with moulds as “moderate Islam”.  
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 The incident that revealed moderate Islam paradox was the terrorist attacks of 
Al-Qaeda. Following the incidents, USA felt the necessity of distinguishing Islamist 
groups and the groups that organized terrorist attacks in the name of Islam. Attacks of 
September 11
th
 marked a milestone in history of Islam and paradoxical moderate Islam 
attribution was one of the suggested solutions against increasing fanaticism.  
 USA formed many commissions contra terrorism. Reports of the commissions 
indicated that a comprehensive approach was adopted towards Islamic world and the 
main objective was to democratize them. This formed the basis of USA‟s Great Middle 
East Project.
126
 
 USA‟s global policy is defined mainly by the deep state and incidents in 
different regions. In this sense, USA also designates its policy towards Turkey in the 
light of these elements. Most recent Middle East policy of USA is the Arab Spring. 
 However this strategy is quite risky for the region. According to author Emre 
Kongar, political Islam signifies both the ones of performing politics according to 
Islamic principles and the ones use any means including terror in order to seize state 
structure and reorganize it based on their will.  
 This hypothesis is also valid for Turkey. Thus, current AKP government aims to 
reorganize the state according to its benefit. Their insistence on a new constitution, urge 
to set the terrorist leader Abdullah Öcalan free and sideline the people that do not share 
their opinion by oppressive policies clearly show this tendency.  Besides all, because 
Turkey is the only Muslim populated country that has a democratic regime, it always is 
used as an experimental subject.  
 Even though the dictatorships in Muslim countries are overthrown, they cannot 
get replaced by democratic regimes, because democracy cannot exist without a certain 
level of industrialization, labor class and freedom of media. For that reason, the 
domestic pressure of international intervention always resulted with replacing current 
regimes with new dictatorships. Moreover, election of representatives of political Islam 
which are the most significant organized powers in Arab Spring countries is quite 
suspicious. It is clearly seen that USA shapes Arab Spring movement according to its 
needs. While full support for Islamic dictatorships like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait is 
given and political Islam is not even in question for these countries, fall of non-Islamic 
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dictatorships and their replacement with Islamic regimes is supported.
127
 Under these 
circumstances, political Islam imposition to Turkey, which is the only laic and 
democratic country in the region, is insensible. But, Samuel Huntington‟s thesis has a 
significant importance for preparing the base of this imposition. 
 USA, which sees itself as the unrivalled leader of world, was shocked by the 
September 11
th
 attacks and twisted the situation into its benefit by declaring war to the 
Muslim populated countries in the Middle East for guaranteeing its resources and 
security. But this pragmatism of USA may often affect its long-term plans.   
 Now, USA evidently suggests Turkey‟s imposed “moderate Islam” regime and 
looks for Turkey‟s economical, political and military assistance in this project. This can 
be understood if Recep Tayyip Erdoğan‟s visit to the three countries that experienced 
Arab Spring manifestations and his support in favor of Islamist circles are considered. 
Even though suggestion of the Turkish regime as a model is an ornament, the perception 
of that regime suggested under the name “moderate Islam” as “democratic Shari‟a” 
would result with a totalitarian regime even if it is accepted through the public vote.
128
 
In this case Islamic world‟s only democratic and laic country would get affected from 
this totalitarianism. 
 Turkey‟s consideration as a model for Islamic world was suggested by Samuel 
Huntington. But Atatürk‟s abnegate for that purpose as Huntington suggests would also 
eliminate the desired aspects of Turkey. After all, the model that Huntington suggests is 
a dependent regime practicing a so called moderate Islam democracy integrated with 
central capitalism. Moreover, not being an Arabic country is the main obstacle for 
Turkey on setting an example to the Arab world. In this sense, Barack Obama clarified 
the model country arguments when he visited Turkey in 2009 and underlined that the 
intended model is the laic and democratic Turkey which was founded by Atatürk while 
he especially avoided moderate Islam definition.
129
  
 It is a fact that Islamic world still could not maintain the political conditions to 
be able to discuss about democracy and laicism. Disapproval of the laicism and 
democracy messages that Erdoğan has given in his visits to Muslim populated countries 
proves that. But what is even more surprising was Erdoğan‟s message in favor of 
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laicism considering that he is the representative of an idea that defends laicism should 
be eliminated if people want. Groups that support Erdoğan were confused as a result of 
this unexpected discourse and delayed to praise this political posture. The reason of this 
confusion was Erdoğan‟s frequently changing discourse depending on USA‟s pragmatic 
policies. In this case it is possible to accept Erdoğan‟s laicism discourse as a part of 
American foreign policy. However, the same political approach was repeated also by 
Abdullah Gül in his visit to Tunisia in 2012. 
 It is true that there are efforts to adjust the developments in Turkey among 
Islamic world, but it is unclear if this effort is in favor of a system that is transformed by 
AKP or a laic Turkish model. 
 As Prof. Bernard Lewis indicates, Turkey is getting increasingly Islamized and 
AKP gains control of various institutions one after another. Besides the institutions that 
are already seized such as economy, business world, universities and media; the next 
step is to gain control over judicial system.
130
 
 It is a fact that Turkey is more advantageous as it started the development 
activities in 1920 which its neighbors could only start in 1950 and this is one of the 
reasons that it is presented as a model. 
 In this context, along with Turkey‟s domestic and foreign policies, USA‟s 
approach is also a determiner for the possible Turkish model. Gülen Community has a 
significant importance because of its alliance with AKP and its strategy plays a 
determining role for the future of Turkey. 
 EU also has an important role in determining Turkish political system. As the 
recession of democratic and laic system would not be desirable for EU, they can protest 
any attempts in this respect. Because EU can influence Turkey in the current system and 
it would lose this privilege if the democratic system in Turkey fails. 
 As a result, it is very important that if USA expects a Turkey which is laic and 
democratic or a country that lost these features by getting defeated to the Shari‟a. 
However, USA‟s requirement of a laic Turkey in order to realize its project to 
democratize Islamic world is inevitable. 
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3.2.5. Islam in Cold War Politics 
 
 World War I caused elimination of the agricultural empires based on religion. 
Followingly, USSR and USA which suffered relatively less from the World War II 
arose as the new global rival powers. In this context, political Islam came into question 
as an ideological tool in international politics in the competitive environment of two 
great powers.  
 There were three elements of this new type of war: armament, economics, 
politics and ideology. Even though economy and armament were the main factors for 
determining the strong; ideological and political aspect was more important for Turkey 
as it was directly affected by the political and ideological decisions of both powers. 
 USSR considered religion and nationalism as discriminatory and defended that 
the real democracy was the equality which was realized in context of class dictatorship 
while USA highlighted religious and nationalist elements in context of democracy and 
human rights.   
 USSR was claiming that it was aiming something beyond the religious and 
nationalist states, it would create a classless society and it would realize the 
transformation through a temporary proletarian dictatorship.
131
 
 USA and the West decided to support Islamist and nationalist ideologies 
globally against this model. In many countries communist and socialist ideologies were 
banned, parties were closed and the intellectuals that were defending these ideologies 
were sentenced; nationalism and religionism were praised in this respect. 
 Political and ideological war was applied in all aspects of social life, especially 
the legal system. Legal system was executed against the people were pro-Soviet 
ideology and sometimes only to be libertarian was considered as a crime. While the 
approaches such as socialism, social classes and exploitation were banned, religion and 
nationalism were praised in this ideological war. Special efforts were made to 
emphasize Islam more than other religions, due to many Muslims living in USSR 
borders.  
  In the pos-1945 period, Islamist and nationalist ideologies ascended also in 
Turkey and as a part of the global trend, the parties that strived for freedom and peace 
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were also closed down; many leftist intellectuals, journalists, students and politicians 
were imprisoned; many publications were confiscated and restricted.  
 Stalin threatened Turkey with occupying its three Eastern provinces in 1945. 
Turkey preferred to make a part of the western camp rather than adopting the ideology 
of USSR which it had a problematic history. Therefore, Turkish president İsmet İnönü, 
asked for assistance to USA accordingly. USA started assistance through Truman 
Doctrine; but it asked for implementation of free elections, closure of village institutions 
which were founded in 1940 to educate teachers for rural schools and augment literacy 
rate and termination of development plans which aimed industrialization of Turkey in 
exchange. Following this, some opponent deputies from CHP, who were against 
Atatürk‟s reforms and reluctant about the land reform to protect their own interest, 
formed DP and pushed the government to execute the plan of USA. 
 DP embraced values of the society which were based on religion and agriculture. 
However, because its only reference was the single-party period, it adopted an 
authoritarian regime; restricted the freedom of opposition, speech and press along with 
worker unions. Thus, the path was paved for Islamist and nationalist fascism.
132
  
 DP tolerated Arab imperialism, got into alliance with tariqahs and disseminated 
the imam-hatip schools. Even though a slight effort was shown to maintain democracy, 
the society could not transform into an industrialist and democratic society, because the 
state was deprived of democratic institutions except elections. People could not escape 
the servitude of feudal landlords, sheiks; worker class was not formed properly and 
people could not transform from vassalage to citizenship. It was still a society based on 
agriculture and religion. Moreover, DP‟s orientation to anticommunist nationalist and 
religious ideologies by taking the support of USA with the excuse of Cold War caused 
Turkey to get an extremely undemocratic form between 1950 and 1960.  
 Turkey was neutral in the World War II, but it declared war symbolically against 
Axis forces at the very last minute to be able to join UN. But still it was anxious about 
the threats of USSR, therefore it struggled to be accepted to NATO for a long time. 
USA, which understood the importance of Turkey, accepted it as a part of the western 
defense system and decided to assist it through the Marshall Plan. This way Turkey was 
able to have a place in the western defense system.  
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 The most important move of the Cold War was USSR‟s surround from west and 
south by USA and creation of an anticommunist “Green Belt Project” based on political 
Islam.  
 One of the outcomes of communism threat in Turkish history was the 1980 
Military Coup.  
 
3.3. 1980 MILITARY COUP 
  
 1980 Military Coup was a military intervention which was realized by Turkish 
Armed Forces on September 12
th
, 1980. It was the third direct military intervention in 
the history of Republic of Turkey. The government in lead of Süleyman Demirel was 
overthrown, parliament was proscribed, 1961 constitution was abolished and the 
military governed period started that day. This period, which the political parties were 
proscribed and political leaders were judged, continued for three years while it took a 
decade to normalize the political and social life. However, when the constitutional 
amendments were accepted through the 2010 referendum, affected people denunciated 
the responsible generals and the trial was held on April 4
th
, 2012.
133
   
 End of the 1970‟s witnessed armed conflicts between the right and left wings 
which were resulting with several victims per day as an outcome of the authority 
struggle between USA and USSR over Turkey. In this atmosphere Turkish Armed 
Forces waited for a suitable time to intervene the bad course of events. The violence 
stopped suddenly following the coup and 50 were executed while 500,000 were arrested 
and hundreds died in prison.
134
 
 There were several reasons for the decision apart from the violent events. One of 
the other reasons was the meeting that MSP organized in Konya on September 6
th
, 
1980. Even though the meeting started ordinarily, it transformed into a power play of 
the Islamist groups in leadership of Necmettin Erbakan and protests against the laic 
state. Consequently, series of conflicts between political parties resulted with inability 
of assignment of a president by the parliament. Moreover, 1980‟s were the years of 
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conversion to neoliberal policies which were dictated by USA; but as it was not possible 
to realize the transformation in a conflicting environment, USA supported military 
coups in order to stabilize the political and social life in the target countries. Also 
USA‟s global policy necessitated a stabilized political and social life in Turkey due to 
its strategic importance towards Iran Revolution, Afghanistan‟s occupation by USSR 
and USA‟s objective to implement the Green Belt Project. After all it was proved that 
USA had an important role in coordination of the military coup.
135
     
 Islamism and Kemalism live on each other in order to keep their permanence. 
The relation between state and Islam was redefined in the pos-1980. In this period, the 
powers that undertook Kemalism‟s advocacy saw moderate Islam as a requirement 
either to take Islamic movements under state‟s control and use them against other 
ideologies such as communism that posed a threat. While conservatives gladly 
supported this idea, Islamists preferred to adopt values of the opposition by Islamizing 
them.  
 Official ideology of the September 12
th
, 1980 military intervention was synthesis 
of Turkish Islam. This ideology served as an integral culture project and it was an 
autocratic regime rather than a democratic one because it aimed to change some features 
of the Turkish culture. In the culture reports that were published by the state at that 
period, it is especially mentioned that Islam was an inseparable part of Turkish culture. 
Turkish Islam synthesis facilitated the domination of Islam in the public space and it 
made the use of Islamic elements especially in the education system possible. Thus, 
Islam‟s new position gained ground in the official culture by strengthening the Islamist 
powers and Islamic communities. 
 Islamist cadre gained legitimacy and the threat perception of military 
government approximated the nationalists and Islamists towards this new policy.
136
  
 In the period following the coup, the economy policy that ANAP adopted with 
January 24
th
 decisions and Turgut Özal‟s liberal attitude helped the social 
transformation of Islamic circles.
137
 Following September 12
th
, 1980, the middle class 
that used to survive with protective policies of the state was eliminated and replaced 
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with a middle class that was mainly formed of provincial tradesmen, artists, small and 
medium size entrepreneurs and leaders that were trained in technical schools. 
 While this new formation assisted the Islamic circles to define their identities in 
the public space, it also set the ground for strong Islamist elite that would finance 
investments such as media institutions which would help Islamist circles to build their 
own identity.
138
 
 ANAP knew how to benefit from the tiredness that political unrests caused in 
pre-1980, the disappointment that social democracy caused and the civil war horror. 
Therefore it avoided to base its arguments on left or right axis and carried on with the 
apolitical process that started in the pre-1980 period.  
 While left wing was negatively affected from the amendments in the 1982 
constitution, Islamist circles came forward. In the direction of new economic policies, 
demands of different identities started to be considered as an outcome of liberalization. 
 
3.4. TURKISH DEMOCRACY CULTURE AND PLACE OF RP IN 
TURKISH  POLITICS 
 
 In order to understand how the society gradually polarized, an analysis of 
Turkish political system should be done.  
 
3.4.1. Turkish Democracy Culture and RP 
 
 Professor Ali Yaşar Sarıbay explains the reality of Turkish society at the present 
day with these words: 
“As „touting votes no matter how‟ understanding is dominant in all Turkish parties, it is 
also possible to see the effects of this understanding ideologically. Majority is only reduced 
to quantitative values and the quality is never considered. We compare the number of the 
veiled to the ones that do not use it, check who has a larger support in the political 
meetings, and only hang out with the people that we accept as one of us just based on the 
symbols to increase our number. Hereafter we live in an era that people does not question 
ideologies, aggregation and vanity is kept above everything.”139  
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 This situation becomes concrete with the typical “99 % Muslim country” 
rhetoric in the context of Islamist parties which is a sheer quantitative dissolution. It is 
not acceptable for the democracy culture to regiment the electorates like that and strive 
for the election of unqualified candidates. This aggregation and vanity has turned to an 
irrational populism in sense of the political power. In this context, people see each other 
in the same category regardless of quality just because they are making a part of the 
same group while democracy struggle is seen identical to fulfill the increasing demands 
of the voters of political power.
140
 The strategic importance of the political power 
increases in direct proportion with the demands. 
 One of the most worrying sides of Islamist parties is their aim to drag the entire 
society into politics. This is clearly a symptom of a totalitarian regime. This situation 
started at RP term and reached the present day by AKP.  
 On the other hand, dependence on this ideology provokes the anxiety of losing 
the political power as well as aiming to build a monopolistic control. Therefore, 
political powers aim to call out any type of control mechanism in order to form a 
monotype society. 
 As a result, parties that share an Islamist ideology constitute a legitimacy issue 
because they do not get approved by the entire society and they try to reach a greater 
society such as AKP does today by adopting liberal values and a more flexible Islamic 
rhetoric in order to come over this situation. In fact, this tendency started at RP term, 
but its lifetime was not enough to see its results.   
 
3.4.2. RP’s Legal Pluralist Model 
  
 It has been a matter for discussion in the pos-1980 if Islamist movement presents 
a threat towards democracy or it contributes to the advance of democracy by civil 
society. While Islamists criticize liberal democracy for belonging to a western value on 
one hand, on the other hand they covertly mention democratic values by claiming their 
legitimacy for being elected.
141
 This creates an inconsistency for their situation.  
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 A multi-national and legal pluralist system became a matter for discussion in the 
pos-1990 against the unitarianism of modern state, but Islamists again found themselves 
in Islamic inconsistency of liberal democracy. 
 According to Islamist authors, democracy is inappropriate for denying the 
supremacy of God; therefore they suggest the multi-cultural and legal pluralist system. 
Even though this system was implemented in the past, it was not retained. Moreover, 
even if this system would be implemented, issue of legitimacy would be inevitable as 
there would be two willpowers in such a system. However this system is a manifestation 
of the increasing pluralist identity demands in the globalizing world against the nation-
state‟s suppression. According to the authors that criticize authoritarian Kemalist regime 
in Turkey, supporting democracy is equal to Islamism.
142
 
 Erbakan suggested legal pluralism to reach Islam‟s golden age. This was a 
model that was suggested as an alternative to democracy and which was implemented at 
the first years of Islam state. According to this model, each community of faith would 
have its own legal system and be governed according to its own rules. Responsibility of 
the state would only be to secure the existence of these systems. However, this system 
would not give them the opportunity to live as they wish by dividing the society in 
different faith systems, on the contrary it would limit their freedom as it would not let 
them to give decisions as individuals. Thus, the people identifying themselves as a 
member of more than one society would be forced to select a single community.  
 Even though it is claimed that the suggested model would strengthen civil 
society against state, it is clear that the model which Islamists want conveys a 
totalitarian aspect. This situation is clearly stated by Ali Bulaç: “Islam carries 
totalitarian features only for Muslims and Muslim block.”143 But Islamists‟ depiction 
that 99 % of the Turkish society is Muslim would provide a clue about what do they 
strive for. In fact, the civil society that Islamists defend which would progress with 
political Islam does not bear democratic features. The system that they defend is 
something equal to the nation system in Ottoman Empire. It is true that Ottoman Empire 
was pluralist as the other pre-modernity empires at its period, but this cannot be 
perceived as a democratic structure. Ali Bulaç defends that, civil society was free 
through Shari‟a until the 1839 Ottoman Imperial Edict of Reorganization which 
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changed the balance in favor of the state and civil society was imprisoned by the 
abolishment of Shari‟a through the proclamation of constitutional monarchy which was 
followed by republic.
144
 Civil society and Shari‟a are identical according to this thought. 
The only way to free civil society from pressure is totalitarianism. 
 But as the subjects will be a member of the group which represents their identity 
in a multi-cultural system, this actually will be divesting their personal freedom. Bulaç 
asserts that rights of the minority could easily get eradicated by the majority in a 
representational democracy. This situation can get resolved by a pluralist model that 
gives each group the possibility to represent their area, such as in self-administration.
145
 
 Moreover, dividing the power to each social group can create a state of anarchy 
as it would prevent the existence of a united legal system. Besides, because this system 
divides people into groups according to their identity, some people may not be able to 
find the right group for themselves as they may have more than one identity and may 
prefer to remain individual rather than joining collective groups. Even if the individuals 
select one of the groups, this would mean that minorities would still remain under 
different groups. Therefore, such kind of a system would only ignore the real problem. 
In this sense, Islamism and postmodernism cohere also on the ideas about alignments 
based on identity. 
 While democracy is accepted as a suitable system for a homogenous society like 
the West which passed through the enlightenment period, it is claimed that it is not 
suitable for a country like Turkey that hosts many beliefs.
146
 
 However this system has mistakes in any way. Even though Islamists are 
considerate towards non-Muslims, they accept Muslims as a single bloc with a 
totalitarian understanding and do not compromise. This attitude of Islamists is not 
correct at all and it also conflicts with Islamist theories. The current situation in Turkey 
generates a good example for this view.  According to Islamists, Turkey is a Muslim 
country and everybody who consider themselves as Muslim should live in a certain 
way. Therefore the secular circles that are used to live religion in a more personal way 
frequently get pressurized by this totalitarian understanding. Eventually the idea that 
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secular circles defend is expressed in a phrase from Quran: “There is no pressure in 
religion.” 
 In this aspect, author Haldun Gülalp criticizes the pluralist legal system 
Islamism suggests; 
 Person‟s identity and the legal system that they will belong are unclear. Besides, if 
alteration between systems would not be possible, a totalitarian regime can arise. 
 A non-democratic repressive system can arise in case the legal systems get 
authoritarian within themselves. 
 It is also unclear how the relations between people from different legal systems will 
be organized.
147
 
It can be clearly seen pluralism and democracy are not the same thing in this context. 
 Legal pluralist model is not ipso facto democratic, because there are no 
suggestions in regards to participation and collective responsibility in this model. 
Therefore, as pluralism and democracy cannot be directly associated, it is also 
impertinent to expect that it will definitely strengthen democracy. The sidelining of 
social groups for making part of a certain identity lies beneath their struggle to obtain 
some rights.  Then, if subjects get identified independent than their group identities in 
the frame of universal rights, a big step would be taken for a resolution. 
 As the state has a binding nature in terms of citizenship, democracy can only be 
performed by the state rather than the civil society. In the end, the monopoly to entitle 
rights is under state‟s control. 
 
3.4.3. RP’s Double Standard Policy 
 
 Following the resign of Erbakan in June of 1997, a new government was formed 
in the leadership of  Mesut Yılmaz of ANAP. RP officials resorted to the method of 
blaming left wing, which became a tradition in the right wing parties over the history, 
for the situation that they experienced. They claimed that the army was leftist because 
its biggest supporter was İP about seizing the control over the government. They also 
claimed that the newly constituted government was leftist for the reason that the so 
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called leftist DSP was among the associates of the coalition and the government was 
supported by the social democrat CHP. 
 Even though it is pointless to claim that Turkish Armed Forces had a tendency to 
left, RP and Islamists immediately collaborated and asserted that whatever befell to 
Turkey was because of the left-wing. However, when they saw that the government was 
supporting Islamists‟ opinion about the veiling issue in the public space, a few months 
later they instantly made a u-turn as they did before.
148
 
 New government started implementing the guidelines that were advised by the 
Turkish Armed Forces. The initial alteration was the increase of mandatory primary 
education to eight years. This way the middle part of the imam-hatip schools which 
were founded in 1940‟s to educate clerics, but later became the focus of Islamist 
ideology. Islamist circles this time complained that the aim of this policy was to spread 
state‟s official ideology rather than assuring quality in education. However, Islamist 
MSP had followed the same method when it seized control over Ministry of National 
Education between 1974 and 1980 and raised the number of imam-hatip schools. In this 
context, incoherence of Islamists is clearly seen which clearly shows the habit of 
Islamists to interpret the incidents as they serve their interests. 
 Imam-hatip schools were considered as the stronghold of Islamist ideology. As a 
matter of fact, many important Islamist politicians and intellectuals such as Tayyip 
Erdoğan and Ali Bulaç were graduated from these schools. 
 In January 1998, constitutional court came to a decision to close RP and to ban 
its executive board from politics for five years. Even though RP launched a 
democratization campaign in the political arena before the decision came into effect, the 
other parties did not approach RP as they knew the real aim was not democracy.  
 
3.4.4. Lack of Democracy in Turkey and Totalitarian Tendencies 
 
 Some authors suggest that Islamic politics refer to the rise of civil society against 
the state; therefore it contributes the improvement of democracy in Turkey. However, 
the totalitarian tendency of the Islamists or Islamist parties is ignored. For instance, if 
RP was elected with a majority vote, its execution of a totalitarian program was 
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inevitable that current AKP governance is the most significant example of this situation. 
However, it is also a fact that the laic circles or institutions also did not follow a 
democratic path in their struggle Islamist parties and this was what kindled the political 
Islam debate.  
 Another fact that proves the totalitarianism of religion is objection of Islamist 
circles to democracy claiming that it contradicts with God‟s dominance. In this sense, 
author Abdurrahman Dilipak expressed his ideas with these words: “Democracy has 
transformed into the Trojan Horse of the West.”149  
 During the period of his candidature to Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality‟s 
mayoralty Recep Tayyip Erdoğan arose as the new face of Islamist movement and 
proceeded to the agenda with saying that democracy was only a tool. He mentioned his 
opinion with these words in an interview: 
“Democracy was sometimes seen as a tool and sometimes as an objective up until now. 
There were also people construed it both as a tool and an objective at the same time. It is a 
tool for choosing a system depending on the one you want to head for. I mean, systems 
come and systems go with democracy. Of course realization of this through democracy and 
by the manifestation of people‟s willpower is a good thing. At this point we can define 
democracy as the manifestation of people‟s willpower. But, today democracy is interpreted 
as an objective in our country and the democracy which is seen as an objective, keeps a 
totalitarian order in agenda. Today we see a dictate regime in Turkey in the name of 
democracy. Unfortunately democracy concept is not settled in our country yet.”
150
  
 The meaning that could be deduced from the interview is “people can overthrow 
democracy if they want.” It is true that there are deficiencies in Turkish democracy, but 
overthrowing democracy is not the method to resolve this. In this context it is clearly 
seen that Erdoğan wanted democracy until he reached the political power. 
 The interviewer asked what if the people elect a totalitarian regime which used 
democracy only to constitute its political power upon this answer. Erdoğan had 
difficulties in giving a satisfactory answer to this question: “If people want a totalitarian 
regime, we have to respect that. But if they would not be satisfied with the new regime, 
the ones to change it are again the people.”151  
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 Another question the interviewer asked was how such a regime would be 
changed. Erdoğan answered: “The people again... None of the regimes can exist despite 
the people.”152  
 However Erdoğan could not clarify how the dictate regime that he wanted to 
overthrow could stay in power for seventy years. So as this regime was also elected by 
the people, what did Erdoğan complain for? 
 As a matter of fact, he gave the signals of his objective at a meeting which he 
held a speech to the crowds on December 12
th
, 1997 in Siirt. During his speech he read 
a poem of a Turkish intellectual, Ziya Gökalp, by rewriting some parts of it. The poem 
was as in the following: 
“The minarets are bayonets, the domes are helmets / Mosques are our barracks, (Muslim) 
believers are soldiers / This holy army guards my religion / God is mighty, God is mighty. 
Our objective is the holy war, its sequel is martyrdom / Our religion requires service with 
trustfulness / Homeland is our mother, nation
153
 is our father / Oh Lord, may you assure 
prosperity of the homeland / Oh Lord, may you assure elatedness of the nation. 
My pennon is oneness, my flag is the crescent / One is green
154
, the other is red / Deplore 
for Islam, take revenge from the enemy / Oh Lord, may you assure prosperity of Islam / Oh 
Lord, may you assure misery of the enemy. 
Many brave comrades in the battle zone / Martyred for religion and the homeland / May the 
ideal stay alive, may not the hopes disappear / Oh Lord, do not let the martyr be mournful / 
Oh Lord do not let the posterity be miserable.”155   
 Besides, Erdoğan skipped five verses of the poem which were: “Our 
commander, officer fathers / Our sergeant, noncom brothers / Order and respect are our 
laws / Oh Lord, may you assure steadiness of the army / Oh Lord, may you assure the 
superiority of the pennon.” Through this speech Erdoğan praised the religious values, 
attempted to disintegrate the society, differentiated between different segments of the 
society and implied that there is an army which was formed of Islamist believers at the 
mosques. Moreover, he pointed laic society and the army as a target to his followers by 
stating that each period had Pharaohs and Nimrods and the Moses and Abrahams would 
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overcome the obstacles and clean the ways which were full of sordidness.
156
 Erdoğan 
also proved his hostility against the army by consciously skipping the verses of the 
poem about it. Erdoğan is still alleged by the laic circles with already having a hostile 
agenda against the army and the laic society since 1997. As a result of his speech, he 
received a penalty of imprisonment for a year and a fine according to the article 312/2 
of Turkish Penal Code which regulates the crimes on provoking the society to hatred 
and hostility. However his penalty was decreased to four months. On the other hand, 
Erdoğan stated that the poem was not an altered version of Ziya Gökalp‟s poem; it was 
cited from a different source named “Türk ve Türklük” which was advised as a school 
book in his defense.
157
  
 Same kinds of thoughts were also mentioned by the leader of RP, Erbakan. 
Erbakan mentioned that the objective was not democracy, it was returning back to the 
golden age at the beginning of Islam.  
 Necmettin Erbakan criticized democracy for paying importance to the votes of 
ordinary people rather than the divine commands.
158
 Erbakan also paid attention to the 
freedoms, but only to the freedoms of Islamists. Ali Bulaç stated that what Muslims 
understand from freedom is nothing more than the elimination of different obstacles 
while they practice their religion freely.
159
 The exclusive attitude of Erbakan can be 
found in a speech he held for his supporters on May 13
th
, 1990. He stated that:  
“If you do not serve for RP, none of your prayers would be accepted. […] We will obey 
the commands of RP as the whole community and believers; we will make a part of this 
army. The ones which avoid from that, belong to the potato religion. […] RP is this army 
and you will work for the evolution of this army. If you do not, you belong to the potato 
religion. It is a must to obey the jihad.”
160
 
 A frightening and authoritarian austereness is sensed in that speech. Totalitarian 
tendency was also distinctive in RP‟s organization method. It is notable that 4 million of 
its 6 million electors were official members of the party in 1995. Erbakan mentioned 
that soon they would have a great number of members that no elections would be 
thrown, the only thing to be done would be going to the notary in order to register 
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party‟s rulership. Erbakan cared so much about integrating with the society that he 
claimed that he represented the interests of whole 60 million. This totalitarian approach 
derived from the same hypothesis as Recep Tayyip Erdoğan mentioned in his speech: 
“We believe that almost the entire Turkish population is already Muslim due to their 
existence, the geography they live in and their historical mission. But practicing their 
characteristics was obstructed by force. If we eliminate the captivity in their minds, they 
will again choose Islam; because they have faith in their essence.”161  
 The austereness of Islamists also shows itself in terms of the racist tendencies. 
Even though the West is not approved, Zionism is seen as the source of all perversities. 
Erbakan refused to enter the EU as he considered that it would be possessed by Israel 
sooner or later.
162
 Likewise, he considered the UN as a Zionist organization for 
pioneering the foundation of Israel.
163
  
 This Islamist austereness unfortunately caused terrible consequences. Madımak 
Hotel in Sivas where the Alevi citizens were staying for a festival was set to fire on July 
2
nd
, 1993 by the Islamists and approximately 40 people were burnt to death. Ironically, 
many lawyers that defended the criminals were elected as deputies of the parliament and 
were assigned as ministers.  
 
3.4.5. Republic, Public Space and Political Islam 
 
 Public signifies to “which is open to everyone”. According to Habermas, 
“Public, presents itself as a private space that distinguishes itself from the public space 
and sometimes as a space which is the opposite of public power; a space of public 
opinion. Depending on the situation, sometimes state agencies or sometimes media 
channels which serve for the state can be considered as public space.”164 However, the 
“open to everyone” meaning of public space is seen in Arendt‟s conceptualization more. 
According to Arend, public space has two dimensions, one is the space of appearance 
and the other is a space which keeps the people altogether. In Arend‟s thought, public 
space is directly related to power. If a space arises as a space of common act, this space 
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can be a public space. It means that a city square is not a public space if there is not a 
common act while a hall which people come together to listen to a presentation may 
be.
165
 While the limits of public space and private space were defined more clearly in 
the past, as a result of the transformation that market economy caused on the society, 
society gradually became the subject of public opinion and developed in off the limits 
of political authorities. This way, private space of the governing elite was transformed 
into the public space.
166
 Public space is usually handled in two axes. One of them is the 
public space which is not the personal space. In terms of the liberal regimes, personal 
rights and freedoms are perceived as the private space while the rest is defined as public 
space. The second and more debated axis is the public space which signifies to the 
institutions that are financed through the taxes. This second definition forms the main 
argument of the Islamist circles in terms of turban conflict and political power. 
 On the other hand, republic signifies “which belongs to the public” in respect of 
its meaning. In this sense state‟s attribution to the public is equal to public‟s possession 
of the state. The fact which legitimated this situation has been the limitation of personal 
benefits for the common good.
167
  
 However the method of determining common good by limitation of personal 
benefits is a matter of discussion. The determiner of this situation is citizenship 
according to the classical understanding. Citizenship necessitates being a part of a 
society which is called the nation and state is the base of this unity. State has a public 
characteristic because it represents the unity which forms the base of republic idea. As a 
result of the increasing elitism of state and public space, civil society was formed but 
public space still could not evade the monotypic frame. With the transition from 
monarchy to republic, community perception was transformed into individualism. In 
this sense, members of the society were transformed into individuals from being 
vassals. However this individual mentality has never fully functioned in Turkey, 
because the state itself was perceived as the community as it undertook a protective role 
upon society. Therefore, the citizenship was not perceived as a right but a duty and the 
state could not get through its totalitarian and autocratic structure. State‟s prediction of 
only a unifying publicity prevented the individualism to develop. 
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 In this context, laicism could not form a boundary between the state and the 
society which resulted with state‟s suppression on society to impose only one type of 
belief rather than assuring freedom of thought. This was while laicism became a new 
political religion, civil society became politicized.
168
 The circles that aim to legitimate 
their truth as the only truth through this path became communitized by using political 
Islam. 
 After the foundation of republic, the protective and monotype policies 
implemented by the state disaffected the society from the state. Islam got eventually 
politicized upon the vote competition between parties following the transformation to 
multi-party system.
169
  
 Because of the vote competition, CHP started to legitimize the Islamic values 
against DP‟s success in elections. Also DP adjusted some arrangements on protecting 
laicism to address a greater electorate audience while sustaining its moderate Islamic 
rhetoric. These incidents resulted with Islam‟s adoption as a party policy. The reason for 
attributing that much importance to Islam was its comprehension as a political 
legitimacy source as a settled political culture did not exist in Turkey. The reason of 
DP‟s success was based on its good organization in the rural areas. 
 As a result of the lack of a political culture, democracy-Islam relation was not 
shaped entirely. In this sense Kemalism‟s emergence as the dominant ideology, resulted 
with the regime opposers to adopt Islam and create an us-them distinction. 
 Turkey‟s bureaucratic-authoritarian governance understanding caused the both 
parties to see Islam as a legitimacy source. As CHP had difficulties legitimizing its own 
policies, it possessed its competitor‟s source by using an Islamic rhetoric.170 Because of 
this bureaucratic-authoritarian mentality, Islam was politicized. DP blamed CHP with 
betraying the society and CHP blamed DP with betraying the state. While doing this, 
both sides were in the asseveration of doing the most realistic interpretation of 
Kemalism. But in reality, these were the practices that were done with desire to shape 
the state, society and politics in a bureaucratic-authoritarian mentality.
171
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 Kemalism‟s usage to legitimize two opposite attitudes got possible by 
sanctifying it. This policy which CHP already had was also carried on in the term of 
DP. This way Islam became uncriticizable. 
 Islam‟s compliance with Kemalism instead of with democracy was taken as a 
base in transformation to the multi-party period.
172
 In this context, 1960 military junta 
leader Cemal Gürsel, who took DP down by blaming it with betrayal against Kemalism 
and giving credit to the Islamic circles, stated that Islam, as being the most sacred and 
the most dynamic religion, ca not be the reason of lagging behind; the real reason of 
retardation was the incorrect introduction of religion which proves that situation.
173
 
 1960 military junta restored the bureaucratic-authoritarian mentality according 
to the needs of the modern society; provided more pluralism and freedom in the society 
by a new constitution and revitalized the religious opposition. Pluralism in the 
modernism process broke down the power of central elites and provided more 
opportunities to the periphery elites to affect the state politics. Thus, Islamic opposition 
rose in the political life with its own elite cadre and socio-economic base. Islam became 
the politics itself rather than being a political tool in the political line of MNP, MSP and 
RP. Many social services started to get designed in a conservative way. Also the 
communalization movements were started to be conducted through modern propaganda 
tools rather than notification.
174
 MNP and MSP headed for legitimizing Islam as an 
element of the modern political life.  
 Kemalist laicism understanding was not seeing the involvement of an Islamic 
political party into the political system as legitimate. That‟s why MNP and MSP strived 
for showing that also Islam can be a legitimate element of the political process by being 
a part of it and they aimed to make a political definition of Islam. The idea of being as 
much legitimate as the demand seen from the society lies beneath RP‟s propaganda to 
the masses by using political tools idea.  
 RP‟s this opinion was equal to DP‟s and CHP‟s attitudes of seeing Islam as a 
tool in the transition process to democracy, only this time the democracy was the 
element that was seen as a tool. In this context, according to RP‟s understanding in a 
country of which 99 % is Muslims, the decision of the majority was to be done. 
                                                 
172 loc. cit. 
173 op. cit., Sarıbay, p. 21 
174 Ruşen Çakır, Ne Şeriat Ne Demokrasi (Neither Shari’a nor Democracy), İstanbul: Metis, 1994, p.p. 81-82 
 
 81 
 
 This majoritarian understanding rose as religious nationalism; strived for settling 
the belief that ummah is core of the nation and the benefit of ummah should be above 
everything. Thus, an alternative was formed against secular nationalism and a nominal 
detach from modernism was realized.  
 RP put forward the idea that Islamic opposition got smothered because of the 
lack of democracy culture. RP‟s democracy perception was only composed of 
quantitative majority. „Tout votes no matter how‟ understanding is equal to 
“opportunism” which puts the values aside. One other point is RP‟s desire to seize the 
state‟s political power to satisfy its electorates. In this context, RP always handled the 
issues in respect of the state‟s interests instead of democratic necessities. Thus, as much 
as the demands of RP‟s base increased, strategic importance of the political power 
increased and RP kept on following a stringent attitude in its politics. In that frame, a 
political culture devoid of trust, tolerance and ethical values was emerged in the public 
space. 
 In terms of the democracy culture, RP included some features of the single-party 
mentality. For example, its desire to politicize the society entirely was an indicator of 
this. It clearly strived for destroying the limit between the state and the society. RP‟s use 
of Islam as a political tool in every opportunity was a part of its totalitarian mentality. 
Its stringent devotion to the ideology caused a monopoly control desire over the society 
and anxiety of losing its political power. Democracy cannot be discussed under these 
circumstances. 
 As democracy is a regime that enables the expression of differences, this also 
includes the freedom to express different versions of a religion in public space. In this 
context, religion should not be the source of a political power that would establish an 
absolute control over the society; different forms and religious pluralism should be seen 
as legitimate.
175
   
 Civil society emerged as a structure that was based on religious expression of the 
people at the beginning, but as the religions attained a shape that limited religious 
freedoms in the frame of unique truth, civil society changed its meaning in time. 
However the existence of sects and tariqahs proves that all religions have different 
interpretations within. Although, the unique truth perception of political Islam stresses 
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that any interpretation is an aberration. This is an indicator of the desire to conduct 
Turkish modernism under a monopolistic understanding. 
 
3.4.6. Islamists’ Discovery of Public Space 
 
 After the failure of the government through February 28
 
postmodern coup, 
Islamism in Turkey stepped into a brand new era. Hereafter, the search to place 
democracy into the Islamist paradigm started rather than objecting it because it is a 
western value.
176
 Thus, the liberal democracy started to get embraced and incorrectness 
of imposing an Islamic system by seizing the state started to be discussed. Islamists 
admitted that such kind of a policy would be the same hostile political approach 
conducted against them by the army. Following this, all Islamist parties started to 
continue their struggle in democratic platforms and supported Turkey‟s EU admission 
process thinking that it may evolve democracy. 
 However a gap in the Islamist political movement emerged following the closure 
of RP. FP was formed as the successor of RP, but while it was struggling with 
leadership issues, it shared the same destiny with its pioneer and was closed in 2001. 
Hereafter, two new parties were formed with indeterminate ideological facts. One of 
them was SP which was founded by the traditional circles that were near to Necmettin 
Erbakan and the other was AKP which was formed under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan‟s 
leadership by the more liberal and charismatic young staff of RP. Both parties were in 
favor of liberal democratic principles. However there was a visible halt in politics either 
in Islamist and left ideologies at this period. Arguments of both sides have not gone 
further than a western originated “human rights” idea by the effect of the democratic 
system they had to adopt.  
 1980‟s and 1990‟s have been a transition period for Islamism. While Islamism 
was an ideology that was suggesting an alternative to Kemalism, with the effect of its 
integration to the global system, it transformed into a frame that refused the modernity 
itself.  
 At the present day, after the problems of multiculturalism came out, the 
importance of handling issues according to the democratic principles is understood. One 
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of the reasons for the approval of this theory was the possible issues that could occur by 
forcing subjects into the fixed identity groups and locate them into the political 
structure.
177
  
 The demands based on identity politics increased as a result of globalization. 
Questioning the nation-state structure formed new civil organizations and 
implementation of a supranational welfare was aimed. In this context, the idea of 
determining the rules of the public space by the values that correspond in all religions 
emerged.
178
 
 No matter how liberal it gets, the main issue of Islamism is accepting the 
Muslimhood as a block. For example, not veiling is a privilege given to the non-
Muslims while the Muslims do not use turban is implicitly claimed of not being a 
Muslim. There is even a harsher discourse about alcohol consumption; it is strictly not 
acceptable to consume alcohol in a Muslim society.
179
 When this rhetoric is taken into 
consideration, we can clearly see that Islamists conflict within themselves and could not 
absorb the values of liberal democracy adequately. 
 If it is considered that democracy is accepted as the principle of cohabitating 
equally and as its main value is showing respect to different views, approving a trend 
unilaterally would void democracy.  
  
3.5. AKP ERA IN TURKISH POLITICS 
 
 Following the closure of FP, reformist wing of the conflicting sides 
founded AKP and traditional wing founded SP which could not maintain its pioneers‟ 
success. In this context, it would be more accurate to analyze AKP, which used its 
political preference from conservative politics by breaking up from Necmettin 
Erbakan‟s line, as it is not possible to identify with the party entirely with Islamism. 
AKP‟s base is formed of a social layer that preserved their traditional conservative 
values which gained ground step by step since the foundation of Turkey and 
transformed in the process. This society that was pushed to the background for a long 
time, managed to reach out by AKP. With the elections made in 2002 AKP came into 
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power in Turkey. This party, its members and admirers are known to be adherents of the 
Gülen Movement and this fact has been seen as a bigger threat by the laics since then. 
There is a large group of well educated people who are defending that AKP was 
founded in order to end the republican era in Turkey. Recently, it was claimed that the 
name of this party was given after a Moroccan party called Justice and Development 
Party which promotes Islamism and Islamic democracy which had almost the same logo 
with AKP. 
 The target society of the party is formed of the religious conservatives that voted 
for AP, ANAP or DYP in the past, because this society is capable of voting for the 
parties that adopted Islamic rhetoric in case their demands are fulfilled. But RP and FP 
could not get a wide support because of army‟s and laic society‟s opposition and 
therefore could not form a conservative government. But a great transformation started 
in FP when the reformists seized the party administration in May 2000.  
 It is possible to see AKP as a structure that was formed in the direction of social 
demands both to reach greater masses and balance political sensitivities. Therefore, 
while this structure shelters Islamist staff, it also embraces different conservative and 
liberal groups under its roof.  Party‟s policy is proximate to central right and its 
increasing electorate percentage is proves that it could reach to the masses. The circles 
that never accorded with the transformation that Kemalism intended and believed that 
they also were not supported economically; this time oriented their support to AKP.
180
  
 AKP announced that it stands against the efforts of the center to generate an 
ideal type of citizen that continued since the single-party government in its first 
government program with its “AKP sees any imposed, imperious, monotypic 
approaches that are based on social engineering as an obstacle for democratic system.” 
words addressing to the society that it claims to represent. It is possible to say that the 
party shows a structure that manages to keep different groups together, shaped around a 
charismatic leader that can lead masses and the politics, oriented to the conservative 
circles in central right and politically supports certain types of liberal policies.
181
 
 Leaders‟ effect on society is very important in political Islam. Also Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan has an important role in AKP‟s success on communication with people. 
Consubstantiation of the party leader with people strengthens the belief that the party 
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could understand and fulfill people‟s demands.182 Party‟s success on communication, is 
also supported by the mechanisms which were formed around municipalities. AKP 
provides concrete aid to the people that have difficulties to acquire their needs such as 
clothing, fuel, occupation and education by being major power in the parliament and 
possessing majority of the municipalities.  
 During its long term, AKP could maintain the social compromise at a level, but 
it has experienced difficulties in equilibrating with the circles that want to gain control 
over political power. Despite the attitude of Turkish state against Islam, Turkey 
generated two important Islamic movements: AKP and Gülen Movement.183  
 AKP is a party which expanded and emerged through the Islamist movements 
that has been continuing since the last thirty five years. In the meanwhile, it is the first 
party that could evade from the traditional Islamist effect of Necmettin Erbakan.  
 The steps taken for democratization caused Islamic parties to gain strength. The 
liberalization that Turgut Özal started in economy in 1980‟s strengthened entrepreneurs 
and businessmen in the rural areas, recently urbanized lower classes and urban 
conservative intellectuals.
184
  
 Even though the traditional rural conservative businessmen class appreciates 
Atatürk as a reformer and a leader that liberated the country from western imperialism, 
it sustains a deep identification with the Ottoman history and they get irritated from the 
idea of underrating and disparaging the Ottoman and Islamic past.
185
 This class provides 
financial support for Islamist parties and Gülen Movement. 
 Islamic publications showed a great increase in the 1980‟s and with the increase 
of Islamist intellectuals, the place of Islamic values in society was started to be 
discussed. The army supported religionism and nationalism against communist 
tendencies through the support of USA during the 1980 coup. Islamist parties had great 
successes in the 1990‟s. The young generation that split from Erbakan‟s party, which 
was closed in 1998, founded AKP. AKP got lessons from the previous mistakes and 
was elected as the major party in parliament in 2002 elections. AKP has a different 
structure than the traditional Islamist parties. AKP stated its confidence in democracy 
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and approached moderately towards secularism. However, it insists on secularism 
should be defined as state‟s neutrality towards any kind of religious faith and 
philosophical opinion and state should be restricted rather than the individuals with this 
principle.
186
 This way, it refuses the laicism definition of Kemalism which defends state 
control over religion. Besides, it avoided Islamic identifications by introducing itself as 
a conservative democrat party in order to brush the attentions off.  
 AKP adopted a bipartisan policy that engaged both with EU and Islamic world 
politics. However, a great part of the Turkish electorates approach AKP with doubt as it 
retains deputies from the cadres of former Islamist parties.  
 Moderate political Islamists stuck to the democratization agenda in Turkey for a 
long time. The counselor of prime-minister Yalçın Akdoğan identified AKP as “a 
national mass party conservative in values which claims its history, former culture and 
religion”.187 In other words, the party handles issues from a religious perspective and 
does not aim spreading Islam. Thus, its non-alignment with any religious or ethnic 
group lies beneath the wide support that AKP takes.  
 AKP sees itself as a party that is formed of moderate Muslims rather than a 
moderate Islamist party.
188
 According to this concept that AKP members acknowledge, 
the religious values of people serve as a source of inspiration, but this should not be 
interpreted as a part of their political identity.
189
While accepting that religion is a 
basically a personal value, AKP defends that religion could be attached to public and 
political spaces without compromising secular state system.
190
 Party strives for polling 
votes through supplying basic needs of the people rather than reflecting an ideology.
191
 
 Professor Graham Fuller states that he sees AKP as “an Islamist party which is 
not only moderate but also and more importantly as a party that tries to explore what 
does integration of religious values with political life mean”.192  
Fuller explains why he sees AKP as an Islamist party as: 
 A great part of the AKP leaders come from Turkey‟s most developed and biggest 
Islamist movement. 
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 While AKP defines itself as a conservative party, actually it meets the desire of 
many believers share by acknowledging and praising the Ottoman legacy rather 
than suppressing it. 
 Even though the party is widely supported by Islamists, AKP electorates are not 
limited with that. 
 It concentrates on necessary reforms over religious issues at the cost of creating 
polarization. 
 AKP followed many socio-religious policies. It defended freedom of veiling in 
public space, strived for listing adultery as an act of crime, worked for integrating 
imam-hatip schools into the academic system, desired more freedom for Islam in 
public space, made arrangements on Islamic banking and supported the historical 
elements of Ottoman-Islam symbolism.  
 AKP members generally show religious features. They often get criticized by the 
laics on AKP‟s dishonesty about defining itself only as conservative and their 
alleged secret agenda to Islamize Turkey.  
 AKP leaders underline the need of maintaining a good relation urgently with the 
other Muslim countries and terminating isolating these countries to end radicalism. 
This way AKP mentions its desire to undertake leadership role in the region.
193
  
 When all these are taken into account, it is possible to categorize AKP as an 
Islamist party. But AKP does not demonstrate a clear tendency towards implementation 
of Shari‟a law. Instead it adopts a wider Shari‟a vision in the context of assuring social 
justice, respect towards religious traditions, education, healthcare, national power and 
social welfare. 
 It is also true that a part of the Turkish Islamists started to question the idea of 
seizing the control over the state and imposing Islamization from the top. Instead they 
orientated to the civil society organizations rather than using the state to promote 
Islamic awareness. In this context, Muslim intellectuals apply to instilling method by 
working together with the society rather than a legal approach imposed by the state. 
 Religious conservatives emphasize that the state should not interfere with the 
faith field and society should have the freedom to commit sins. Former Director of 
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Religious Affairs Ali Bardakoğlu, made this statement about religious understanding on 
January 15
th
, 2010:  
“Each society and individual reduces the religion from top to down their own personal 
world and reflect their religious perception to practice in the frame of their inner world‟s 
capacity… There is no reform in religion itself, only innovation in our religious perception 
is the case, a constant innovation… We should not accept the religious interpretations 
verbatim as a model, except the main religious resources. Each period has religious 
perception according to that period and the conditions of that period; we can produce ideas 
and gain experience from those.”
194
  
 It is seen that there was also an innovation and liberalization in the perspective 
of Department of Religious Affairs at the beginning of AKP‟s term. The evolution of 
this new Islamic approach in Turkey can be explained with the factors such as 
expansion of Turkey to the world in terms of modernization and democratization, 
orientation of Islamists to new quests due to Kemalist repressive approach and Turkey‟s 
isolation from the tendency between the West and Islamic world through its social and 
geopolitical location. 
 However, even though AKP adopted a moderate policy, it also could not avoid 
from experiencing a closure case as its pioneers. However, it was luckier than the 
previous Islamist parties. A closure case was presented against the party by 
Abdurrahman Yalçınkaya, the attorney general of the High Court of Appeals, in 2008 
with the allegation of becoming the focus of anti-laic acts. The indictment was inherited 
to the Constitutional Court soliciting closure of AKP and banishment of 71 politicians 
from politics including President Abdullah Gül and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan on March 14th, 2008.  
 Indictment stated that the principles which political parties should respect as 
being in relation with the state and civil services as a part of democratic life were 
defined by the constitution, alignment of their practices with current codes and the 
constitution was inspected according to the laws and it was Public Prosecution Office of 
the High Court of Appeals‟ responsibility to request closure of a party considering 
social requirement  and the frequency of its acts that did not accord with democratic 
mentality if it became focus of the mentioned acts.  
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Table 1: Allegations on AKP’s Case of Closure 
Crime Element Examples 
Intending to set the 
ground which would 
change the basic 
principles of Republic 
of Turkey. 
 Proposals to change the constitution and Code of Higher Education 
 Attempt to eliminate laicism principle through the amendments of 
constitution on turban freedom 
 Practices on filling the civil services with AKP adherents and persons who 
are known to be inclined to political Islam 
 Support given to Gülen Movement by Abdullah Gül at the time of his 
membership of the cabinet 
 Some speeches of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 
Using religious 
elements with political 
concerns. 
 Erdoğan‟s “Think that even if turban is used as a political symbol. Can 
you accept that wearing a political symbol is a crime?” speech during his 
visit to Spain 
 Employment of veiled doctors at some public hospitals 
 Enforcement of the enterprises bearing alcohol license to move to the 
outskirts of the city 
 Censor of some explicit banners in Istanbul 
Dividing the society as 
religious and non-
religious. 
 Speeches which stated a determination to transform the laic republic into a 
new lifestyle and order 
 Mortal attacks to the Council of State upon its decision on unlawfulness of 
a teacher‟s veiling at school 
Attempting gradually 
to reconfigure the laic 
legal order and 
manipulate. 
 Erdoğan‟s “the right to utter about veiling is ulema‟s duty, not the 
jurisdiction” speech was highlighted and it was defended that the party 
was giving religious statutes according to Shari‟a purpose 
 Erdoğan‟s advisor Egemen Bağış‟s “turban freedom should be valid also 
for the parliament beside universities and the other public space” 
statement 
 Cüneyt Zapsu‟s “forcing a woman to unveil is indifferent from forcing a 
woman to take her underwear off in the street” statement 
Opening future of the 
regime in discussion. 
 It was stated that AKP did not cease its link to closed FP and RP, AKP‟s 
ultimate objective is the Shari‟a order 
 It was stated that AKP‟s tendency was political Islam, its political 
principle was Shari‟a and AKP was using taqiyyah (dissimulation) which 
was based on Shari‟a as it aspired after Shari‟a 
Source: “İşte Başsavcı‟nın İddianamesi” (Here is the Allegation of Attorney General), 17.06.2008, Ntvmsnbc, 
narrated by Wikipedia, Acc. 13.05.2013: 
http://tr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adalet_ve_Kalk%C4%B1nma_Partisinin_kapat%C4%B1lma_davas%C4%B1 
   
 Becoming the focus of anti-laic acts is defined in the 68
th
 and 69
th
 articles of the 
Constitution of Republic of Turkey. These articles state that the acts and programs of 
political parties cannot be against the democratic and laic principles of the state and they 
hold High Court of Appeals responsible of detecting anti-laic acts of the political parties 
and take necessary actions. It was also stated that objective of the laic system which 
targets impartiality of the state towards all religions, does not mean the indefiniteness of 
religious liberties, it only aims organization of the state in a rational and scientific way. 
It was mentioned that religious rules were completely different from state 
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administration and principles.
195
 It was mentioned that the prime minister, the president, 
several deputies and many members from AKP‟s body made statements against laicism 
principle. 
 The closure case was highly debated at the parliament and it was stated that urge 
of closure of a party which is the government at the parliament by the Constitutional 
Court was arousing suspicions; it was defended that a party which was elected should 
leave through elections
196
 and closure of a party with motivation of laicism was 
intervention to democracy.
197
 Some highlights from the bill can be seen on Table1. 
 Murat Yetkin stated on his article at Radikal dated March 19
th
, 2008 that finding 
the attitude of the general attorney politically incorrect would not mean the prosecution 
was not legal. Election of a party by obtaining 47 % of the votes would not make a 
difference legally; there was a specific weight which was political, not legal. Therefore 
what had been debated was the alignment of the prosecution with politics, not the laws. 
The one that had seized the power with majority would use its power on rewriting the 
laws, but dominance of the political power would not depend on simple majority vote. It 
was AKP‟s political preference to place its ideology into the political agenda. As this 
attempt was restricted by the judiciary, the boundaries of both politics and the judiciary 
should be redefined. Therefore, as the prosecution in course, everybody should wait the 
results of it.
198
 In addition, CHP stated that if there was a crime, attorney general should 
do what was necessary as constitution was concerning also the political parties.
199
 
 Attorney general defended that the prosecution was based on legal enforcements 
and stated the legal bases in his allegation. However, Bülent Arınç from AKP deputies 
claimed that the case was prepared with inadequate proofs and it was an outcome of 
hate and grudge while another deputy stated that the coups had transformed and judges 
had taken the place of tanks and guns, the allegations were entirely ridiculous and 
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nonsensical.
200
 These statements actually show that AKP was uncomfortable with the 
situation and was anxious about the outcome. Some politicians from different parties 
also defended that the prosecution was not democratic and stated that political parties 
should be closed only for giving support to acts of violence.
201
 Also Newsweek stated 
that it was a judicial coup d‟etat.202 Minister Ertuğrul Günay claimed that the real reason 
of the closure case was to prevent to prosecution of Ergenekon Case which was a 
pending action to reveal so called connections of the deep state.
203
 
 Constitutional Court announced that it was decided not to close the party but to 
deprive it from financial aid on July 30
th
, 2008 by six votes against five where the 
approval of at least seven members was required for closure.
204
 This way AKP had the 
possibility to stabilize its power once more and received the majority once more at the 
elections on June 13
th
, 2011 by raising the rate of its votes by 3.17 %.  
 It is seen that even though AKP claimed that it changed and it did not have a 
secret agenda, laic circles clearly did not share the same opinion, consequently a closure 
case was opened. While the righteousness or alignment with democracy could be 
debated, it is obviously seen that the case was not entirely insubstantial. It is possible to 
see that AKP accepted the religion rhetoric as its primary political agenda and showed 
that it still bears some of the features which caused the closure of its pioneers. This 
mostly relates to corruption of the political system with certain ideologies. As it is 
stated, religion was used as a political tool starting from the 1950‟s, so it was not a new 
thing; but this incident clearly shows that not much things were changed in Turkish 
politics during the last sixty years. Therefore, this understanding is the main responsible 
of the polarization in society. 
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3.6. GÜLEN MOVEMENT AND ITS EFFECTS ON TURKISH 
POLITICS 
 
As stated before, Gülen Movement was one of the most important outcomes of 
the Islamist mobilization of Turkey. Gülen Movement has become a social phenomenon 
first in Turkey in the late 1980‟s and later in a wide range around the world by the 
beginning of the 21
st
 century. The enlargement of this community‟s radius was not a 
coincidence. Because of the political conflicts between young people in the early 1980‟s 
as an aftershock of 1968 generation, communism was a threat for Turkish Military. That 
is why the military paved the way for Islamic movements trying to influence and ward 
off young people.  
 This so called non-political movement which was initiated by a Turkish preacher 
called Fethullah Gülen aims to give a peaceful, moderate, tolerant message to the entire 
world and to clear up the prejudices about Islam. It receives a great support from 
numerous conservative; rich Turkish and foreign businessmen, thus has a great financial 
potential. By the help of this financial power, the movement naturally sees it very 
logical to find a place for itself in the private educational system in Turkey in order to 
carry out its mission connected with moderate Islam.  
 Even though the Gülen Movement seems to be apolitical, it has the ability to 
affect Turkish politics indirectly. The movement originates from the Nur Movement 
which emerged at the last years of Ottoman Empire and is seen as one of the most 
important socio-religious movements of the 20
th
 century. The movement was born 
through the economical and emotional depressions at the decadence epoch of Ottoman 
Empire in the lead of Islamist modernist intellectual Bediüzzaman Said Nursi.205 Said 
Nursi spent his life to prove that Islamic values are effective in coping with the 
problems of modern world.  
Gülen Movement was inspired by the Nur Movement. Whether or not political, 
community‟s area of influence was wider with the governmental support especially 
during Turgut Özal era and then it was time for them to train their own men in order to 
fulfill the necessities of their cause. By the end of the same decade Gülen Movement 
was the most powerful Islamic organization in Turkey. Fethullah Gülen left to USA in 
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1999 because of the political atmosphere in Turkey following the February 28 period 
and sustains his life in USA since then; he is accepted as one of the most important 
Turkish Islam intellectuals as an outcome of the success of his movement. Considering 
USA‟s Greater Middle East Project, its support to the movement which is identified 
with moderate Islam makes sense. Fethullah Gülen is often blamed to be a secret agent 
by the laic circles upon the fact that he never came to Turkey since 1999. Especially 
after September 11, he is one of the most important Turkish and probably Muslim 
person that give speeches about Islam being a modest, tolerant and loving religion. His 
indestructible connection with the current government in Turkey is evident. Besides, 
how he became one of the most powerful persons from being a simple preacher at a 
mosque is a complete mystery. Moreover, he was sentenced to death by Saudi Arabia 
because of announcing himself a sheikh and his activities to attract followers. 
 The movement operates through organizations, schools and foundations in many 
countries. Even though it strives for spreading Turkish-Islamic identity, it has an 
international reputation through his schools which provide quality education. Gülen 
Movement is characterized with integrating national sensation with Islam in a certain 
way.
206
 The movement intends to transform Turkish society by spreading the 
propaganda of Islamic values in the social level. It has a centralist and communal 
aspect. 
 Even though Fethullah Gülen endeavors for not conflicting with the state, he is 
usually criticized on being dishonest, hiding his real aim and tending to seize control 
over the laic state and declare Shari‟a by especially the laic circles in Turkey. 
 Even though the movement glorifies the traditional values, it bears a modernist 
approach. It pays attention to education, but a biased education, to transform the 
society; it defends that comprehension of religion and progress of society is only 
possible through religion. Therefore, Gülen Movement formed an education network 
which covers more than a hundred countries. The financial resources of the organization 
come from the businessmen that are members of movement and the donations made by 
the society. However, there are suspects that the movement is also supported by the 
official institutions and state funds in some countries including Turkey and USA. As a 
matter of fact, if USA‟s moderate Islam project towards Turkey is taken into account, it 
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can be considered as possible. But there are no official evidents to prove this relation. 
Even though official Turkish education curriculum is applied in the schools, which are 
accessible to anyone, it is known that the schools have secret practices to impose 
religious values. The recent incidents in Uzbekistan which resulted with closure of the 
schools and deportation of the responsibles prove that.
207
  
 Teachers are directly recruited within the Gülen community and the movement 
provides dormitories for the students upon request. Laic circles accuse the movement 
with imposing religious doctrines by brainwashing the students which are not 
completely impertinent.
208
 It is also known that Gülen encourages publication of biased 
sources by cooperating with some academicians. 
 The movement disapproves any kind of violence and defends that these kinds of 
acts do not correspond with the message of Islam. Therefore, Gülen undertakes the 
responsibility of reconciliation between different religions, sects and religious 
communities. However, because it is Sunni Islam oriented, ironically it precludes sects 
such as Alevism.  
 Gülen Movement is extremely successful on promoting itself through media 
channels. It also spreads its propaganda through the member media institutions beside 
the social media. Zaman Newspaper serves as the voice of the movement. 
 Gülen Movement avoids being directly involved into politics and it is against 
foundation of political parties based on religion as they could cause conflict and damage 
the reputation of religion among society. Even though, it cannot escape from being 
criticized by some circles on not being involved in a political organization because it 
does not want to limit itself with the Code of Political Parties. Moreover, many 
intellectuals agree that Gülen Movement is definitely not apolitical. 
 Its studies to transform the society usually bear political features. Even though 
the movement does not participate in the process as an institution, it is indeed a political 
movement in terms of carrying out political activities indirectly. Despite the movement 
is excluded by the laic circles and the army, it has a great impact on the police force. 
This situation is considered as threatening by some circles. As a matter of fact, there are 
doubts about movement‟s desire on overthrowing the laic and Kemalist system. The 
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movement was appreciated by the Turkish politicians in the scope of Turkish-Islam 
synthesis project that was supported by USA during the Cold War period. It is seen as a 
nationalist value that can fight with the leftist ideologies by the Islamist circles. 
 Gülen Movement works in the scope of Turkish society, not as part of a pan-
Islamist movement.
209
 Therefore, it is compatible with the values of Turkish 
nationalism. As it does not fantasize about supranational Islamism, it operates in context 
of a local cultural form that could be called as Turkish Islam. As a matter of fact, both 
because of the multi-ethnic society and religious tolerance of Turkish states along the 
history and not passing under the yoke of anybody else, it is true that there is a different 
perception of religion in Turkey. 
 The movement considers that religion, modernity and state are compatible to 
each other. As a principle, Gülen Movement suggests an Islam perception which admits 
different national expression styles but does not deny Islam‟s universal character.210 In 
this context, it is not acknowledged by the supporters of Islamic union who has a radical 
Islamist ideology. This segment acknowledges the Arab form of Islam as the true Islam.  
Gülen Movement accepts legitimacy of the state, but it is persistent on more 
religious freedom. That‟s why it is seen as a threat by the laic circles, because laic elites 
and Islamist elite compete to gain control over the state. However, it is not possible to 
talk about a strong governmental structure when NGO‟s or civil associations are this 
much powerful. This community is gathers millions of dollar every year and it claims 
that this money is spent for poor people, uneducated people and whoever needs it. For 
example, a charitable institution called Deniz Feneri which is renowned by its close 
relations to the community has been charged with fraud. Millions of dollars and assets 
vanished; still the media is not posing any accusations towards them.  
 Ironically Gülen Movement also cannot get along with the Islamist parties, 
because political activities of Islamists draw attention over it. However, since AKP 
started to follow a more moderate policy, they are in a harmony with the movement. 
This relationship creates a strong perception in society that the movement and AKP 
collaborate closely to appoint people close to the movement in key positions at the state 
level in order to realize the desired state model. Henceforth AKP is seen as the 
component of Gülen Movement in the political arena.  
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 The movement organized Abant Platform
211
 in 1998 and 1999 which targeted 
social reconciliation and is considered to be an important step in terms of social and 
political structure of Turkey. Platform defends a government model which is based on 
popular sovereignty; modern, democratic, pluralist, centralist and tolerant.
212
 However, 
how much of the society shares the opinions of the platform is debatable.  
 Acknowledgement of the opinions of the platform by Islamist parties is 
promising. But majority of the society is doubtful about honest application of principles. 
However it is clearly seen that the definition of laicism is in an evolution process. 
It is not possible to talk about a strong governmental structure when NGO‟s or 
civil associations are this much powerful. This community gathers millions of dollars 
every year and it claims that this money is spent for poor people, uneducated people and 
whoever needs it. However very recently in Turkey, a charitable institution called Deniz 
Feneri which is renowned by its close relations to the community has been charged with 
fraud. Millions of dollars and assets vanished; still the media is not posing any 
accusations towards them.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
211 See Also: Glossary 
212 ibid., p. 131 
 97 
 
CHAPTER 4 
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL POLARIZATION IN TURKEY 
 
4.1. POLITICS AND POLARIZATION 
 
 Anatolia has been home to many civilizations throughout history, such as 
the Persians, Greeks, Urartians, Armenians, Romans, Georgians, Circassians, Kurds, Sel
juq Turks and Ottomans. Each of these civilizations left their cultural, social and 
political marks on Anatolian society one after another which formed the present Turkish 
traditions. During the long Turkish history in Anatolia, society underwent many great 
transformations, as it does at the present. Because society is like an organism, changing 
life conditions transform it. Relatively tolerant Ottoman rule which lasted longer than 
six centuries was successful in melting many cultures in the same pot and forming a 
unique Ottoman society. 
 However, this significant harmony was spoiled as a result of poor administration 
skills of the sultans, decrease of central authority and increasing arbitrary practices on 
Islam as well as Ottomans‟ failure of adjusting global transformations and industrialism. 
Turkish, who were seen as the protectors of Islamic world, started to question 
themselves for their deterioration and thought that they would regain their power by 
importing innovations of the West; but they never considered that it might be the 
religion until some clerics realized that the real issue might be the Muslim identity at the 
end of 19
th
 century. In the process of overcoming this problem, clerics disaccorded and 
they were divided into two concepts as the ones that perceived the problem in Islam 
religion and the others perceived in Muslims. The reforms which were desperately 
implemented to reorganize the society caused even a greater polarization in Turkish 
society. 
 At the present day, Turkey subsists with a society that is almost divided in two 
as of the one take its identity from traditional values and the one embraces western 
values. Dissolution of those two identities especially derived from the laic policies that 
Kemalism imposed. Thus, Kemalism fell behind replenishing the space that was opened 
by the elimination of Islam from the social life and Turkey encountered the danger of 
polarization.  
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 According to Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, polarization shows itself in every aspect of 
life: 
 There are two types of Turkish language; one segment uses a traditional Turkish 
which is integrated with Arabic and Persian words while the other uses a pure 
Turkish which is purged from Arabic and Persian. 
 There are two histories; while one segment adopts a history which ignores all 
elements that evoke Islamic culture and even feel indisposed with those elements, 
the other embraces the traditional history perception which utters the strongest 
period of the state that is almost sanctified as a result of the inferiority complex.  
 There are two Islam perceptions; while one is the Islam which one segment thinks 
that it should be a conscientious thing and the primitive sides of it should get 
modernized, the other is a superficial Islam which is traditionally embraced by the 
other segment that is limited with a modal and stereotyped worshipping perception 
rather than its social, intellectual and cultural sides of it.
213
 
 Even though the polarization is not something specific to the Turkish society, the 
recent developments show that it is the foremost problem of Turkey. It is not possible to 
explain the polarization in Turkey in the context of a specific theory. This is mostly 
pertinent to the historical perspective and demographic features of Turkish society. 
 Even though this polarization can be explained by taking several theories into 
consideration, one of the most pertinent theories that can enlighten the current conflict is 
the culture theory. This theory presents two subcultures that are low or popular culture 
and high culture which categorize the society according to their social perceptions and 
lifestyles.
214
  
 Low culture or popular culture was emerged in the 19th century with the original 
meaning of the group of people from the less educated and low wealth society. Popular 
culture is highly affected by the media and permeates the everyday life of the people 
because it is understandable by more people. It is unquestionable that the low culture is 
basically the leftovers after the high culture definition was found. The entities of this 
group are extremely introverted, religious and conservative; they make parts of big 
families with strong ties and attribute a great attention on country freemanship. This 
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group forms the social segment which came to the city from the rural and found their 
own way of remaining traditional especially through the help of Islamist or religious 
conservative parties such as RP. Majority of this society prefers to live in slums and 
usually mostly in the same buildings or the same neighborhood to sustain their 
traditional culture. Low culture is mainly identified with the religious and traditional 
conservative groups as well as Islamists. This segment has a central or conservative 
right political ideology and forms the main electorate profile of AKP, SP and MHP. 
Majority of this segment is the follower of AKP and its leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 
with a bold fanaticism while they strictly discriminate the opposite segment which is 
more conscious, modern and laic. Because of their collectivist understanding, they value 
benefits of the clientelist network which AKP provides for them. It is a well known fact 
that AKP owes its success to this network as it is mentioned above in the third chapter. 
Also due to their low economical conditions they fall for the concrete aid that religious 
conservative parties provide for them through the clientelist networks rather than 
cogitating on the common good. In that sense we also can consider them as 
individualists for being egocentric in a way. However this should not be perceived as if 
the whole group is in needy conditions. On the contrary, as a result of globalizing 
world, this segment also created its own elite, high income society through the 
assistance of clientelist networks that Islamist movements provided. 
  As a part of their traditionalism, the entities of low culture still pay a high 
importance to their Ottoman-Islam past; get irritated by any critic against it and still 
consider themselves as vassals of the state. Even though this segment used to respect 
Atatürk as a figure that liberated the country from imperialism, as an outcome of the 
ascending polarization in society, this respect that was shown decreased drastically. 
Needless to say that Erdoğan‟s aspersions against Atatürk and his values with the 
concern of consolidating his legitimacy and maybe other interests were extremely 
efficient in this decline.      
  On the other hand there is the high culture which can be defined as the patterns 
that distinguish the society‟s elite group of people and is the contrary of the low culture 
that was mentioned above. It is used to define the group of people with high or middle 
income who are well educated white collar employees that mostly work in the private 
sector or civil services while they make a part of central left, socialist or liberal political 
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ideology and form the main electorate profile of left-wing parties such as CHP and İP. 
This group is formed of those who already born or have been living in the urban areas 
for a long time as well as the people who immigrated from the rural but could adjust to 
the urban life. The members of this segment usually come from nuclear families and 
they form the questioning, individual and secular layer of the society while they do not 
demonstrate strong ties with religious identity. They attribute a high importance to 
individualist, Kemalist values of modern Turkish republic and tend to strive for the 
common good of their nation. It is also true that there are also people who imagine 
Atatürk as a deity along with the people who are more liberal and humanitarian in this 
segment. In this sense we can say that some members of this segment also have the 
same discriminative approach as the primary group. The high culture segment started to 
become a minority in Turkey especially after the 1980‟s as an outcome of rapidly 
increasing migration.  
 In this chapter, focuses of polarization will be evaluated in terms of their 
contribution to the polarization, public opinion about the current polarization will be 
evaluated based on the data collected and finally the results of this polarization will be 
overviewed.  
  
4.1.1. Focuses of Polarization 
 
  In this chapter of the research, effects of the social polarization will be handled 
in the light of above mentioned theoretical frame and based on the contribution of 
turban issue, education, urban life and immigration to the social polarization. First of all 
contribution of turban issue to the social polarization will be studied. 
 
4.1.1.1. Turban Conflict 
 
 Handling social polarization in Turkey without mentioning the conflict about 
veiling, in other words turban conflict as it is positioned in Turkish social life would be 
an inadequate analysis. Turban has been a major issue in the pos-1990 period as the 
subject was intensively corrupted and politicized by the Islamist movement and RP as a 
result of the struggle for political power. Hence, the contributions of turban conflict to 
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social polarization will be analyzed after a short study on the historical basis of veiling 
is done. 
 Veiling is considered to be a requirement of following Islam religion according 
to “And say to the believing women that they cast down their looks and guard their 
private parts and do not display their ornaments except what appears thereof, and let 
them wear their head-coverings over their bosoms, and not display their ornaments 
except to their husbands.” verse in An-Noor section215 and “O Prophet! say to your 
wives and your daughters and the women of the believers that they let down upon them 
their over-garments; this will be more proper, that they may be known, and thus they 
will not be given trouble; and Allah is Forgiving, Merciful” verse in Al-Ahzab section 
of Quran.
216
 In addition to these verses women‟s existence at the same place with 
strangers is considered to be a sin according to “A man should avoid staying alone [in 
the same room] with women that are not his intimate.” hadith of Prophet Mohammed.217 
 Therefore, some women who follow Islam religion in Turkey also prefer to veil 
themselves as many Muslim women do around the world. According to industrialization 
theory, religion‟s influence on society should decrease. However, as said before, Turkey 
makes an exception in Islamic world by embracing modernism and Islamic elements 
together. As being an exception in exception, Turkey modernized with religion. Thus, 
as a result of the long lasting political polarization, turban issue arose as a factor of 
social controversy. 
 Veiling is not an extension of the classical burka, but is the new form of 
women‟s involvement in the society. The most important disagreement between laic 
and Islamist societies is the enforcement of western model to leave traditional values. 
Veiling is still a conflict between conservative and laic societies. While laic people 
consider it as an anti-laic act, conservative people defend that it is a human right. 
Veiling issue was reflecting the most important side of new neo-liberal policy, which 
caused rise of Islamic impact in public space.
218
 Those policies also caused a religious 
impact on economy and media which encouraged Islamic ideas. 
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 As mentioned above, Turkey is divided in two societies, as of modern and 
traditional.
219
 Therefore, according to Culture Theory, veiling shows the features of a 
popular culture in Turkish example as it is based on rural, traditional and conservative 
perception. While there was not any kind of issue in the first years of laic republican 
regime, it transformed into a conflict as a result of globalizing society and migration 
from the rural. In other words, turban issue has been the propulsive force of Islamist 
movements and Islamic dressing became a desperate rebellion against this corruption in 
values.
220
 
 While Kemalists defends that turban should be banned in public space with the 
intention of protecting the laic nature of the state and sustainability of the regime; 
Islamists defend that the ban is illegitimate and bring the state and the public over 
against. As the agenda of modernization of Turkey was determined by the state, it 
resulted with entrance of religion under control of the state. Islamist rhetoric handles 
this subject on state and public or the elite and people contrast. Therefore, frazzling the 
statist elites which defend the laic principles gradually became a strategy in Islamist 
rhetoric. The definition of public space forms the most important part of the continuing 
turban debates in Turkey.
221
   
 According to Jenny B. White, the symbolical context of veiling is extremely 
paradoxical. While it gives credit to an “Islamic modernity” idea which anticipates 
women to get education, be professionally and educationally active; on the other hand it 
attributes to the values such as male-dominant hierarchy, gender discrimination, 
considering the motherhood as the principal objective of the women and defining their 
place as home. Some other times it consists of a fashion which indicates being urban, 
modern and keen on advancing in a veiled way even though it is not in reality. She also 
mentions that this symbolical burden exposes the women who really want to advance to 
dissatisfying conditions as it associates to two different meanings. So, even though 
veiling is symbolized as the key point of the Islamist movement, it has a powerful 
cultural reflection in the social life and carries many symbolical meanings with 
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reflecting the class identity beside its religious and political identity in the life of lower 
class society.
222
   
 Turban conflict is based on the social and political outcomes of veiling ban in all 
public institutions including the schools and universities as well as some private 
corporations in Turkey. The court decisions which banned turban in public space with 
allegation of being the symbol of political Islam and application of the same ban for all 
kinds of veiling generates the base of this conflict. The first issue ever regarding veiling 
in Turkish history occurred in 1951. By the initiative of DP religion courses started to 
be organized for the female students in imam-hatip schools which were designed to 
educate male religion staff. This incident brought about the problematic if girls could 
attend courses veiled or not.
223
 
 The first turban protester was author Şule Yüksel Şenler. Turban defender 
Şenler, carried her protest which was initiated in Istanbul out to Anatolia. She made 
turban propaganda through her conferences in 1960‟s at rural cities and invited women 
to veil. Moreover, she drew the guidelines of turban by stating that headscarf should 
hide the hair and dewlap, a topcoat should be worn. She did not settle with turban and 
decided to wear a burqa in 1980‟s.224   
 The turban ban is applicable for all teachers, students and other staff at schools 
and universities regardless of being private or public as well as the officers of judiciary 
system, the parliament, workers of government-owned corporations and all other civil 
servants. However, this ban is only valid for the women who are actually working or 
studying at these institutions. There are no restrictions for the women who intend to 
visit or get service in public institutions. Likely, the ban only involves judges, lawyers, 
public legal officers, other legal staff and workers. On the other hand, this ban is 
practiced strictly in military institutions; while female military officers cannot veil at all, 
visitors and relatives of the officers are accepted into the military zone only if they wear 
traditional headscarves which do not associate with political Islam. Image 1 and Image 
2 show the difference between headscarf and turban; the additional cap underneath 
turban and tying style are the basic determiners of the difference between two.  
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 The modern turban was imported from Lebanon. It was created by an Iranian 
Shiite cleric who lived in Lebanon in order to protect women from Palestinian Sunni 
guerillas in 1970‟s.225 Even though the styles are different, ban was extended gradually 
to all types of veiling as a result of politicization of the topic. Nevertheless, restrictions 
are not too heavy for the women that preferred traditional style of veiling as it is not 
perceived as a political tool. However, it is possible to say that number of the women 
who wear a headscarf decreased in the last years as an outcome of the partisanship that 
current social polarization caused. The conflict forces the society to choose a side, either 
laic or conservative. The religious conservatives claim that turban is a requirement of 
their religious faith, and wearing it, is a democratic right while it is perceived as a 
symbol of political Islam. 
 
 
Image 1: Headscarf Style 
 
 
Image 2: Turban Style 
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 As indicated at the beginning, one of the major conflicts is experienced in 
educational institutions. Any kind of veiling is prohibited in primary and secondary 
education according to the 4
th
 article of the dress code of Ministry of National 
Education.
226
 However, some alterations were done recently in the dress code of public 
schools which can be considered as steps for transition to an absolute liberty.
227
   
 The imam-hatip students were allowed to veil themselves only during the 
lessons related to Quran through the 12
th
 article of the dress code which was accepted in 
1981.
228
 According to the code, students have to attend other lessons unveiled. 
However, as these schools are relatively homogenous regarding the type of the student, 
imam-hatip school administrators were conniving at the situation. Especially during the 
AKP term, the code was mostly ignored. Through the latest amendments in the 
education system which is known as 4+4+4 system, elective Quran lesson was 
implemented at public schools and veiling was set free for this lesson through the 3
rd
 
article of the new dress code which was accepted in 2012.
229
 This way, students were 
allowed to attend a lesson veiled for the first time at public schools while uniform 
obligation was also eliminated. These alterations were criticized by the circles which 
were concerned about extension of this practice to all lessons.  
 The same dress code also allowed imam-hatip school students to veil in all 
lessons as it was only limited to the lessons related to Quran before which was set by 
the 1981 dress code. The middle part of imam-hatip schools were reopened through the 
4+4+4 education system which meant that a student who attended imam-hatip school at 
the age of ten could be influenced to veil herself at a minor age. These alterations were 
heavily criticized by the laic circles who were concerned that a gradual transformation 
to Shari‟a state was in question. Cumhuriyet Newspaper columnist Sinan Tartanoğlu 
states that students of some public schools started to attend all lessons with turban 
unlawfully following the change in dress code which was obviously not practiced by the 
school administration. The columnist also criticizes that the students were wearing jeans 
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under which proved that they were not wearing the turban for religious purposes.
230
 
Columnist Saygı Öztürk states in his article on Sözcü Newspaper dated November 28th, 
2012 that real aim of the alterations in the education system and dress code is to allow 
turban gradually in all schools. He adds that turban liberty for the imam-hatip school 
students can be perceived as a matter of inequality and the liberty can be extended to all 
schools followingly.
231
  
 Following this regulation, it was detected that teachers were also entering the 
classes with turban in some schools despite there was no change in the code for civil 
servants. For instance, Radikal Newspaper‟s article states that a newly assigned teacher 
to a school in Western Turkey was detected wearing burqa at school. Parents were 
extremely dissatisfied with the situation and reported the situation to the Ministry of 
National Education while the teacher defended that she was wearing a topcoat. Ministry 
stated that they were investigating the situation.
232
 According to the 5
th
 article of 1982 
Dress Code of Civil Servants which is currently in force, teachers are obliged to unveil 
at their workplace unless there is a special type of uniform which should be used by the 
directive of school administration. Consequently, considering that turban is not a special 
uniform and the school administers do not interfere, there is violence against the law.  
 On the other hand, even though admitting veiled students in education 
institutions contradicts with laic ideals; forcing veiled students to unveil at classrooms 
may cause a human rights violation according to the international law.
233
 However, it is 
also a dilemma if veiling of a minor is a human right or not as it clearly cannot be her 
free will to use turban at a minor age.  
 Turban is also forbidden at universities according to the additional 17
th
 article of 
Code of Higher Education that took effect on October 25
th
, 1990 which states that there 
is a liberty of dress only if not against the laws in effect. The mentioned laws in effect 
are the 10
th
 and 42
nd
 articles of the Constitution of Republic of Turkey. In the period 
before 1980 military coup there was not a centralized authority for the orientation of the 
universities. Therefore, dress code was defined by each university and some of the 
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articles at the constitution. Upon the mortal incidents and increasing religious 
reactionism the military coup was done in September 12
th
, 1980. Following the coup, 
due to the normalization efforts in politics, military regime prepared 1982 constitution 
and its subsidiary regulations. Ascendance of turban conflict and move to the front lines 
of Turkish political agenda was a result of the Council of Higher Education‟s turban ban 
through the alterations in its dress code for students. Since January 10
th
, 1983, when the 
amendments took effect, turban debates never finished at the universities. However, the 
rule was moderated through the initiatives of ANAP. As the atmosphere was more 
tempered, ANAP attempted to pass a law package which was accepting turban liberty at 
the universities in 1984. This attempt was not welcomed by the generals and President 
Kenan Evren carried the case into the Constitutional Court. Council of Higher 
Education started to call any kind of veiling as turban as a protest against ANAP‟s 
initiative in order to specify that the issue was political.
234
 
 The student protests at universities which started in late 1960‟s had been a 
propellant power for the turban conflict. The first incident about veiling at universities 
was Hatice Babacan Case. Babacan was a student at Faculty of Theology of Ankara 
University in 1967 that did not want to unveil and insisted on her decision. As a result 
of her insistence she was dismissed from the class and thus Hatice Babacan became the 
leading actor of a campaign that was started by a part of the press. Following the 
incident, the first turban boycott ever was initiated and many other students started to 
enter the university with turban. As a result of the unpleasant events, Babacan was 
expelled from the school to menace the others.
235
 Thus, turban issue became a political 
symbol. 
 Nesrin Konukçu was a student at the Faculty of Medicine in Ege University who 
sued the school to be able to attend the lectures veiled. However the case was rejected 
by the Council of State with this decision: 
“Our girls who are not educated adequately cover their heads without significant reasons 
under influence of their social environment and traditions. Regarding this matter, it is 
known that some of our girls and women who took enough education not surrender to the 
influence of their social environment or traditions cover their heads exclusively in order to 
protest the laic principles of our republic and indicate that they embrace the religion based 
government system. Headscarf becomes the symbol of an ideology which is against 
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freedom of women and our republic‟s basic principles rather than being a harmless habit for 
these people.”236   
This decision later based the justification of annulment of the law on turban liberty at 
universities by Constitutional Court in 1989.  For the first time, a legal justification 
defined polarization of the society on turban basis. 
 Another incident was Leyla Şahin Case. While Şahin was a student at Medicine 
Faculty of Istanbul University in 1998, she got a disciplinary penalty from the school as 
she insisted on attending the lectures with her turban. Şahin sued Turkey at ECHR, but 
lost the case. ECHR decided that Turkey‟s sanction had a legitimate basis upon Turkish 
constitution; Turkish dress code was clearly defining the rules and laicism was an 
indispensable condition of democracy.
237
 This case bears a great importance as it 
became a binding prejudication precedent in ECHR.
238
 
 On February 9
th
, 2008 long debated amendment in the constitution for turban 
freedom at universities was approved by President Abdullah Gül. Veiled students 
attempted to enter the courses at universities before the law was ratified by President 
Abdullah Gül, but they faced reactions by the university authorities as the code was still 
not published at the Official Gazette.
239
 The code came into effect by the changes on 
10
th 
and 42
nd
 articles of Turkish constitution on February 23
th
, 2008. Alteration added 
new lines to the articles which stated that everybody was equal before the law on 
enjoying any kind of civil services and assured that nobody should be deprived of using 
their higher education liberty for any reason which was not enacted by law.
240
 Under 
those circumstances, additional 17
th
 article of Code of Higher Education was neutralized 
as the 42
nd
 and 10
th
 articles of the constitution were changed. The legislation was 
roughly criticized by some rectors who stated that they would not let veiled students in 
courses until an alteration made in the Code of Higher Education.
241
 Thereupon, many 
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journalists warned the authorities not to make any changes on additional 17
th
 article as it 
would create the necessity of defining the tying style of the veil which would result with 
a democracy scandal.
242 
 However, CHP carried the legislation to the Constitutional Court and requested 
annulment of the amendments about turban with allegation of being against the laic 
principles of Republic of Turkey. Thus, the legislation was annulled on June 6
th
, 2008 
through decision number 2008/116 of Constitutional Court and turban ban got into 
effect once more at universities.
243
 
 Many veiled students cannot continue education because of the turban issue. 
However, some students which do not persist on being obstinate with the laws attend 
their courses unveiled or wearing a hat or a wig instead.
244
 Even though the professors 
are obliged to comply with the dress code because of their positions as civil servants, 
following this date many universities agreed on veiling is a democratic right and 
moderated their attitude towards university students as an outcome of the 
democratization process alongside with the assignment of rectors who were known of 
their adherence to AKP.  
 The 13
th
 article of Code of Higher Education that regulates the assignment of 
rectors by the President of Republic of Turkey causes inequality, damages independence 
of universities and causes their politicization. According to the law, rectors are elected 
by the universities, but if the president does not approve a candidate, he can choose one 
other from the list of candidates. As a result, the rectors who are known with their 
proximity to the political power can be assigned. Engin Ören‟s article dated August 11th, 
2008 on Milliyet Newspaper states that the rector assignments which were performed 
on August 8
th
, 2008 witnessed the debates which reflected the polarization in Turkey. 
Therefore, his attitude left an impression as he acted with political motivations. The 
columnist also states that one of the candidates that could not show success in elections 
was assigned by the president. This raised the perception that the president had 
undertaken an ideological cleanup mission at the universities. Moreover the columnist 
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criticizes the president for assigning a candidate who was a former deputy candidate 
from AKP.
245
  
 Following the positive political atmosphere after the 2009 Local Elections, steps 
had started to be taken for democratization by AKP. A referendum was held for 
constitutional amendments in 2010 in order to rule the undemocratic effects of 1982 
Constitution out which was prepared by the coup generals. The constitution was 
extremely repressive and had prohibited the responsible generals from being accused for 
their practices. Majority of the people voted in favor of the amendments and thus the 
constitution was changed. Next step for democratization of the country was seen as the 
turban liberty by AKP. As execution of the 2010 law package stopped, turban was still a 
matter of conflict at universities and other public space. 
 In the meanwhile, election propagandas had started for the 2011 General 
Elections at the time and parties were handling their election speeches. Unexpectedly 
CHP released a turban report in lead of its new moderate chairman Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu 
and opted for admittance of the students at universities with turban claiming that it was 
a democratic right; however it was still strictly disapproved for civil servants. 
Moreover, Kılıçdaroğlu stated that AKP should show its sincerity by not using turban 
conflict for political reasons.
246
 CHP proved its terms by passing the warning of Council 
of Higher Education to Istanbul University not to dismiss veiled students from lectures 
off.  
 Even though the alterations on dress code for schools placated the religious 
conservatives, turban issue still remains in the public institutions. Recent alterations in 
dress code of schools raised turban liberty also for the civil servants into question. 
Guidelines of the dress code for civil servants were determined by Dress Code of Civil 
Servants which came into effect on October 25
th
, 1982. 5
th
 article of the code brings the 
obligation of unveiling at their workplace for all civil servants.  
 One of the most known incidents is the case of Merve Kavakçı. Kavakçı was a 
Turkish politician who was elected as a deputy from FP in 1999 General Elections. 
When she entered the parliament with her turban in order to swear her oath, she was 
protested by the DSP deputies and dismissed from the parliament. Followingly she was 
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denationalized as she did not inform the authorities about her dual citizenship. 
According to the bill of indictment of High Court of Appeal dated June 4
th
, 1999 for 
FP‟s closure case, incident was organized by FP‟s executive cadre in advance.247 Also 
some statements of the party executives were indicated in the indictment. She rejects the 
claims about turban being a harbinger and she defends that it is a part of the Turkish 
culture and states that 60 % of the Turkish women are veiled. She also claims that there 
was no restriction of Turban when she entered with her turban in the parliament. 
However this is not correct; deputies at the parliament are also subject to the 1982 Dress 
Code of Civil Servants through the Discipline Regulation of National Assembly dated 
July 13
th, 1984. Kavakçı stated that her denationalization was only a pretext for the 
government to expel her from the Turkish politics.
248
 However, indictment stated that 
FP was the successor of Islamist RP and Kavakçı was striving for the declaration of an 
Islamic regime by showing a speech she held at a conference that was organized by 
Islamic Association of Palestine in USA.
249
 Kavakçı applied to ECHR and won the case 
against Turkey for the oath incident, but could not pursue politics as she was not 
regranted with her Turkish nationality.
250
  
 One of the other persons who rekindled the turban conflict was Lawyer Emine 
Aykenar. She was protested by her colleagues upon her decision to attend the trials with 
her turban in 1970‟s. The bar association decided that it was impossible to reconcile the 
religious veil with modern dressing and professional appearance and discarded Aykenar 
from the association. Aykenar extended the debate by carrying her case into the Council 
of State. Her lawyer also was a deputy of Islamist MSP. As she was also found guilty by 
the Council of State, she could not return back to her occupation.
251
 
 Even though veiling is seen as a requirement of religion, it is also a fact that 
many conservative women also prefer it as a dressing style. This perception also arises 
as a matter of conflict. At this point, conservative women who see turban as a dressing 
style are roughly criticized by radical Islamist and laic circles for emptying the meaning 
of religion by preferring unsuitable ways of veiling which do not fit in the Islamic style. 
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In an Islamic style of veiling all parts of the women body should be covered with 
nontransparent, unattractive loose dresses which do not fit on the body. Therefore under 
normal circumstances wearing jeans, short skirts, close-fit shirts or lurid colors are not 
approved as a correct way of veiling.
252
 On Image 3, an example of the disapproved 
style of veiling is seen. Thus, turban conflict arises as a political and sociological fact in 
Turkish society. As religion holds an important place in rural/conservative lifestyle, 
imposition of veiling to the young women at a very early age by their patriarchic and 
conservative families, discloses the idea of being veiled no matter how understanding. 
However, it is also a fact that in real democratic systems these kinds of discriminative 
attitudes should not exist. 
 
 
Image 3: Criticized type of Veiling 
 
 In the light of the information above, it is asked what the subjects that 
participated in Study C think about the people fitting religious values according to 
themselves such as veiling and wearing revealing dresses at the same time. While 
Subject 1answered as “After a point, religious values transformed into political tools 
and values lost their significance. Promotion of religious values by a political party is 
bothersome”; Subject 2 answered the same question as “I think dressing is also a 
preference; everyone has the right to dress according to their taste regardless being 
veiled or not. That is why; I tolerate and do not feel uncomfortable about it.” The 
answers show that the attitude against veiling depends mostly on the political opinion. It 
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is seen that while the subject that has a relatively laic opinion was against turban‟s 
prominence, the other subject who is relatively more conservative mentioned that she 
tolerates. Therefore, social polarization shows itself in the responses of this question. 
On the other hand, as the second subject mentioned that she is tolerant to any kind of 
lifestyle; reflects the liberal values of Subject 2. This variation will be analyzed more 
detailed below.
253
  
 In the final analysis, as the legal basis of this issue is still not set, turban issue in 
education seems to remain unresolved in the near future. In the next parts of the thesis 
opinions of Turkish society about the turban conflict will be reviewed. Before moving 
to the opinions, polarization in education will be handled.  
 
4.1.1.2. Education 
 
 One of the major spheres that suffer polarization is education. Education has a 
special importance in politics for being the main institution to impose official state 
policy on the young brains. Therefore along the Turkish history especially starting from 
the transition to multi-party period, it was seen as a policy tool by the supporters of both 
ideologies. As we saw in the third chapter, especially starting with the 1950‟s education 
was politicized gradually. As a result of the arbitrary practices on education, main issues 
of Turkish education are turban issue, gender disparity in education, status of imam-
hatip schools, compulsory religion education at schools and role of religious 
communities on education at the present day.  
 Even though colleges and minority schools are usually preferred by the modern 
elite and laic circles, urbanized religious conservative elites also started to prefer private 
schools as a result of the increasing number of Gülen Movement institutions. On the 
other hand, the lower layers of both segments attend the same public schools where 
usually the conflicts on conservative-modern axis arise as a result of the current 
practices. İmam-hatip schools which are the schools to educate required clerics provide 
very limited education and they are under control of religious conservative or Islamist 
parties as well as religious communities such as Gülen Movement together with some 
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private schools. However, rise in the number of imam-hatip schools made a big 
contribution on schooling of the children which come from conservative families.  
 The highly intensive central management of Turkish education does not meet the 
needs of a diverse society. Public schools serve the public interests by preparing 
students for society and by teaching common values, but private schools can better meet 
special interests by providing alternatives in order to address diversity so that parents 
can act in the best way according to their perception of the interests of their children
254
.  
 As indicated above, one of the major issues is turban which is not allowed in 
primary and secondary education according to the 4
th
 article of the dress code of 
Ministry of National Education while universities do not have a common decision. 
Strict policies of Turkish state regarding the turban issue decreases the enrolment rates 
of girls in Turkey. Consequently, if they have enough money, many families send their 
children abroad for university education. The Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, 
stated that his two daughters had to complete their university education in USA because 
of their dressing style. However, another article from Proleter Internet Newspaper, 
states that Erdoğan‟s daughter actually left to USA for not being qualified in university 
placement test.
255
 This means that turban issue was once more used as a political tool. 
 
Table 2: Facts about Turkish Education 
Education Expenditures 
2.9 % of GDP (2006) 
Country comparison to world: 145 
Literacy 
Definition: Age 15 and over can read and write 
Total Population: 94.1 % 
Male: 97.9 % 
Female: 90.3 % (2011 est.) 
School Life Expectancy (Primary to Tertiary Education) 
Total: 14 years 
Male: 14 years 
Female: 13 years 
Source:  CIA World Factbook / Turkey 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tu.html 
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Table 3: Turkish Gender Inequality on Education 
Population with at Least 
Secondary Education 
25 and Older 
Female Male 
2006-2010 2006-2010 
26.7% 42.4% 
Source: The 2013 Human Development Report – "The Rise of the South: Human Progress in a Diverse World"                 
 http://www.tr.undp.org/content/turkey/en/home/library/human_development/hdr2013/ 
 
 While the turban issue continues, Turkey also struggles with the gender disparity 
in education. In Table 2 it is seen that there is a significant disparity between the girls 
and boys in literacy while female education period is a year less than male students. 
While 97.9 % of men are literate, this number drops down till 90.3 % for women. 
  
Table 4: Schooling Ratio by Education Year and Level of Education 
 
Source:  Ministry of National Education, National Formal Education Statistics, 2012-2013 
http://sgb.meb.gov.tr/istatistik/meb_istatistikleri_orgun_egitim_2012_2013.pdf 
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 Likewise in Table 3 it is seen that while 42.4 % of men above 25 have a high 
school diploma, only 26.7 % of the girls are able to complete high school. This shows 
that many girls drop school during puberty. 
 Six year net and brute schooling rates according to the school year and education 
level based on gender are given in Table 4. Pre-primary schooling rates also take place 
starting with 2009-2010 data. The pre-school schooling rate is 30.93 % for 3-5 year 
olds, 44.04 % for 4-5 year olds and 55.35 % for 5 year olds. The schooling rates of girls 
and boys follow each other tightly. Schooling is higher between 4-5 year range and 5 
years. However, when the country total is taken into consideration, it is seen that almost 
half of the population is excluded from schooling. There is still a big gap between male 
and female schooling at high school and higher education. Such as in Table 3, also here 
it is seen that many girls do not proceed to high school or higher education. The 
numbers that were analyzed show that every year approximately 2 % to 5 % of girls 
remain unschooled. In 2012-2013 period it is seen that the percentage of schooled 
females is higher than the male percentage interestingly. This shows that the efforts 
made by the institutions such as UNICEF and Çağdaş Yaşamı Destekleme Derneği to 
meliorate the rates of education for girls have been successful. 
 There are several reasons for above-mentioned disparity. One of them is the long 
distances that the girls have to walk until they reach their school. Approximately 15.500 
girls need to walk every day to attend their classes especially in Eastern Turkey which is 
not welcomed by conservative families as they are not comfortable with letting their 
daughters alone in the streets because of religious and safety reasons.
256
 Besides, many 
families do not think that girls‟ education is important; they rather strive for bestowing 
their daughters to marry at an early age or keep them at home to help with household 
chores which actually can be considered as against the 4
th
 article of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights
257
 as well as the 7
th
 article of Universal Declaration of the 
Rights of the Child.
258
 Foremost reason for the conservative families not to send their 
daughter to school is mainly their religious and traditional perspective. 
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 Conservative families are concerned to raise their daughters‟ as “chaste” 
individuals. Main sources that base the claims of religious conservatives and Islamists 
to avoid sending their daughters to mixed schools. However this perception usually 
contradicts with Al-Alaq verse of Quran: “Read! In the name of your Lord Who 
created.”259 Therefore, it is clearly seen that actually Islam does not have any 
restrictions for education of girls; it only has a restriction towards not being veiled 
which while being educated which would take us back to the turban topic.  
 Besides the turban issue there is another important conflict which is the 
perception of western style education system that was implemented by Atatürk as 
“atheist” (or laic in other words) by those religious conservative circles. The reflection 
of this state of mind is seen in everyday life which beholds the girls from having their 
compulsory education. Provided that, preventing girls from going to school because it 
does not provide an education according to Islamic values and speaking of the human 
rights is quite disingenuous. The question of the parent of a 7 year old to Islamist 
intellectual Nureddin Yıldız makes us think: 
“I have a 7 year old daughter. We did not send her to school. We sent her to the Quran 
lectures organized for minors at İsmailağa Mosque for the reasons such as preventing her 
from being educated at the schools of infidel system, to encourage her for veiling at an 
earlier age, to raise her up as a chaste person, not to have any unperformed salats. […] 
Our daughter wants to attend school, but she hesitates to ask us. What do you think we 
should do?”  
 Nureddin Yıldız replies as: “[However], while sending her to school, you have 
to search for a way to „disinfect‟ her when she returns.” 260     
 If this conversation is evaluated, it can be seen that the parent who asks the 
question clearly defines current education system as infidel and implicitly accuses the 
girls going to public schools with being unchaste. Moreover, Nureddin Yıldız suggests 
“disinfecting” her, which basically means brainwashing. In this sense, it is true that the 
parents are responsible from education of their children, but forcing a minor to adopt a 
certain life style also does not comply with human and child rights according to the 10
th
 
article of Universal Declaration of the Rights of the Child.
261
 The same kind of gender 
discrimination is also seen in the messages that Ministry of National Education sent to 
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the parents. The message basically states that the parents should give extensive freedom 
to the boys while they keep their daughter under control.
262
  
 Nevertheless, there are also the conservative elites which adopt rather a modern 
lifestyle compared to fundamentalists. These circles form the more intellectual and 
urban part of the religious conservative society. While the average layer of this society 
prefers to send their children to imam-hatip schools, high-profile members prefer to 
send the schools which are connected to Gülen Movement. 
 Another problem in Turkish education which becomes a subject of polarization 
is the imam-hatip schools. İmam-hatip schools are the vocational high schools which 
were founded at the early years of republic to educate the required staff for religious 
affairs. The imam-hatip schools especially spurted during 1970‟s in connection with the 
rise of religious and nationalist movements against communism threat. In this sense, 
supporting such kind movements became the official policy of Turkish.
263
 İmam-hatip 
schools were especially embraced and adopted by the religious conservative families 
who wanted to teach both positive sciences and basics of religion to their children. The 
basic reasons for this support were the possibility of veiled girls to study with minimum 
interaction with boys, encouragement of foundation of new imam-hatip schools as an 
outcome of the power struggle of political parties and the imam-hatip solidarity network 
which gave them the opportunity to unite.
264
 Therefore, as the number of imam-hatip 
graduates outnumbered the available jobs, they headed towards other vacancies. Rough 
debates took place about admitting them to civil services such as police force, army and 
judiciary system or not. This rapid development was not welcomed by the laic circles. 
Laic circles have always approached to imam-hatip schools suspiciously.  
 İmam-hatip schools, which were established as vocational schools at the 
beginning, are criticized for deviating from their aim and for admitting many girls as 
obviously they cannot be imams. These circles which see imam-hatips as vocational 
schools propound that they have progressed more than the other vocational schools and 
served for education of surplus imams and preachers. Also they were worried about 
imam-hatip schools‟ transformation into alternative education institutions over public 
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academic high schools.
265
 Again, this anxiety of the laic circles was not insubstantial. 
İmam-hatip graduates had the possibility to choose any university course by the 
amendment made in the constitution by the military government in 1982. In 1990, 
TÜSİAD prepared an education report and detected that imam-hatip graduates were 
highly opting for different courses as their first choice at the university placements.  
 
Table 5: University Preferences of İmam-Hatip Graduates in 1988 
Department 
Candidate that Marked as the 1st 
Option 
Total Placed 
Law 8714 313 
Public Administration 4754 199 
Theology 2496 988 
Medicine 2078 188 
Engineering 2016 286 
International Relations 1255 34 
Other 1189 1828 
Teaching (4 Year Cycle) 1102 404 
Management 496 145 
Teaching (2 Year Cycle) 474 815 
Distance Learning 453 4058 
Press 450 23 
Vocational Higher Education 341 51 
Turkish Language & Literature 285 134 
Economics 182 94 
History 170 130 
Labor Economics 165 72 
Finance 123 81 
Education Programs 61 62 
Geography 51 26 
Total 26855 9931 
Source: Zekai Baloğlu; Education in Turkey Report, 1990, 137 
 
 Table 5 shows that first two preferences of the majority were law and public 
administration. This actually shows that the Islamist mobilization actually strived for 
seizing the control of the state by placing themselves in key points at civil services and 
political cadre. Moreover laic circles claim that imam-hatip schools became the 
backyard of Islamism.
266
 While imam-hatip schools used to provide both middle and 
high school education until the February 28 memorandum in 1997, only the high school 
section of imam-hatip schools remained open after the memorandum as a result of the 
eight year compulsory primary education legislation that was advised by the generals. 
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This decision was highly influenced by the TÜSİAD report of 1990.Therefore, AKP‟s 
progress towards the political power was seen as a hope by imam-hatip schools as many 
politicians from its cadre were imam-hatip graduates.  
 Table 6 shows us the evolution of numbers of imam-hatip schools and students. 
According to Table 6, while imam-hatip schools had only 71,100 students in 450 
schools at the beginning of AKP term in 2002, number of the students quintupled and 
school number grew up to 708 in ten years. It is seen that while the number of schools 
and students remained stable until 2009-2010 term, they started to rise after then. The 
reason of this increase is the melioration of university admittance process by changing 
the coefficient rates in Student Examination System. Coefficient system was a measure 
to limit higher education alternatives of imam-hatip graduates with theology faculties 
which was presented after the February 28 period. In 2009, the coefficients were 
attempted to be overruled by the pro-government president of Council of Higher 
 
Table 6: Number of Students that Attended İmam-Hatip High Schools by Years 
Academic Year 
Number of 
Students 
Number of 
Schools 
2002-2003 71.100 450 
2003-2004 90.606 452 
2004-2005 96.851 452 
2005-2006 108.064 453 
2006-2007 120.668 455 
2007-2008 129.274 456 
2008-2009 143.637 458 
2009-2010 198.581 465 
2010-2011 235.639 493 
2011-2012 268.245 537 
2012-2013 380.771 708 
Source: Ministry of National Education Formal Education Data, Edited by Eğitim-Sen Education Union 
www.egitimsen.org.tr/genel/bizden_detay.php?kod=20064&sube=0#.UjNnM8ZdCuA 
 
 Education, but the decision was precluded by the Council of State.
267
 
Nevertheless, the constant increase in number of the schools and students has been a 
worrying development for laic circles. Also, Eğitim-Sen mentions that positive 
discrimination of AKP government towards imam-hatip schools in every aspect is seen 
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at every step of the process; while state schools suffer inadequacy of funds, imam-hatip 
schools never face such kind of an issue. In the last two periods of the chart, it is seen 
that number of the schools drastically rose from 493 to 537 and then to 708 while the 
students grew up more than 150,000 in the last two years.
268
 The article of CNNTurk 
dated August 10
th
, 2013 states that while imam-hatip high schools were placing only 25 
% of their students to non-theology university programs during the period that 
coefficient was in question, the number rose up to 35 % after the elimination of the 
rule.
269
 The changes can be considered as an outcome of army‟s deteriorated Kemalist 
authority over politics and covert efforts of Islamist movement to reinforce its rulership 
through education of approved generations. 
 AKP introduced the new education system which was called 4+4+4 on March 
30
th
, 2012 that basically raised compulsory education to twelve years and divided it to 
four equal parts allowing circulation between all types of academic and vocational 
schools including imam-hatips. Thus, middle parts of imam-hatip schools were 
reopened.
270
 Moreover, legislation also abolished the coefficient system; previous 
system was multiplying the final grades with 0.15 if imam-hatip graduates wanted to 
proceed to theology faculties and with 0.12 for all others. As an outcome of this 
abolishment, imam-hatip graduates became entitled to have the same rights to proceed 
to any higher education institution they wish according to their rank at the exam 
results.
271
 Even though the previous system was an equity constraint, it is clear that the 
amendments were made for benefit of a certain society. Unfortunately Turkish 
education system at the pos-1980 period was constantly seen as a political tool and 
changed frequently according to the ideology of the ruling parties which left the 
students in a difficult situation. This amendment is also one of many other alterations, 
but yet the most extensive one.  
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 This education system was subject to rough critics with the accusation that it 
would drop the number of students which would attend school and it was seen as a 
focus of religious reactionary and an anti-laic act as it was giving the option of 
transferring to imam-hatip schools. Thus, CHP took the amendment to the 
Constitutional Court and pressed a charge for  annulment of regulation and suspension 
of execution with the allegation of unconstitutionality of the regulation regarding the 
articles which reduce the schooling age to five, implement elective religion lessons such 
as Quran and Prophet Mohammed‟s Life in addition to the compulsory one while still 
maintaining the religion lesson as compulsory, disintegrate continuous education to 
three chapters of four years that would increase drop-outs, re-implement imam-hatip 
middle schools and reduce their admission level to eleven years. CHP considered all 
those alterations as against the children rights according to the 7
th
 and 10
th
 articles of 
Universal Declaration of the Rights of the Child which was ratified by Turkey and 2
nd
, 
10
th
 and 24
th
articles of the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey which takes the 
laicism as an irreversible right in every aspect of administration and life; also forbid 
mixing state and religious affairs. In this sense, prosecutor CHP deputy Emine Ülker 
Tarhan stated that there is an imposition in question through the establishment of imam-
hatip middle schools and implementation of compulsory lessons such as Quran and 
Prophet Mohammed‟s Life.272 She continued her words as in the following: 
“Imposition of such kind of an influence on a minor child is against the rational education, 
[…] and principles of the laic state. Laic state has equidistance to all faiths. The citizens 
from different faiths were ignored by this regulation. The regulation is against the rule of 
conduction of education based on modern principals settled by the 42
nd
 article of the 
constitution. This decision is against the freedom of religion and conscience. No relation 
can be settled between religion and the state in a laic state. Using the laws and the state in 
order to raise a generation that fits in one‟s ideology is clearly abuse of religion; it means 
giving priority to one belief and ignoring others. It is against the 10
th
 and 24
th
 articles of the 
constitution. Religion education is up to the request of the student and their guardians. 
Optional course and elective course concepts are entirely different from each other. 
Everybody is forced to announce their faith through this regulation. Moreover, their faith is 
tried to be measured. This means to insulate the children from their parents‟ influence and 
educate them systematically in direction of a specific perspective through imposing a 
certain ideology. Only the oppressive regimes that want to educate monotype people want 
to use such kind of a method.”273 
 With these words, the polarization can be clearly seen between the laic and 
religious conservative parties. The accusations are actually accurate in regards to the 
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Turkish constitution. As a matter of fact, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan already stated that he 
strives for educating a religious generation at a press release he made at the presentation 
of an educational project. He made the following statement: 
 “We cannot agree with you (the journalists) here but when we talk about „a modern 
generation‟, cannot a religious generation be modern? Cannot it be both religious and 
modern? Gentlemen, bend your head down and think how a generation both religious and 
modern is educated.”274 
 Even though the intention is clearly seen in the words of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, 
Constitutional Court dismissed the lawsuit on September 20
th
, 2012 and published its 
justified decision in the Official Gazette of Republic of Turkey on March 18
th
, 2013 
with 2012/128 registration number.
275
  
 The court listed the following reasons in its justified decision: 
“Laicism is a feature of the state rather than being a feature of the society.[…] There are 
two interpretations of laicism; the strict version does not approve the reflection of 
religious faith to the public space while more flexible version considers that personal 
dimension of religion is a social fact. […]The individuals that are making part of different 
religious beliefs are under protection of laic state. […] 2nd article of the constitution 
signifies that laicism does not mean to be a non-believer; each individual can follow the 
religion or sect they desire and comply with its obligations and not to be subject of a 
different procedure in regards to their religious beliefs.[…] The state should remove the 
obstacles in front of religious and conscious freedoms of individuals and provide an 
appropriate environment for them to live according to their beliefs as an outcome of its 
positive responsibility. […] According to 5th article of the constitution, state is responsible 
of removing social, political and economic obstacles which limit individuals‟ basic rights 
and freedoms and provide necessary conditions for evolution of moral and material 
existence. […] As constitution does not allow foundation of private religion institutions, 
naturally it should be state‟s responsibility to provide religion education. It is clear that 
the elective lessons that were introduced by the code are the requirements of the religious 
education that will be provided by the request of oneself and their guardian. Name 
preference of Quran and Life of Prophet Mohammed lessons do not necessarily mix 
religion with state affairs as the names are designed only to show respect to the followers 
of the religion. […] Besides, foundation of schools to educate clerics was stipulated by 
the Law on Unification of Education of March 3
rd
, 1924 which clearly holds Ministry of 
National Education responsible of the education of clerics. 24
th
 article of the constitution 
gives the possibility of providing a state-run religious education while it prohibits 
determination of the principles of the state based on religion. Therefore this regulation is 
not against the 2
nd
 and 24
th
 articles of the constitution.”276  
 Even though the Constitutional Court stated that the amendments are aligned 
with the constitution, CHP stated that they will reapply for reconsideration. Considering 
that the law is open for interpretation, it can be seen that the interpretations of the 
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Constitutional Court and CHP are completely different from each other. As mentioned 
before
277
, the court also stated that there are two interpretations of laicism and the court 
clearly decided to interpret it according to the more flexible version that is known as of 
Anglo-American type of secularism. However, considering this, the amendments are 
actually against the constitution if they are considered in the context of the French laic 
understanding which is stricter than secularism. In this sense, it is possible to say that 
Constitutional Court gave its decision in favor of the government. This attitude is an 
outcome of the recent structure of the Constitutional Court, which was changed through 
the referendum held in 2010. The new structure abolished independence of the 
Constitutional Court by letting three of its members to be selected by the parliament and 
seven by the president.
278
. 
 While the 4+4+4 education system is still a matter of conflict, there were more 
steps taken by the government that would concern the laic society. For example, 
according to the article of a Turkish internet newspaper Ntvmsnbc dated June 19
th
, 
2012; Ministry of National Education founded 67 new imam-hatip schools in 39 
counties of Istanbul following the 4+4+4 regulation.
279
 However, the concerns are not 
limited with the increase in the number of imam-hatip schools.  
 As mentioned above, the 4+4+4 education system introduced elective religion 
lessons at public schools. Even though this implementation was considered as rightful 
by the Constitutional Court and the legislation was not abolished, its effects are 
debatable. Compulsory religion lesson was introduced in the curriculum at the pos-1980 
period as a result of the military coup government‟s pro-Islamic attitude against the 
communism threat, but the minorities and laic circles were always in favor of its 
elimination. Therefore, introduction of new religion lessons and conservation of the 
compulsory lesson was seen as a threat by those circles.  
 Nevertheless, the worries are not groundless. According to the article of Milliyet 
Newspaper dated January 15
th
, 2013, an exclusion anxiety emerges on the kids that do 
not select elective religion lessons. The article states that even though each student was 
affected differently, the majority is unhappy with existence of religion lessons. There is 
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also the effect of the discomfort originated by the exam based evaluation which brings 
faith and obligation together. Besides, exempt of some Alevi students based on the 
decision of European Court of Human Rights from religion lessons has been a hope for 
many families that strive for rescission of the lesson. However, the families which were 
expecting a rescission faced a bad surprise by implementation of new elective religion 
lessons on top of the compulsory one instead of abolishing them. Moreover, the article 
states that even though some electives such as Democracy or Human Rights are not 
opened, the lessons about religion are always opened. Thus, if another lesson is not 
opened, the students get forced to take religion lessons. This situation is especially 
inconvenient for the Alevi students as their Muslimhood beliefs would be evaluated in 
case they refuse to take the lessons.
280
 Moreover, this system also causes tagging of the 
students which avoid electing religion lessons. As is seen, the curriculums are clearly 
organized in favor of the government‟s biased policy. As a matter of fact, religion 
should not be this much prominent is a laic state. Even though compulsory religion 
lesson is insisted, a new curriculum that includes different sects should be created, 
because this way the system is against the human rights as per 24
th
 article of Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.  
 In this sense, polarization in the society which is embittered by the current 
education system is seen in the words of an Alevi citizen who enjoyed the right of 
exemption of his child from religion lessons: 
 “I am the first person who sued the compulsory religion education and won. My child 
was not attending religion lessons, instead was having a break at the yard as there were no 
other course options. He was exposed to questions and harassed, therefore because he was 
fed up with explaining the situation, he started to say that he was punished by the teacher. 
He was only ten. I spoke to the school manager and provided him with staying at the 
classroom; we won the case, but could not prevent my son to take the lesson physically. I 
also faced problems in my job, they forced me to resign, I was threatened, my son was 
leaving school under assistance of the police, my house was kept under surveillance by 
the police against threat risks.”281    
 This is not the only discriminative incident at schools. According to the article of 
Vatan Newspaper dated August 28
th
, 2013, middle school student Nazlı Şirin El, who 
preferred not to attend the religion lessons and carried the incident to court due to her 
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religious faith, was classified with 2 over 5 for the religion lessons and lost her chance 
to obtain a certificate of appreciation for her overachievement.   
 Moreover, according to the 86
th
 and 99
th
 articles of the regulation, sanctuaries 
could be placed at schools in case of request and students of imam-hatip schools would 
be responsible for education of the public by organizing one-on-one meetings with the 
people within the range of school‟s neighborhood.282 These alterations show that a 
comprehensive religion project is in question. Saygı Öztürk mentioned that these 
alterations would lead to conflict of the teachers and students who practice salats and 
who do not. He also expressed that the next step might be formation of separate schools 
for boys and girls.
283
 However, Ministry of National Education did not accept the 
allegations, defended that the objections to the new education system were ideological 
and blamed the circles who criticize the implementation with not being able to give up 
the habit of education monotype generations by assimilating differences.
284
 This blame 
is critically discriminative and reflects the intolerance of the government against 
criticism. In the first place, criticism is a democratic right and the criticism is not 
entirely insubstantial. It was proved many times that the Islamist and religious 
conservative parties had the tendency of conveniently misunderstanding. Thus religious 
conservatives usually claim criticism as in their monopoly.
285
 
 As is seen from these incidents, following another religion, sect, belief or 
political thought and enjoying the rights that is obtained through these identities is not 
welcomed in Turkey. These are typical exemptions that the laic people suffer at the 
present day. The society is under influence of a strict Sunni understanding which 
exempts other understandings and accepts Sunnism as the only truth and unfortunately 
such kinds of oppressive attitudes also became a major element in politics. This attitude 
is seen either in politics and social life. As mentioned many times before, the real reason 
of polarization in Turkey is based on religion.  
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 Another concern is the elimination of academic public schools from education 
system in alignment with the 4+4+4 education system. Academic public schools were 
serving for the students which did not wish to specialize in vocational or religious 
spheres and could not be successful in the high school placement test. The exam gives 
the possibility for the students to access an academic quality education in special public 
schools that are called Anatolian High School. However considering that the pre-
condition of being admitted to these schools is to pass the exam, it means that 
elimination of academic public high schools forces the students either to attend to 
private schools or specialize in vocational or religious schools. Basically, it can be seen 
that the system covertly directs the students to imam-hatip schools.  
 With the initiation of the process, many repressive incidents started to arise. 
According to the article of Radikal Newspaper dated August 22
nd
, 2013, during 
transformations of the schools according to 4+4+4 system, it was detected that despite 
the lack of interest, approximately 20 public schools in a conservative city called Konya 
were transformed into imam-hatip schools which were previously providing academic 
education. Moreover, registrations of the students who were attending those schools 
were transferred automatically to imam-hatip schools.
286
 Article also states that 
registrations were transferred beyond the parents‟ knowledge. Even though the school 
managers stated that parents can transfer their children if they are not content, in a small 
conservative city such as Konya, where the social pressure is extremely high, it is 
impossible for the parents to take the risk of being otherized.
287
 It is clearly seen that the 
state tries to direct the students to imam-hatip schools which is a sheer violation of law. 
 Eğitim-Sen states that 1,112,604 students which attended to the last exam show 
that the students are still interested in academic education; it is seen that Ministry of 
National Education strives for canalizing the students to educate cheap workforce by 
vocational schools and obedient citizens by imam-hatip schools.
288
 However, after the 
complaints that Ministry of National Education received and manifestations of the 
students, Ministry of National Education had to retreat by announcing that obtaining the 
desired education is a democratic right and promising that classrooms will be 
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introduced that will give academic education in a part of vocational schools. But, it is 
ironic to see that they considered it as a democratic right while they did not think about 
this before introducing the new system.
289
  
 In the recent years there is a significant raise in the number of conservative 
families who send their children to the private schools and other institutions for better 
education. This is due to the raise in the number of private schools and strong 
encouragement of the state in extent of raising schooling rates. Besides, the Gülen 
Movement schools are sought after for their quality education, outstanding opportunities 
and accessible prices as well as more conservative environment compared to the public 
schools. 
 Fethullah Gülen started an educational movement in Turkey and different parts 
of the world since 1990 through private schools, after-school courses, universities and 
university dormitories. While there were only 125 schools of the movement in Turkey 
in 1998, Prof. Helen Rose Ebaugh, who is a sociologist in collaboration with Gülen 
Movement, stated that the number of movement schools reached approximately to 1000 
in Turkey on an interview she gave on CNNTurk on January 12
th
, 2011.
290
 He 
passionately supports this educational movement. Students who attend these schools 
and courses usually score high in the university placement tests as a result of the high 
quality education. However, the increasing cheating scandals in the university 
placement tests aroused suspicions against the movement institutions.
291
 This makes the 
movement identical to elitist Islam. Even though Gülen supports the schools, he denies 
the existence of an organic relationship between himself and these institutions. He 
claims that the financial resources for establishment of the schools are provided by 
conservative businessmen.
292
 However these schools are heavily criticized by the laic 
circles for serving Great Middle East Project by pioneering moderate Islam. In this 
sense, the claims of the laic circles are not insubstantial. As a matter of fact, the 
movement does not hide its objective of providing education based on Turkish-Islam 
synthesis.  
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 Apart from the private schools, the critics concentrate on movement‟s 
dormitories and private apartments which are called “Houses of Light”. It is widely 
known that as a part of Gülen movement‟s education system based on Turkish-Islam 
synthesis, the dormitories and apartments serve as missionary houses. Some people are 
forced to stay there and read books about the movement or Fethullah Gülen. On İlker 
Akşit‟s article on Free Kocaeli Newspaper dated December 23th, 2011, an interview 
with two university students that were staying in the movement‟s dormitories shows 
that the movement does not hide itself anymore. While approximately six, seven years 
ago the movement‟s members were hiding themselves, in the last years they became 
more prominent. Akşit states that the activity style of the movement has changed as an 
outcome of the changing political environment in Turkey. The dormitories are cheap 
and it is obligatory to perform salats five times a day. The author states that there is a 
big effort to brainwash by forcing students to watch only the movement‟s television 
channel and read its newspaper.
293
 Another article in Aydınlık Newspaper dated January 
06
th
, 2012 tells a story about three students that were forced to stay in the dormitories 
and were obligated to sign a yearly contract. The students stated that the dormitories 
were missionary schools and they were approached to be converted to missionaries, 
however when they could not pay their rent, they ended up in court.
294
  
 The above mentioned profile forms the main reason of the controversy of Gülen 
inspired institutions by the modern laic circles. As seen from both articles, there is a 
heavy effort to educate a religious generation. However, it is debatable whether the only 
objective is to educate or influence the students. The community pays great importance 
to winning at least five or ten students from each school. This is why they choose 
especially poor children win their hearts by offering them things they will never have on 
their own and forcing them to perform salats and fasting. This contrast between what is 
being said and what is being done is suspicious. Education system of Turkey is being 
used politically. The community makes great effort not to go public. Like headhunters 
they are searching for poor, needy and uneducated people to include them in the 
community. If the main purpose was to create a Golden Generation it would not draw 
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this much attention. It is seen that the concept is organized; the movement picks up the 
students who are more conservative and raise them to serve for the movement in 
different levels as missionaries. As a matter of fact, every year during the university 
registrations, missionaries of the movement try to attract the confused freshmen by 
accessible prices.
295
 This heavy repressive attitude of the movement members 
occasionally become a subject of conflict. According to the news, movement members 
tried to influence the freshmen by accusing the other dormitories with not providing 
secure conditions. In this frame, the protests of laic modern students against movement 
members in Middle East Technical University were not welcomed by the conservative 
media and parties.
296
 However, in this case again it is possible to see the classical 
victimhood argument of the religious conservatives in biased media.
297 
 The most important polarization focus in Turkish social life was handled in 
Education section of the thesis. Since long years education has been used as a political 
tool by each party which came into power, but this is the first time that the religious 
conservatives have reached their long-lasting dream of being the majority in political 
power.  As AKP came into power, they implemented the most drastic alterations on 
education with an objective of educating a religious generation and they immediately 
initiated the transformation. However, apparently the alterations do not reflect support 
of the entire society. While the alterations are done in favor of the religious society, 
basic needs of the laic society and the citizens from different faiths are excluded. 
Moreover, Turkish society gets more and more polarized each day and otherizes each 
other. Education system which is under heavy influence of the government is far from 
meeting the requirements of a peaceful and united Turkish society.  
 Even though education system has a heavy influence over the current 
polarization of Turkish society, it is not the only reason. One other focus is immigration 
and urban life. People from different societies live side by side in the same cities and 
same neighborhoods. This makes the conflicts inevitable. In this part of the thesis the 
effects of immigration on society will be reviewed.     
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4.1.1.3. Urban Life and Migration 
 
 The industrialization phenomenon, which started in the 18
th
 century in the 
developed countries, could only start in 1950‟s in Turkey. As the result of the 
industrialization movements, the major part of the population immigrated to nearest 
settlements first and as a result of improvements in the mass communication, rapid 
transportation and socio-economical improvement; the population agglomerated in a 
few principal locations.
298
 
 After 1950‟s, traditional and conservative members of the rural culture fleeted 
into urban areas with the hopes to have a better life standard. But while they were 
coming, they also brought their cultural values with themselves and because they were 
living in the same neighborhoods with their fellow countrymen, they could not adapt 
into the city. 
 At first they were considered to fit in the urban life in time, but this did not 
happen. Rapidly rising rural population in the cities drastically changed the social 
structure and this transformation carried the half urban-half rustic popular culture, 
accordingly the popular Islam, to the cities. New slums arose and old solidarity between 
neighbors, old lifestyle got disappeared in transformation of the tribal frame.
299
 Before 
the wave of immigrants in the late 1980‟s, high culture urban population was forming 
the majority in the cities. During the 1990‟s the conflict between the members of rural 
and urban cultures gradually transformed into a status struggle. Migrated religious 
conservatives urbanized with their traditional culture and when they started to attend 
schools, work in the urban culture, their differences caused conflict and they were 
otherized by the modern urban elites. As the conflict escalated, the society polarized 
gradually. The religious conservatives started to blame the laic system, Kemalist 
republican values and the urbanized modern elite for their otherization and they 
organized under the Islamist movements to claim their rights.  
 The migrants created the slums at the outskirts of the cities and as they were 
deprived of their social network and religious facilities, they tended to create a 
vernacular network in their neighborhoods with the help of Islamist movements. This 
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was the element which defined Islamist parties‟ success. Resocialization was provided 
by mosques and foundations in slum neighborhoods. Social differentiation was taken as 
the main data and Islamic clubs and organizations were founded in order to rebuild 
traditional solidarity network.
300
  
 It is easy to recognize the low culture in the cities. Those are usually the circles 
which have large families that live in the slums with a minimum wage. The crime rates 
in these parts of the cities are higher. Slum parts of the city are in poor maintenance and 
the less educated people in these parts crave to become like those from the higher 
culture. 
 Following their settlement in 1980‟s Islamist masses became urbanized 
inhabitants through the help of their vernacular network, development of education and 
employment opportunities. In time, low culture migrants took the place of high culture 
urban citizens while noble families left the city‟s conflict and moved to suburbs.301 The 
young intellectuals, who come from the families that were urbanized short time ago and 
were educated in western oriented state schools, form the cadres of Islamist parties.
302
 
 A new cultural model depending on financial power arose in these new cities. 
Modernism brought pride of the higher class and demands of poor people together 
which caused hostility against the West. Experiences told about Western culture raised 
the aim to commit sins. Therefore Islamists try to imprison themselves to a certain 
lifestyle and dignify virtue.
303
 Islamism‟s success lies beneath the opportunity that it 
gave to the youth, which was disappointed, to compensate this inequality.
304
 
Embracement of Western culture brought the pleasure to a point which is impossible to 
reach.
305
  
 As it was mentioned above, the masses, which live in the rural areas or in the 
slums of cities, manifest their political and social demands with an Islamic identity in 
today‟s Turkey, take their power from the rustic popular Islam. These circles bring 
popular Islam out as an opposing identity against the ruling elite. By the access of 2
nd
 or 
3
rd
 generations that migrated from the rural and settled in the cities into leadership 
positions in education, politics, and bureaucracy; Islam that was eliminated by the 
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reforms again gained ground in public space. This is the situation that laic circles 
characterize as political reaction. The majority of the society that was not heard since 
the single-party period demands their rights now. Their struggle with the laic circles is 
for not losing the benefits they obtained since now.
306
  
 Urbanization is the transformation process that social change causes on the 
behaviors, social relations, values, economical and moral lifestyles of individuals as a 
result of the civic progress. It has two aspects which are social and economical 
urbanization.
307
 
 As the rural migrants did not have the necessary features to adapt to the urban 
life, they had difficulties to identify their new habitat that they migrated. That is why the 
primary relations such as fellow countrymanship, neighborliness relations exist. This 
process concomitantly brings the clientelist relations.
308
  
 The migrant population has been increasingly stamping its presence onto the city 
in physical and social terms, and the migrants have become major actors in politics, 
especially in local politics. In time, the city has produced its subcultures.
309
 
 The migrant community acts as a means of granting an identity to the migrant in 
cosmopolitan atmosphere of the city. In Turkey, fellow countrymanship operates as a 
mechanism of membership to a particular group of people with similar origins. If fellow 
countrymanship is regarded as an identity category for migrants separating migrants 
from others; the requirement for the membership is being a rural migrant in the city. For 
those living in slums, fellow countrymanship mainly becomes a means of separating the 
established urban population from the population of rural origins. In order to benefit 
from the offers of the network they have to emphasize their associations with their rural 
backgrounds. As it is seen, this structure explains how and why the Islamist movement 
became powerful among the migrants. The migrants preferred to stay as a closed 
community in the first years of their migration and in order to benefit from the fellow 
countrymanship network they needed to communize in their neighborhoods. As Islam 
also shares the traditional values, the Islamist network was easily accepted among the 
migrants. However, it is also known that religion is more valued in the rural areas of the 
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world. In this sense, it would be correct to say that affection of the migrants to religion 
is also a sociological fact.  
 On the other hand, this analyze also proves how the society was polarized and 
marginalized gradually. As the migrants arrived in the city, they increasingly changed 
the social fabric of the cities. Urban culture was intensively affected by the rural culture 
and thus a popular culture which is a mixture of urban and rural cultures emerged. This 
popular culture also included a type of popular and urbanized Islam understanding. 
While the migrants were closing themselves into their own local networks, they forgot 
about the outside world and avoided to integrate to the urban society. Therefore, 
members of the urban culture were anxious about the results of this transformation 
could bring to their social and business life and thus the otherization process was started 
by the both sides. Even though both sides had many differences such as urban-rural, 
modern-traditional, religious conservative-social democrat, Islamist-laic; most of the 
differences reconciled through the assimilation process. Traditional people started to 
adapt to the urban life through their schools or jobs, in time the people started to be 
more liberal and democrat, they were modernized; but identity of the people in Islamist 
and laic axis never changed. The migrant groups brought their religious identities with 
themselves to the cities that which were thought to assimilate in time and importance of 
religion would decrease, but this never happened. Instead, the low culture embraced 
religion and modernism together; started to modernize with Islam. This lead to the 
transformation of Islamist parties to a more moderate form and stabilize their legitimacy 
in politics. 
 Those migrants who experienced economic betterment and wanted to integrate 
into the urban middle classes without breaking their ties with their villagers felt the need 
to prove to other migrants that they were not changed.
310
 They strongly opted for 
keeping their identities alive and not to deny their villager past. This also showed itself 
in the social life of the migrants. When they went to their villages, they needed to fit in 
the village codes and to the city codes when in the city. Thus, they formed a different 
identity group. They continued to remain rural depending on the case. Tahire Erman 
cites the thoughts of a migrant woman in her research as follows: 
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“Once when I was cleaning the house, I saw my brother-in-law climbing up the hill. He had 
just come from the village to visit us. I was wearing a dress with short sleeves, and my hair 
was uncovered. I was afraid that he would see me like that. I rushed into the house, changed 
my dress and covered my hair.”311  
 These thoughts give an idea about the role of the rural community. It emerges as 
a tool of psychological support to the new migrants, but also as a mechanism of social 
control especially for the women. It shows that gender plays an important role in the 
rural society and chastity of the women is seen as the decency of whole family or 
community.  Therefore, this finding explains why the urban society was otherized by 
the rural society and why the society is this polarized at the present day. There is the 
saying “neighborhood pressure” in Turkish. This saying is used when the others 
pressurize somebody with their behaviors and speeches. For example kissing in the 
streets or drinking alcohol can be a conflict between the traditional and modern cultures. 
This pressure is highly related to the mentality of societies. In this sense, traditional 
rural circles clearly limit the freedom of the urbanites by threatening their freedom. 
 Tahire Erman states that the research on Turkish society points the role of 
bureaucratic and military elites in the modernization project carried out by the state
312
, 
more strictly in the early republican era. Moreover she mentions that the elites 
attempted to transform the society into a modern, secular and democratic one oriented to 
the West, and they tended to legitimize their leadership in this transformation via the 
evolutionary-positivist view of development in which those “who knew the truth” (those 
who were educated about the laws of the society) had the responsibility to go to the 
masses to educate them.
313
 Moreover, she states that some political scientists regard the 
elites as the motor of social change toward a democratic and secular society, by which 
they mean a tendency of a small, privileged sector to dominate society, and consciously 
or unconsciously to regard its domination as legitimate and desirable because of the 
cultural or intellectual inadequacy it attributes to non-elite elements."
314
 Even though 
the class structure was highly based on the leadership of urban elites until the end of last 
decade, election of AKP in 2002 completely changed the balance in favor of traditional, 
religious conservative society as a result of the rise of political Islam as an opposing 
socio-political project. As mentioned before, this increasing otherization between the 
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urban moderns and modernized conservatives and their scramble for political power 
should be taken into consideration while studying the reasons of polarization. 
 The higher quality of the urban elites in terms of education, culture and 
knowledge as well as their material and power advantage has been a distinguishing 
feature between them and the rural migrants. Tahire Erman states that while the first 
generation migrants emphasized the first point in her research, the second generations 
emphasized the latter. According to the research while first generation feels 
uncomfortable with socializing with urbanites because of not being able to act free like 
them and not sharing the same values; the second generations stated that urbanites does 
not accept rural migrants as a part of them as they do not want to discredit 
themselves.
315
 She cites the thoughts of a young migrant student in one of the 
interviews: 
“Of course, we experience exclusion. Look at the Cankaya (an upper-class district) youth 
who imitate Western culture. They definitely pretend that our people do not exist, they 
reject them. I cannot be friends with them. I cannot listen to the same music they listen to. 
Yet, I can live together with them if I am put in a room, but they cannot live with me. Why? 
Because they are conceited, they put on airs; they are inclined to look down on people like 
me.”316 
 These words of the student explain the polarization between the urbanites and 
rural circles at his school. However, this situation widely changed in the 2000‟s. It is 
true that these people were excluded in the first years of their arrival; however as a 
result of the changing balances they were able to access the high class society through 
their Islamist clientelist network. 
 The Islamist project is also based on leadership of the educated elites, their elite 
lifestyles and showing their lifestyles as a model such as in Kemalist social 
engineering‟s top-down model. Nilüfer Göle states that the present actors of Islamism 
are the university students, future intellectuals, self employed professionals and new 
elites rather than the uneducated masses which are marginal and unsuccessful on 
reaching their objectives.
317
  
 According to White, the Islamists use cultural symbols such as veiling in a 
strategic and deliberative frame in order to achieve a social genuineness. They strived 
for associating the social behaviors such as veiling and gender discrimination with 
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urban/modern/educated meaning combination, thus challenging the social hierarchies 
which related these behaviors with rural/reactionist/uneducated/slum concepts. Thus, 
this approach has elitized this behavior and provided a connective cultural demonstrator 
between the Islamist parties and the Islamist movement. 
 The differentiation between the prevalent Muslim practices and elite Islamist 
practices expresses the efforts to step out of proletarianism as a result of the 
identification of cultural differences with class discrimination in Turkey. However, 
members of the Islamist elite are the least suffering circles of this polarization as they 
already obtained a social statute in life through their education, occupation or political 
activities. The real victims of this polarization are the lower class proletarians which 
still live in the slums of the city. As their income is not enough, they usually are used as 
political means by the elite Islamists in order to strengthen the legitimacy of the Islamist 
movements and parties. These Islamist elites give these lower class citizens what they 
cannot afford to buy and thus force them voting for Islamist parties. As the lower class 
citizens are in needy conditions, most of the time they perform a self-seeking attitude 
and search for what is beneficial to them. The assistance can be given them in many 
ways by the Islamist movements. For instance, it can be assistance of supplies, home 
appliances, educational or vocational courses, deductions from their taxes and it can 
even be a full day at the rallies of Islamist parties with all expenses covered such as 
transportation, food and extra pocket money for spending the day at the meeting. This is 
the main reason for the lower class society to be attracted to the Islamist parties. Usually 
this aid is provided through the party funds, companies supporting the Islamist 
movement or sometimes the government funds. As it is seen, this competition definitely 
is not fair; in one hand there are the people who pay their taxes and try to survive 
without assistance while the groups which vote for Islamist parties are rewarded as well 
as the Islamist elite which use the lower classes.  
 One of the parties which attracts supporters by the assistance given is AKP. 
According to the article of Radikal Newspaper, Governorship of Tekirdağ gave 50 
Turkish Liras just one day before AKP rally in the city.
318
 Another article from AKP‟s 
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newsletter states that 20,000 students were financially assisted.
319
 T24 Internet 
Newspaper states that the coal assistance of AKP which especially peaks before the 
election periods has reached to 13.6 tons between 2003-2011 periods which was 185.6 
% more than 2003 data. 1.9 million packages of coal were distributed by AKP only in 
2009.
320
 However, another article from Milliyet Newspaper states that MHP office in 
Turgutlu detected that the coal assistance which was done by the district governorship 
was distributed through the trucks which belonged to AKP-run municipality and this 
caused an unfair propaganda as it created the perception as the assistance was done 
directly by AKP rather than the state. The article states that the MHP organization at the 
town was furious about the situation and claimed that AKP only cared about the votes 
they would get as the scandal occurred right before the elections.
321
 According to Sol 
Newspaper, the checks for financial aid which were distributed in Batman right before 
the elections were overdraft. Following the local elections in 2009, the people which 
went to the banks in order to liquidate their money, were told that the accounts were 
closed and could not get their money. The newspaper states that AKP was punishing the 
people because it lost the elections against another party at Batman and the aid was an 
election bribe of AKP.
322
 On the other hand, OdaTV Internet Newspaper states that 
Zorlu Holding, which is one of the biggest holdings in Turkey, donated 40,000 support 
packages for Ramadan month to be handed to AKP Women Branch. Total of the aid 
was 1,844,000 Turkish Liras. Moreover, article criticizes AKP for turning the Ramadan 
month into a political show by providing iftar
323
 banquets through the assistance of 
AKP organization itself and it mentions the anxiety about capital groups to be forced to 
AKP partisanship through stricter controls of Ministry of Finances over the companies 
which do not share the same ideology with the government. Besides, the article 
                                                 
319 “20 Bin Öğrenciye Eğitim Yardımı” (Education Assistance for 20,000 Students), 17.09.2011, AKP Newsletter, 
Acc. 05.07.2013 http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/20-bin-ogrenciye-egitim-yardimi/12998 
320 “AKP 8 Yılda 13,6 Ton Kömür Dağıttı (AKP Ditributed 13.6 Tons of Coal in 8 Years), T24, Acc. 04.07.2013 
www.t24.com.tr/haber/akp-8-yilda-136-ton-komur-dagitti/211012  
321 “Fotoğraflı Tespit Yapan MHP‟den Suç Duyurusu” (Criminal Complaint from MHP that Made Photo-Detection), 
03.03.2009, Milliyet, Acc. 04.07.2013 http://siyaset.milliyet.com.tr/fotografli-tespit-yapan-mhp-den-suc-
duyurusu/siyaset/siyasetdetay/03.03.2009/1066612/default.htm 
322 “AKP Yardımları Karşılıksız Çıktı” (AKP Assistance was Overdraft), 04.04.2009, Sol, Acc. 04.07.2013 
http://haber.sol.org.tr/devlet-ve-siyaset/akp-yardimlari-karsiliksiz-cikti-haberi-12506 
323 See Also: Glossary 
 139 
 
underlines that the aid was 60 times of the legal limit which should be 30,710.36 
Turkish Liras in maximum according to the Code of Political Parties.
324
 
 As it is seen from the newspaper articles, Islamist elites only remember the rural 
migrants when they need their votes. This leads to the abuse of religion by taking 
advantage of the lower classes‟ needy conditions. Parties which take religion as their 
official program try to attract people through the Islamist rhetoric.  
 
4.1.2. Political Parties and Politics 
 
 A very intensive polarization in Turkish society takes place at the present day. 
There is a predictable positioning about issues. For instance when somebody speaks 
about the political situation in the country, they can at least predict what type of an 
attitude they have to expect from the other side. Because it is supposed that the other 
side lost their objectivity and equanimity towards the discussed subject, has prejudice 
while evaluating the situation according to their position and their remark is an outcome 
of this prejudice and position. 
 Nobody denies that this tension is not a polarization. However, while everybody 
thinks that they are the only ones that can make sensible critics; they blame the others 
with not being objective or being biased. Even this manner is an example, reason and 
result of the polarization in Turkey. 
 Naturally the most common spheres that this argument can be noticed are media 
and politics. There is a political perception which doing politics depends on an arrogant 
manner with almost no negotiation and persuasion efforts. It is very interesting that the 
media also is a part of this polarization. 
 At the end, politics is the process of reconciling different or rival interests and 
demands in the society. Political parties are the primary elements of this process. It can 
be said that political parties should reconcile the state with citizens and politics with 
daily life. Political parties are the organizations which reflect the society‟s daily needs 
and demands to the decision making mechanisms, negotiating with the other political 
                                                 
324 “Bu da Yardım Lobisi” (And This is the Assistance Lobby), 27.07.2013, OdaTV, Acc. 27.07.2013 
http://www.odatv.com/n.php?n=al-sana-faiz-lobisi-2707131200 
 140 
 
parties and demand groups, striving for finding solutions to these demands and needs in 
the pos-reconciliation period.  
 The political parties which are the primary elements of politics demonstrate a 
top-down structure as a result of westernization efforts. As the system is based on a top-
down strategy instead of being formed through demands of the society, parties do not 
take their source from the needs and demands of the society; on the contrary foundation 
of a political party depends on organization of a group of people around an ideology. A 
new political party emerges and exists traditionally under control of the leader and small 
group of people around the leader instead of cultural and social differences or variation 
of demands and needs. Followingly, this cadre and political ideas are tried to relate to 
society‟s demands and needs. As the system works adversely, the ideological 
transformation and evolution of cadres does not happen through the natural ways. 
 However, when the situations like state intervention through the laws, its 
restriction or even prohibition are articulated to this system parties institutionalize and 
neglect to produce self-renovation mechanisms. Therefore, parties which embrace the 
citizens and search for their needs and demands do not arise. 
 Parties live on and exist through the power and resources of the state. As a result 
of this perception, political ground focuses on seizing all potential of the state. Political 
ground evolves on how to seize the state mechanisms and share them rather than the 
demands of society. 
 Naturally, this kind of a structure produces an unhealthy political style. Main 
understanding which dominates the political method does not evolve on understanding 
different demands and needs, negotiation, persuasion and reconciliation. The rivalry of 
seizing the power and interest mechanisms causes an aggressive and intolerant political 
environment. Aggressive environment of the last sixty years does not rise because of the 
aggressive personalities of the politicians; instead this model necessitates the cadres that 
can keep up with such kind of a political style.  
 However, this situation also produces different issues. Moreover, as their top-
down organization, this aggressive attitude and style spreads first to their organization, 
then to their supporters, the society and daily life. Eventually political parties which 
should be the subjects of compromise become the subjects and reasons of social 
polarization. 
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 As the simple citizens cannot find a place for themselves in the political life, 
they start not to trust political parties. All researches made on the subject state that 
citizens are not happy with general functioning of political system. Citizens believe that 
parties do not fulfill the responsibility of their role, they only follow up the interests of 
people that are close to the political party and do not represent their electorates. As a 
result of this situation, people fall into despair with the political system, inure the issues, 
lose motivation to struggle for the common good and even try to resolve their individual 
issues through unlawful ways. When Study A is analyzed, it is possible to see the 
evidence of this situation. In graphic A-1, the responses to “Which party can resolve the 
biggest and most urgent issues of Turkey?” as “new parties are necessary” by 5 % and 
“these issues remain unresolved” by 4 % of the participants indicate that the society lost 
its hopes on politics. 
 According to Graphic A-2, when “Which institution do you trust the most?” 
question is asked to the simple citizens, the ones provide a political actor form only 10 
% of the society and the individuals that do not trust on any institutions form 24 %. 
Moreover, existence of a social segment that does not trust on any institutions and lost 
hopes on politics which forms approximately one fourth of the participants is another 
big issue. 
 On the other hand, Graphic B-17 shows that 53.13 % of the participants of Study 
B state that they do not participate in political activities while 43.75 % participate. This 
shows that the participants are almost divided in half on participating in political 
activities. 
 The same question was asked to the subjects who participated in Study C. 
Subject 2 responded as: “I think I have a lot to do in this area and therefore I perform 
political activities. I worked on several platforms.” while Subject 1 responded as: 
“We always supported CHP as a family, so I was raised with the ideology of Atatürk since 
my childhood. I did not join political activities that much during the university period, I 
went to the meetings of CHP for a few times in Ankara. After my graduation, I joined the 
Atatürkist Thought Association‟s activities, but apart from that I was not very into the 
politics. […] It was an association, not a political party. But I do not think the association is 
that neutral; even though they do not have an organic link with CHP they are still linked in 
a way.” 
In the answers given to this question proof of the statement above can be seen. Subject 1 
stated that she is not that much interested in politics while Subject 2 states that she 
makes a part of political platforms. As Subject 2 mentioned before the interview, she 
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works for AKP Youth Branch in order to defend her opinions. Thus, also another 
conclusion could be reached about the political attitudes of individuals through 
analyzing this question. While Subject 1 who has a laic and consequently a relatively 
left worldview states that she is tired of politics, Subject 2 is very interested in politics. 
This attitude can interrelate with the actual decline in left politics while religious 
conservative liberal though has showed a development in the recent years. 
 Objective of Graphic B-13 is to see if the participants of Study B are satisfied 
with the current AKP government. As we see from the graphic, 84.38 % of the 
participants are not happy with the government. It is certain that the recent polarization 
affected government‟s reputation such as prime minister Tayyip Erdoğan‟s fierce 
attitude against people that were concerned about the implementations against laicism, 
government‟s strict attitude towards military officers and Ergenekon Case, 
government‟s attitude towards Syrian civil war, abatement of action about Madımak 
Hotel victims, legislation of the code letting imam-hatip graduates to be admitted in the 
faculties other than theology faculties, arrest of journalists. 
 It is seen that 36.88 % of the participants define themselves as democrats while 
30 % claim that they are socialists according to Graphic B-11. It is strange to see that 
liberalists only form 15 % of the participants. On the other hand religious conservatives 
form the smallest cluster with 3.75 % in Study B. When this question is analyzed along 
with question Graphic B-8, it is seen that there are different perspectives in each 
political group. According to the statistics we can presume that especially CHP shelters 
liberal, socialist and democrat groups within it. 
 When which ideology they support is asked to the participants of Study C, again 
it is possible to see the polarization between two subjects. Subject 2 responded as “I 
define myself as a democrat indeed. My parents are a bit conservative in family life, but 
they are also democrats as a political ideology.” while Subject 1 mentioned: 
“There was a big impact of my family in determining my ideology. We were supporting 
CHP and Kemalist ideology. For example when I was at the university I was staying in the 
university dormitories, at first my father did not want to send me there, because he was 
concerned that I would veil myself as a result of being affected by the main atmosphere 
there. He thought the religious fanatics there might influence me and we argued about this 
several times. These incidents have a major influence on determining my ideology. 
However, when I joined the association after the university, I realized that I was not 
Kemalist. I think it is incorrect to sanctify his ideology. Respecting his thought and 
sanctifying his ideology are different things.” 
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It is seen that Subject 2 considers herself as a democrat even though her family is 
relatively conservative. However, as it was handled before, not defining themselves as 
Islamist or conservative bus as democrat is a general feature of AKP partisans. This 
reflects the diversity of party grassroots. On the other hand, Subject 1 mentioned that 
her ideology was generally determined by her family. So, it can be said that Subject 1‟s 
family tried to draw the line she has to obey. But, also considering that Subject 2‟s 
family is conservative and herself also embraces conservative values; it can be thought 
that family has a big influence on defining ideology of the individuals. As a matter of 
fact, Graphic B-22 proves proposition. However, it is seen that Subject 1 started to 
dislike the political ideology which was imposed on her after she became an active 
member in politics. 
 Consecutively, their political party preference was asked to the participants of 
Study C. Subject 1 said that she had voted for CHP at the last elections, but did not want 
to vote in the next as there was no party which she felt close to. On the other hand, 
Subject 2 was confident about her choice and mentioned that she voted for AKP. 
Besides, she stated that everybody should be comfortable to speak about their political 
preference. 
 As mentioned before, especially during the Cold War period Turkey was 
gradually transformed into a country which was seen as a base for political Islam model 
of USA in order to create and isolation line against communism threat. In the light of 
this information, it is asked if the subjects of Study C think that Turkey is still imposed 
to be a model for the region countries. Subject 1 mentions that she finds this situation 
worrisome and adds that she perceives it more as a conspiracy theory; she says that she 
does not want to think that deep. But, she carries on as in the following: 
“Such kind of incidents does not arise beyond the desire of the West. For instance, Mubarak 
was supported by USA; but at the point that he completed his mission, he was overthrown 
and manifestations started followingly. For this reason, I suspect the incidents are only for 
democracy.” 
 When the same question was directed to Subject 2, she answered as:   
“I do not think that external powers have an influence on that, this situation is peculiar to 
Turkey. Turkey is an example country where the people following different faiths live 
together in a democratic and laic system. The messages, which our prime-minister gave in 
his visits to Middle East in the recent past, show that Turkey is ascending as an example 
country. The struggle of the people in other countries shows that. I absolutely do not think 
that the external powers have an influence on that, because Turkey is an independent 
country and it progresses in a good way. Therefore it does not need orientation.” 
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Subject 1 mentions that she does not to think much on conspiracy theories, but she also 
states that the uprising in Egypt was an incident that was planned by the West. On the 
other hand, Subject 2 emphasizes that Turkey was definitely not influenced by the 
external powers and the so called democratization process was peculiar to Turkey.  
 In this part, politicization process of Turkish society and different attitudes 
towards political parties were handled. According to the findings that were collected in 
different researches and short evaluation of the polarization focuses, it is obviously seen 
that Turkish society suffers a great social and political polarization which gradually 
radicalize the different poles. In the next part of the thesis, recent political disputes and 
opinion of the society will be handled. 
 
4.2. POLITICAL DISPUTES 
 
 Political disputes are the main reason for the polarization in Turkish sociery. As 
the system is based on seizing the government, rivalry of the parties often cause 
conflicts in society as each party desires to govern according to its own ideology. In this 
sense, major disputes are the corruption, Ergenekon Case, Shari‟a, military intervention 
and seizure of judiciary system in Turkey. This part will provide an overview of these 
conflicts. 
 
4.2.1. Public Opinion about Political Disputes 
 
 In this part, a short summary of the findings of Study A on public opinion about 
recent political disputes will be reflected.  
 When the general opinion of the participants on preparation of a new 
constitution is asked, 55.8 % of the participants consider it as a correct and 
necessary step towards democratization while 44.2 % consider it as a step of the 
political power towards a civil dictatorship. 
 When their opinion is asked about Ergenekon Case, 56.5 % of the participants 
responded that the government was fighting with the illegal networks while 43.5 
% consider that the government was punishing its opposers. 
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 When their opinion is asked about the tension between the government and the 
higher judiciary institutions, 53 % of the participants consider that the 
government was interfering in the juridical affairs while 47 % consider that the 
government was not interfering. 
 While 29.3 % of the participants consider that military coup was the highest 
threat, 17.1 % consider that religious reactionism was the highest threat. While 
44.5 % of the participants consider that they were both threats, according to the 
9.1 % none of them were considered as threats. 
 The ones that are anxious about establishment of Shari‟a rule were 40 %, while 
the ones that are not anxious are 46.2 %. 
 While the idea of military intervention is supported by 28.5 %, 47.1 % of the 
participants are against an intervention. 
 While the 57.1 % of the participants think that political parties could be closed 
in case of necessity, 30.3 % of the participants are against closure of parties. 
 While 55.2 % of the participants believed that many important reforms were 
done during the AKP term, 23.2 % of the society was thinking the opposite way. 
 While 38.1 % of the individuals believe that religious reactionism increased 
during the AKP term, the individuals who think on the contrary are 42.5 %. 
 
4.2.2. Recent Political Disputes 
 
 If the opinions regarding the current political discussions are taken into 
consideration, it is seen that the society is divided in almost all subjects. Therefore, the 
reasons and demographic characteristics of this dissolution should be investigated. 
 As a result of the research, analyzing the responses to some questions through 
main groups based on gender, age or location may not be enough to explain the reasons 
of dissolution in the society; however other differences such as being Kurdish or Alevi, 
veiled or unveiled give clues about the changes in results on some issues. For example 
Kurdish people are strongly against closure of parties or Alevis are more anxious about 
the establishment of Shari‟a rule. Nevertheless, even those differences do not have a 
common basis to explain the dissolution in all questions. 
 146 
 
 On the contrary two basic data are enough to explain all response groups. These 
data are educational level and political preference, which means those two directly 
affect the ideas and opinions of people in many subjects. 
 
4.2.2.1. Amendments on Constitution 
 
 As it was seen in the previous chapters of the thesis, Islamist and religious 
conservative circles are the most affected circles by the previous constitutions which 
bore laic-Kemalist nature. 1982 Constitution was the most repressive constitution ever 
in Turkish history. Its repressive nature was an outcome of the left-right conflict in 
1970‟s and rising Islamist movements. However, this repressive nature of the 
constitution which presents various restrictions on the ideology of religious 
conservative and Islamist society were never welcomed by these circles and gradually 
became one of the main focuses which triggered polarization in the society. 
 Changing the articles of 1982 Constitution which bore a repressive nature and 
limit freedoms was one of the election promises of AKP in 2007 General Elections.
325
  
However, its initiatives to implement the changes were interrupted by the closure case 
which was held against the party. Following the decision of Constitutional Court in 
favor of AKP, its first implementation had been the amendments of constitution. 
 Thus, President Abdullah Gül submitted the amendment package to the public 
vote on February 12
th
, 2010. Main aim of the package was to eliminate the unfair 
practices of 1982 Constitution. The amendments were first voted at the parliament. 
While CHP, BDP and MHP stood against the amendments, AKP and SP stood for and 
the package was approved with 336 votes in favor against 72. Followingly, the 
amendments were presented to a referendum and were approved through receiving 
57.88 % of the votes in favor and 42.12 % against. Referendum was highly supported 
by the group which called themselves as “Not Enough, but Yes”. This slogan gradually 
became the main rhetoric of AKP‟s campaign. The slogan was embraced by the circles 
which had thought that the alterations were not enough and a new constitution was 
needed or the circles that strived for the elimination of repressive factors in the 
                                                 
325 “AKP Seçim Beyannamesini Açıkladı” (AKP Announced Its Election Proclamation), 24.06.2007, Haber 7, Acc. 
12.08/.2013 http://www.haber7.com/siyaset/haber/250752-akp-secim-beyannamesini-acikladi 
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constitution no matter how which were in favor of the generals that organized the coup. 
Therefore, it can be said that the amendments gained a very broad social stratum. 
 However, the constitution was protested inclemently by the laic, traditional 
conservative and Kurdish left-wing alleging AKP with promoting every alteration as 
reform while they were consolidating AKP‟s political power but not emancipating the 
society. İlker Kılıç states that these so-called implementations were stating the obvious 
by reimplementing the facts which were already established through international 
agreements, doctrines and jurisprudences while deluding the society in his article. 
Moreover, he states that as enjoying freedoms depend on the level of repression of each 
government, changing the constitution does not mean that the freedoms will definitely 
be assured.
326
   
 As a matter of fact, many people criticized AKP for hiding its real aim. Apart 
from the alterations, the package was also providing alterations on the principals that 
the political parties should respect which clearly was an alteration in favor of AKP. The 
change on the 69
th
 article of the constitution bereaved the right to execute audit mandate 
from Constitutional Court which meant the elimination of Constitutional Court‟s right 
to present financial cases against political parties. The alterations in this article resolved 
that a closure case against a political party could be only presented through taking the 
permission of a commission formed under the parliament.
327
        
 The package also eliminated the sentence below from 68
th
 article of the 
constitution: 
“The statutes and programs, as well as the activities of political parties shall not be contrary 
to the independence of the State, its indivisible integrity with its territory and nation, human 
rights, the principles of equality and rule of law, sovereignty of the nation, the principles of 
the democratic and secular republic; they shall not aim to promote or establish class or 
group dictatorship or dictatorship of any kind, nor shall they incite citizens to crime.”328 
As it can be seen, this sentence was regulating the enforcements against the acts to the 
laic and democratic nature of the state. Thus, the political power was given the 
possibility to act against the laic nature of the state and even to declare a dictatorship. 
 Also, alterations on the 68
th
 article prevented the closure of the political parties 
                                                 
326 İlker Kılıç, “İşte Anayasa Paketi‟nin Madde Madde Analizi” (Here is the Clause-by-Clause Analysis of the 
Constitution Package), 22.03.2010, Oda TV, Acc. 05.08.2013 http://www.odatv.com/n.php?n=iste-anayasa-
paketinin-madde-madde-analizi-2203101200 
327 “Anayasa Değişiklik Paketi” (Constitution Amendment Pack), Acc. 10.08.2013 
http://www.abgs.gov.tr/files/Bas%C4%B1nMusavirlik/anayasa_degisiklik_teklifi.pdf 
328 “Anayasa” (The Constiution), Acc. 10.08.2013 http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/anayasa/anayasa_2011.pdf 
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permanently, deprivation of political parties from financial aid without presenting a 
closure case, eliminated the paragraph about reestablishing a party which replaces a 
closed party, decreased the stipulated period of banishment for the members of a closed 
political party; alterations on 84
th
 article prevented the annulment of deputyship of a 
parliament member even if the deputy‟s party gets closed; alterations on 125th article 
enabled the soldiers which were cashiered from the military due to their anti-laic acts 
during February 28 period to sue the military for remitter and deprived the legal system 
of its rights to inspect decisions of the executive power if they are suitable to the 
constitution. Exclusion of premonition and reprimand penalties of civil servants from 
the legal inspection was eliminated through the alterations on 129
th
 article; this enabled 
the civil servants who were dismissed from the civil institutions due to their anti-laic 
acts to sue the state and return back to their occupation.
329
 
 Alterations on 145
th
 article removed the obstacles in front of judgment of the 
military officers in the civil courts. This was the article which made judgment of the 
responsible generals February 28 period and all other times possible. Even though this 
looks as a progress, objectivity of the legal system is debatable as the alterations on the 
146
th
 and 159
th
 articles which politicized the jurisdiction created a biased legal system 
through increasing the influence of the president of republic on selection process of the 
members of Constitutional Court and Judges and Prosecutors Higher Council which 
regulates the basic principles of admission, assignation, relocation and disciplinary 
action of judges and prosecutors.
330
  
 Moreover, alterations on 159
th
 article were changed in the means to permit the 
judges and prosecutors to be trialed for their decisions and gave the possibility to sue 
the state on previous dismissals from profession for anti-laic acts and return back to 
their profession. Through the abolishment of provisional 15
th
 article judgment of the 
responsible generals of 1980 Military Coup became possible.
331
 
 When all the amendments are considered in relation to each other, it is seen that 
this constitution package meant more than a reform for Islamists. However, it is also 
quite worrying for laic circles as the current government is quite far from giving 
objective decisions as it is acting with the concern of taking the revenge of previous 
                                                 
329 op. cit. Anayasa Değişikilik… 
330 loc. cit. 
331 loc. cit. 
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incidents. As a matter of fact, immediate investigation and arrestment of the opposing 
generals that are responsible of February 28, journalists, students and politicians with 
the allegation of organizing a military coup shows the nonobjectivity of the religious 
conservatives. Political power‟s self-seeking attitude has a great impact on polarization 
of Turkish society. Moreover, AKP deputy Burhan Kuzu stated that another closure 
case against AKP was in agenda of the Constitutional Court if the amendments on 
constitution were not done.
332
 This statement implicitly indicates the motivation of AKP 
on implementing the changes hastily.  
 Also AKP‟s implementation of the so-called reforms that only concerns itself 
with a self-seeking attitude since it came into power in 2002 is very thought-provoking. 
Such kind of events decreases credibility of the political power among laic and 
traditional conservative circles. AKP gave political promises in 2002 which are still on 
standby. One of the most important ones was abolishing the election threshold which 
was also implemented through the military power in 1982 and is the highest rate in 
Europe with 10 %.
333
 However, the political power acts reluctant on bringing into 
agenda as it knows that eliminating the threshold would decrease its votes in elections. 
Some of the other promises which were made but not implemented were transparency 
on expenses of politicians and political parties, augmentation of parliamentary system
334
 
and abolishing the Higher Education Council which was established in 1980 Military 
Coup. On the other hand it made amendments on the constitution, changed education 
system and implemented alterations on the constitution in order to provide dressing 
liberty at universities. It is seen that most of the implementations were in favor of the 
political power.  
 When Graphic A-3 is analyzed in terms of political party partisanship, it is  
possible to see polarization of the society based on the polemical revision of 
constitution. It can be seen that 89 % of AKP supporters considered it as a requirement 
of democratization, 86 % of CHP and 76 % of MHP supporters mentioned that it was an 
                                                 
332 “Burhan Kuzu: Anayasa Değişikliği Olmasaydı AKP‟ye Kapatma Davası Açılacaktı” (Burhan Kuzu: If 
Constitutional Amendments were not Implemented Another Closure Case was to be Opened against AKP), 
22.08.2013, Zaman, Acc. 28.08.2013 http://www.zaman.com.tr/politika_burhan-kuzu-anayasa-degisikligi-olmasaydi-
ak-partiye-kapatma-davasi-acilacakti_2122612.html 
333 “Avrupa‟da En Yüksek Seçim Barajı Türkiye‟de” (The Highest Electoral Threshold is in Turkey in Europe), 
14.08.2011, Milliyet, Acc. 08.08.2013 http://siyaset.milliyet.com.tr/avrupa-da-en-yuksek-secim-baraji-turkiye-
de/siyaset/siyasetdetay/14.08.2011/1426614/default.htm 
334 Mehmet Tezkan, “AKP‟nin Vaatleri İnandırıcı Değil” (AKP‟s Promises are not Creditable), 17.04.2011, Milliyet, 
Acc. 09.08.2013 http://gundem.milliyet.com.tr/akp-nin-vaatleri-inandirici-
degil/gundem/gundemyazardetay/18.04.2011/1379053/default.htm 
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indication of progress towards a civil dictatorship according to Graphic A-3. While the 
neutrals and the ones indicate that they would not vote were more moderate and 
cautious, SP electorates were more approximate to AKP and electorates of other parties 
were more approximate to CHP and MHP bloc. 
   
4.2.2.2. Corruption in Politics 
 
 In the recent years Islamists‟ name has been commemorated with a series of 
incidents which were considered as corruption by the laic circles. Some of the The most 
important of those was Deniz Feneri Case. Deniz Feneri Organization is an Islamic 
charitable foundation which operates in Turkey and Germany. German authorities 
detected that 41 million euros of the donations were utilized for non-assistive purposes. 
Thus, the executive board of the foundation received imprisonment on September 17
th
, 
2007 and its properties were transferred to the German public treasury. Officials from 
the Turkish branch of the organization stated that both organizations did not have an 
organic link, thus they set the charges against them aside. Also AKP and Erdoğan were 
accused in scope of the lawsuit. CHP deputy Ali Kılıç mentioned that Erdoğan‟s name 
was also in the bill of indictment of German authorities as the prime suspect of the 
incident. Moreover, Kılıç claimed that it was also reported that Erdoğan received a part 
of the money to assist Milli Görüş and other Islamist organizations in Turkey.335  
 Another debated topic was the ship that Recep Tayyip Erdoğan‟s son bought. He 
was criticized and invited to specify the source of his funds. Later, on a talk-show 
program, Erdoğan stated that the one his son bought was not a ship; it was a “small 
ship”.336 However, the article on Sözcü newspaper proved that the ship in question was 
not a “small ship”, but a proper ship. Moreover, article states that Erdoğan‟s son 
recently bought another ship and invites prime minister‟s son to explain how he can 
carry on his business successfully while other companies bankrupt one by one.
337
 
 According to the article of Hürriyet Newspaper dated January 27th, 2006, the 
then Minister of Finances, Kemal Unakıtan, violated the laws through constructing 
                                                 
335 “CHP‟li Ali Kılıç‟tan Yeni Deniz Feneri İddiaları” (New Deniz Feneri Allagations from Ali Kılıç of CHP), 
13.05.2009, Radikal, Acc. 08.08.2013 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/politika/chpli_ali_kilictan_yeni_deniz_feneri_iddialari-935728 
336 Seçim 2007, NTV 
337 “Gemicikler Para Basıyor” (Small Ships Print Money), 03.08.2013, Sözcü, Acc. 09.08.2013 
http://sozcu.com.tr/2013/gundem/gemicikler-para-basiyor-347635/   
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villas which were higher than the permitted quota for an area and faced with the 
enforcement of demolishment. However, mysteriously the zoning plan was changed, 
villas were maintained and two members of the municipal council who opposed to the 
alteration of regulation were dismissed in a month. Article states that the seal which was 
stamped by the municipal officers was removed three times which was found unlawful 
by the authorities.
338
 Kemal Unakıtan‟s name was also involved in other corruption 
incidents such as changing trade quotas to facilitate his son‟s merchandise and 
fraudulent sale of a real property to his enterprise.  
 In 2002 Erdoğan was accused of tax fraud and a lawsuit was presented against 
him. As a result of the fiscal investigations it was claimed that he had 256,138,000 
Turkish liras of unstated difference on his declarations of property between 1998 and 
2001. He was trialed with the solicitation of imprisonment of 5 years. Nevertheless, 
following his premiership the case was mysteriously closed in his favor.
339
  
 According to another article on Yeniçağ Newspaper, AKP government 
contracted 219 tenders for highway construction to its partisans in the first 13 days of its 
rulership; privatized and contracted a paper mill, textile factory, fertilizer factory, petrol 
refinery, port, hotel, a valuable public property to its partisans; contracted the  
renovation of train stations and insurance of the vehicles of a municipality to its 
partisans; took no action against 1 quadrillion Turkish liras of fictitious export on textile 
industry; collaborated with a medical factory on a fraudulent tender; privatized two 
telecom companies for ridiculous prices and contracted a news channel and newspaper 
to AKP partisans during its political power since 2002.
340
 These are said to be a small 
part of the corruptions in politics. While the fraudulent activities are disturbing enough 
no matter which ideology the people share, performance of it as a habit by a party which 
embraces Islamic values is unacceptable.  
  Keeping the information above in mind, participants of Study C are asked what 
they think about the critics. Subject 1 responded: 
                                                 
338 “Unakıtan‟ın Kaçak Villaları Kurtarıldı” (Unakıtan‟s Illegal Villas were Rescued), 27.01.2006, Hürriyet, Acc. 
09.08.2013 http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=3851921 
339 “Hazine Soracak: Nereden Buldunuz?” (Undersecretariat of National Treasury will Ask: Where did You Find It?), 
Milliyet, 26.12.2002, p. 18 
340 Selcan Taşçı, “Manşetlerin sakladığı Türkiye Gerçeği: Köşe Bucak Yolsuzluk” (The Reality of Turkey which the 
Headlines Hide: Fraud Everywhere), 23.05.2013, Yeniçağ, Acc. 09.08.2013 
http://www.yg.yenicaggazetesi.com.tr/yazargoster.php?haber=26865 
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“Almost all parties do that. But when Islam is used as a political tool, it loses its 
significance. When the organizations such as Deniz Feneri which are based on Islamic 
values do corruption, it frustrates me. Recently we started to see the reality and realized that 
such parties and organizations are actually not that innocent.” 
When the same question was asked to Subject 2, her perception on the topic was 
completely opposite of the Subject 1: 
“As any citizen I am also against corruption. It was a higher threat before AKP term and we 
lived the consequences of that all together. During the term of current government, there 
are implementations to prevent this. That is why I do not see corruption as a threat 
anymore. Eventually corruption is something I always stand against, no one should use 
their positions for interests. This is also something that is related to the personality of the 
people; it is something not related to the ideology but mentality. People should think about 
the consequences of their actions, this is a civic responsibility.” 
 It is seen that two subjects think completely opposite of each other. Subject 1 
mentions that she becomes frustrated when the corruption is done especially by the 
groups which highlight their Islamic values. Even though she did not mention clearly, 
her consideration on such parties and organizations not being innocent shows she 
actually thinks that the current government is also in the same position. As a matter of 
fact, Subject 1 mentioned above that she was also frustrated about the promotion of 
religious values by AKP. 
 However, even though Subject 2 shares the same idea with Subject 1 by standing 
against corruption; she emphasizes that corruption has decreased during the term of 
AKP. This shows another polarization between the two subjects. While Subject 1 thinks 
that corruption has increased during the last years, Subject 2 completely thinks the 
opposite and mentions that corruption decreased as an outcome of the efforts of the 
government.   
  
4.2.2.3. Ergenekon Case 
 
 As AKP government got more confident of itself rightfully for constituting the 
half of the parliament, it also embarked to make an ideological cleaning by repressing 
its opponents as other political parties. In this sense, Ergenekon Case rises a sensitive 
issue in Turkish democracy. 
 Ergenekon is a so-called armed illegal deep-state network which is claimed to 
have operated at the end of 1990‟s and the beginnings of 2000‟s. The network is alleged 
with a series of unsolved murders, terrorist acts and preparing a coup d‟etat against 
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AKP government.
341
 Ergenekon notion was mentioned for the first time on a talk show 
called “40 Dakika” which was broadcasted on a national television channel. Strategist 
Prof. Erol Mütercimler mentioned that he heard about the organization from one of the 
responsible generals of 1971 Memorandum which forced the then government to resign 
and claimed that it was an organization formed of many small underground networks 
which incorporated military officers, policemen, academicians, students, journalists and 
politicians.
342,343
  
 The first proofs of the organization were acquired through the encounter of 
secret documents during a police raid that was organized to search for proofs of a 
fraudulent act in 2001 to the house and workplace of journalist Tuncay Güney who was 
the news coordinator of “Strateji” magazine.344 “Strateji” was a magazine which was 
known for its anti-Islamist publications during February 28 period. However, it was 
mentioned that the magazine was in contact with some deep-state networks by one of 
the employees of the magazine.
345
 Following the course of events Güney was detained 
and six sacks of secret documents which contained information about Ergenekon 
organization and the so-called coup that was organized against AKP were confiscated 
by the police. Besides, Güney was accused with associating to Susurluk incident and 
was tortured to testify.
346
 Güney took refuge in USA following his release and did not 
return back despite the warrant issued on his name in 2003.
347
 Followingly, it was 
detected that the secret documents of Güney were stolen from the police archives upon a 
mysterious denunciation; the documents were encountered buried underground at a 
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factory.
348
 Güney, other suspects and the incidents were seriously criticized by the 
Islamist press.
349
 However, the incidents reminded of a conspiracy as there was not a 
clear base for the course of events. For example, it was never understood how the secret 
documents were relocated from the police archives. 
 Sabah Newspaper declared that Tuncay Güney was a member of the MİT who 
leaked into secret services of the military and consequently to Ergenekon 
organization.
350
 But, MİT disclaimed their relation with Tuncay Güney.351 However, 
later the videos which proved that Güney was an agent were published and revealed his 
relation with the deep-state.
352
 
 MİT prepared a booklet with supportive documents from different sources about 
the organization and sent it to Presidency of General Staff as the agency had the 
impression that a network which targeted the state and the regime was striving for 
getting organized in frame of its own interests and the findings from different sources 
were supporting each other.
353
 In the meanwhile, MİT retrieved a document during a 
police raid to the İP office which contained some secret documents which was claimed 
to show İP‟s connection with Ergenekon. Besides, the booklet was showing articles 
from different newspapers that were written about Ergenekon as proofs. The most 
important of those was journalist Fehmi Koru‟s articles dated 30.04.2001 and 
01.05.2001 with the pseudonym of Taha Kıvanç. He claimed to have acquired a 
document which contained information about the organizational scheme of Ergenekon. 
The retrieved document which started as “The objective of this project is to contribute 
to the reorganization of Ergenekon which was shaped through Atatürk‟s principles and 
operates under the unique defender of Kemalism, Turkish Armed Forces.” was 
mentioning a secret organization that was requested to be refounded.
354,355
 Fehmi Koru 
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received the first reaction from Aydınlık Newspaper, which is the media organ of İP. 
Hikmet Çiçek showed his reaction by writing “The campaign to wear out the army with 
the contribution of CIA, NATO and MİT chefs is continued in all spheres. The so-called 
reports and files are ignored. Ergenekon falsification is only another step of it.”356 
Ergenekon file was also handled in Aksiyon Magazine on May 12
th
, 2001; Harun 
Odabaşı claimed that Ergenekon organization was the architect of February 28 
memorandum in his article named “Sivil Ergenekon”.357 
 Nokta Magazine published the journals that were claimed to belong to former 
navy general Özden Örnek on March 19th, 2008. The magazine claimed that the 
generals were disturbed by AKP government‟s policies and planned a coup d‟etat 
against the government which was not implemented upon disapproval of the then 
President of General Staff, Hilmi Özkök.358 Upon the article, the headquarters of the 
magazine was raided through court-martial‟s decision on April 13th, 2007 and its 
computers were seized. Özden Örnek denied the allegations by mentioning that he never 
wrote journals and presented a case to the editor of the magazine.
359
 He lost the case, 
but the court also did not let the case to be extended to search the coup assertions and 
closed the case.
360
 The magazine was closed following the events and Harun Odabaşı 
was denounced as a follower of Gülen Movement by laic circles. Followingly, another 
document was posted to MİT by a mysterious individual who introduced himself as a 
military officer and claimed that the documents were retrieved from the computer of the 
navy general Özer Karabulut which was brought to his office by Özden Örnek. These 
documents were passed to Prime Minister‟s Office without actions. Those documents 
were the coup journals which set the base for Ergenekon Case.
361
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 In June of 2007, a denunciation was made to the police force that a big amount 
of explosives which were provided by a military officer were hidden in a slum at 
Istanbul. The slum was raided on June 12
th
, 2007 and inhabitants were taken under 
custody and the explosives were captured along with some secret documents related to 
Ergenekon on the computer of the tenant. In the light of the statements of the suspects, a 
great investigation was started and seven that included soldiers and police officers were 
taken under custody at the first place.
362
 One of the suspects, retired soldier Fikret 
Emek, was caught with ammunition that was stolen from the army resources.
363
 
 Following the events, the operation gradually extended and was merged with 
different cases that were thought to be related to the organization and several waves of 
arrests were conducted. 380 suspects were arrested in between 2007 and 2009 including 
İP officials, military and police officers, rectors and civil officers from different 
institutions. 
 The prosecutors alleged the organization with “weakening state authority 
domestically and internationally through aiming a weak state image that struggles with 
domestic ethnical conflicts and fake terrorist organizations by triggering constant 
domestic conflict, chaos, conflict with neighbors and opposing EU and international 
laws; striving for controlling all political powers which oppose their secret objectives 
through different methods; forming desired political powers through leading the country 
to an ungovernable state which the terrorist organization could orientate easier and 
overthrowing executive, juridical powers and seize the state governance through their 
ideological objectives.” in their bill of indictment.364   
 The suspects were accused with intention of overthrowing the AKP government 
in 2003-2004 period and preparation of coup d‟etat plans to this end. Nokta Magazine‟s 
article and Taraf Newspaper‟s article dated July 7th, 2008 which shared some documents 
that were claimed to belong to Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği‟s president Şener Eruygur‟s 
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computer.
365
 However, Taraf Newspaper could not define the source of its allegations. 
Following this incident, the newspaper was alleged with being financed by Gülen 
Movement by the laic circles.
366
 One other proof was shown as the documents that were 
erased from Cumhuriyet Newspaper‟s Ankara representative Mustafa Balbay‟s 
computer but were retrieved through the investigation of the hard-disk. Balbay rejected 
that the documents belonged to him and claimed that different documents were 
montaged; processed and new comments were added by a mysterious hand.
367
 The cases 
were merged with Ergenekon Case and the suspects that were alleged with the plans 
were arrested. 
 Another case that was merged with Ergenekon Case was about the murder of a 
lawyer from the Council of State on May 17
th
, 2006. It was claimed that the murderer 
yelled as “God is mighty, we are God‟s soldiers” while triggering368 but later some 
Islamist Zaman Newspaper denied it and criticized the society with connecting 
everything to Islam.
369
 Decedent‟s funeral was turned into a protest against AKP 
government and Islamism.
370
 This incident was very thought-provoking as it was 
organized upon Council of State‟s decision against assignment of a teacher who was 
using turban as a principal. As a matter of fact, Islamist Vakit Newspaper printed 
Council of State members‟ photos upon their rejection of the case. Vakit was alleged 
with showing the target for the murder.
371
 However, two days after the incident 
President Abdullah Gül announced that the murderer was instigated by a former 
military officer, Muzaffer Tekin following the acquirement of telephone conversations 
of two. Thus, the case was merged to Ergenekon and two generals and the murderer 
were arrested. Also the responsible of the security company who was claimed to 
obfuscate the evidences was trialed. 
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 One of the most polemical cases that was merged with Ergenekon Case was 
ÇYDD Case with the alledging its eight executive board members with being the 
member of Ergenekon organization, providing secret documents related to state security 
and violating the right of privacy.
372
 It was claimed that one another leg of the 
Ergenekon organization was the “Ata Houses” of ÇYDD which were claimed to be 
private houses for the naval academy students to stay and brainwashed in order to be 
raised with Kemalist principles. According to the bill of indictment the girls that the 
organization would pick up were planned to pair up with the naval academy students 
and keep them under control.
373
 On the other hand, officials from the organization were 
explaining the purpose of the houses as “Ata Houses is a dormitory project for the girls 
who do not have means to support themselves which will enable the girls to have 
important roles in the future of Turkey; embrace laic, Kemalist, democratic and 
constitutional features of the state; complete their education without getting under 
influence of Islamist fascism, religious reactionist understanding and Islamist tariqahs 
and organizations in the first years of their university life.”374 The allegation against the 
organization was based on the deleted documents on the computers of a branch of the 
organization. The members of the organization rejected the claims; mentioned that they 
had never seen the documents, the claims were against the philosophy of the 
organization and they should have been placed by a secret hand. Moreover, another 
scandal arose in April 2012; it was detected that the prosecution never sent four folders 
of indictment to the court during the lawsuit that was seen since 2010. The situation 
withdrew attention as the court was handling the trial with missing documents and the 
incident was protested by the lawyers. As a matter of fact, the hard disk was sent to an 
independent consulting company in USA and it was detected that the computer was 
turned off on April 10
th
, 2009 at 20:48; the documents were uploaded to the hard disk 
from a different computer after that time the same day and deleted followingly while the 
police raid to ÇYDD office was conducted three days after the incident. The company 
also detected that date of the computer which the documents were uploaded was 
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changed to show as if the documents were uploaded months before the incident. Lawyer 
of ÇYDD stated that the report of the consulting company proved that how easy it was 
to create fake documents and the documents were uploaded to the computer by a secret 
hand. Considering that the digital documents hold an important place in the cases which 
sat on country‟s agenda and other similar corruption was detected in also the other cases 
showed that it was an organized digital attack.
375
 Thus, the suspects were absolved, but 
these findings seriously damaged the legitimacy of Ergenekon Case. Nevertheless, the 
biased attitude of the prosecution is clearly seen from the incident.  
 Ergenekon organization was also alleged with several assassination plans against 
the influential clerics, an action plan to a shopping mall
376
, planning the murder of four 
Christians in Malatya
377
, selling weapons to the murderer of the Council of State 
incident, threatening Zekeriya Öz, the prosecutor of Ergenekon Case and attacking to 
Cumhuriyet Newspaper headquarters.  Sixteen other cases were merged to Ergenekon 
Case which made it the greatest organized crime case in Turkish history. A total of 78 
people were sentenced to imprisonment.
378
 
 As a second step of the Ergenekon, government also initiated another 
investigation against the military officers that were said to plan a coup against AKP. 
The operation was called Balyoz; however it did not bear much attention as most of the 
officers were already under arrest. It is said that the number of the people who are 
triealed in both Ergenekon and Balyoz have reached to 743. 
 Even though the allegations cannot be completely ignored as the existence of 
deep-state was known since 1990‟s, the evidences that were acquired are criticized not 
to be clear and their validity to be debatable. As a matter of fact, many evidences 
acquired are claimed to be falsified through a mysterious hand by the suspects. 
Investigation process and the methods that were used while collecting the evidences are 
thought-provoking. Prosecution cannot show its informants with the pretext to hear 
them as secret witnesses and cannot explain the incoherency of some allegations. 
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Moreover, connections of the attorney general who started the case were revealed with 
Gülen Movement recently. Therefore this case still carries its mystery and it is widely 
believed that 78 people were imprisoned with fake evidences by the laic circles. 
Recently it was detected that the evidences that were found in Çağdaş Yaşamı 
Destekleme Derneği‟s computer were corrupted by someone through the alterations 
made in the date and time of the documents.
379
 Therefore, even if the suspects were 
imprisoned, it still is a current issue and it does not seem to fall off the agenda until the 
prosecution can enlighten the mysterious events. This case also plays a significant role 
in polarization of the society as laic circles see it as a threat for democracy; religious 
conservatives think that it is a step for democratization.  
 When Ergenkon Case is taken into consideration, 87 % of the AKP electorates 
mentioned that government was fighting against the illegal networks while 83 % of 
CHP voters thought that the government was punishing its opposers according to 
Graphic A-4.  Majority of neutrals and SP electorates also shared the opinion that 
government was fighting against the illegal networks.  
 
4.2.2.4. Other Disputes 
 
 If the tension between the government and judiciary institutions is considered, it 
is seen that 80 % of AKP electorates mentioned that government was not interfering in 
juridical affairs while 88 % of CHP and 77 % of MHP electorates were in the opposite 
opinion according to Graphic A-5. 
 The threat of a military coup seems to be the highest threat according to 71 % of 
SP partisans and 46 % of AKP partisans while it was the highest for 12 % of CHP 
supporters. On the other hand, religious reactionism seems to be the highest threat for 
41 % of CHP partisans while it was the highest only for 6 % of AKP partisans and 3 % 
of SP partisans according to Graphic A-7. 
 The individuals that were more anxious about the establishment of Shari‟a rule 
were CHP electorates while the partisans of SP and AKP formed the least concerned 
group about that. According to Graphic A-8, only 25 % of AKP partisans and 11 % of 
SP partisans were anxious about the establishment of Shari‟a rule while 73 % of CHP 
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partisans considered Shari‟a as a threat. In overall statistics 41 % of participants 
considered Shari‟a as a threat. 
 Majority of the individuals who supported that political parties should be closed 
when necessary were CHP and MHP partisans while the majority of AKP partisans 
were against this opinion. According to Graphic A-9, 47 % of AKP partisans who 
participated in Study A agreed that parties should be closed when necessary while 71 % 
of CHP partisans agreed. However, it is very interesting to see that 64 % of Islamist SP 
partisans agreed that political parties should be closed when necessary considering the 
previously closed Islamist parties which were the pioneers of SP such as FP and RP. 
 Majority of the individuals who supported that military could seize the political 
power when necessary were CHP and MHP partisans while the majority of AKP 
electorates were against this proposition. According to the statistics in Graphic A-10, 51 
% of CHP partisans approved the proposition while only 27 % of AKP and 29 % of SP 
partisans agreed.  
 
4.2.3. An Evaluation of Politicization 
 
 When actual politics is considered, dissolution depending on the political party 
preferences and a common attitude among the party electorates can be seen. This may 
be considered as normal if we think that each individual has a worldview and they can 
adopt a similar attitude on similar issues.  
 When electorate attitude is taken into consideration, it is widely accepted that 
society disunites on axes such as right/left, laic/anti-laic, authoritarian/democratic etc. 
and make their preferences according to that. Another model which is also widely 
accepted is the electorate‟s economic perception and expectations play an important role 
on their political preferences. 
 Generally it is accepted that age, gender, education, income, basic 
demographical features and values define individuals‟ course of action and political 
preferences. Also there is the opinion that behaviors and preferences develop as a result 
of a consideration and comprehension process in this acknowledgement.  
 Each of these models explains the formation of preferences on some choices 
until a certain point. All those approaches pre-accept that the electorate behaves 
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rationally. But, we know that emotions, anxieties, perceptions and expectations also 
play a role in electorate‟s behavior as well as the rational intelligence and evaluations at 
the present day. 
 Whereas, it is known that either life or our thoughts do not develop this way. 
Our preferences and thoughts form through the interaction of our minds, emotions and 
social conditions. Therefore, the way these elements interact with each other is very 
important. 
 One other point is our experiments and the lessons we learn from these 
experiments. The social conditions of the day, emotional complexities affect our 
preferences and this can cause construing the same incident differently each time 
depending on our changing experiences. Therefore, the people cannot be manipulated 
easily. Their preference develops as a result of the interaction of their mind with their 
emotions and perceptions.  
 Now it will be investigated if people‟s expectations and perceptions change 
according to these political attitudes and if the same electorate cluster shows behaviors 
and attitudes towards the same direction as a bloc. 
 
4.2.4. Expectations from Life and Perceptions 
 
 A general dissatisfaction is observed when the responses to a group of questions 
are taken into account. According to Study A, three-fifths of the participants think that 
the life standards got worse in Turkey in general and one-third of the participants think 
that the future of the country is not bright. The ones which think that the state of affairs 
is getting worse constitute the half of the participants.  
 According to Study A, the propositions that show the rates of the participants 
which responded as “yes” on Graphic A-11 can be divided in two and satisfaction of the 
individuals can be evaluated through the questions asked. 
 As a result of this analyze it is seen that while young people‟s satisfaction from 
individual life is the highest, they are the ones who are the most pessimist about social 
life. University graduates‟ dissatisfaction is above the average according to the 
statistics. As education level increases, satisfaction from social life decreases while 
satisfaction from individual life increases. On the other hand, while satisfaction from 
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individual life is the highest among students and high-level employees, their satisfaction 
from the social life decreases. The most dissatisfied group from both individual life and 
social life arise as the blue-collar workers.  
 Also the followers of Alevi faith are among the lowest rank about satisfaction. 
The ones define themselves as religious has a higher satisfaction index compared to the 
others. The ones live in slums are the most dissatisfied segment of the country. On the 
other hand, the people live in luxury condos and apartments are relatively more 
satisfied. 
 The results on Graphic A-12 show that there is diversity on expectations from 
life and perceptions depending on the political preference. It is seen that the most 
satisfied group is AKP partisans and CHP partisans have the lowest rank on individual 
satisfaction. Interestingly AKP supporters arise as the segment that has highest rank 
both in individual life and personal life.  
 According to Study A, when an overall ranking is done according to the 
satisfaction scores of each demographic cluster, the alignment of the ones at the bottom 
and the ones at the top indicates an interesting situation. Existence of three clusters 
within each of the five clusters which are formed according to the political preferences 
and categorized between the most satisfied and the most dissatisfied on Graphic A-12 
points out that the diversity on political preferences affects the perception of satisfaction 
from life and form variations depending on political preferences not only on current 
issues but also on perceptions if Graphic A-13 is studied.     
 
4.3. CONTRIBUTION OF DIFFERENT SOCIAL CLUSTERS TO 
 POLARIZATION  
 
 Now, the type of polarization will be investigated through handling the nine 
questions which were asked to the participants of Study A and analyzing if the 
participants made their preference on the same direction.  
 Political reactionism increased during AKP government. 
 Many important and useful reforms/innovations/legal alterations were done in 
some spheres during AKP term. 
 I am anxious about establishment of Shari‟a rule. 
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 Is military coup or religious reactionism a higher threat for Turkey? 
 Military can seize power when necessary. 
 Political parties should be closed when necessary. 
 Which of the following answers explain your opinion on the debates about 
Ergenekon Case better? 
 Which of the following sentences explain your opinion on the debates about 
judiciary and government relation better? 
 Which of the following sentences is true in your opinion about the debates on 
constitutional amendments? 
 A political index has been created by evaluation of the answers of nine questions 
altogether. An increase on the scores of this index indicates that the opinions in favor of 
AKP have increased and a decrease on the scores indicates that the opinions to the 
detriment of AKP have increased. In other words, if all nine answers are in favor of 
AKP, the score will be 9 and if all questions are to the detriment of AKP, the score will 
be 0. Thus, it will be possible to see if a political polarization is in question or not by 
determining if there is accumulation in 0 and 9 or not. 
  Study A shows that when the evaluation is done based on the main demographic 
features of the participants, there is no polarization. However, when an analysis based 
on cultural identities is done, the statistics on Graphic A-14 show that there is a serious 
accumulation. According to the statistics, Alevi participants display an attitude to the 
detriment of AKP while Kurdish citizens display an attitude in favor of AKP. This 
situation proves that how influential are the identities in decision making of the Turkish 
society. 
 Moreover, it is possible to see the situation which arises if an analysis based on 
political preferences of the participants is done on Graphic A-15. According to Graphic 
A-15, CHP and MHP electorates and AKP electorates form opposite blocks. According 
to Study A, the findings based on Graphic A-15 are the proof of the polarization. 
 In the next part an answer will be sought if the polarization is an outcome of the 
preferences on political parties or if it is produced by people‟s lifestyles; if the party in 
power is the only responsible for polarization; if the conflict in the daily life is caused 
by politics or if the politics live on this conflict and if the situation could be resolved 
through the changes in the attitudes of politicians.    
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4.3.1. Social Clusters 
 
 A cluster analysis was made according to the answers that were taken about the 
social life in Study A. This analysis method serves for grouping the cases that are 
similar to each other in a data set and create different clusters. Grouping the participants 
created three clusters that are different from each other but has many in common. When 
these clusters are studied, it is possible to see that they correspond to different opinions 
and values in Turkish society. These clusters can be named as Moderns, Traditional 
Conservatives and Religious Conservatives. 
 
4.3.1.1. Moderns 
 
 This cluster represents 30.8 % of the society. While the approximate education 
score is 7.8 years in Turkey, the ones in this cluster are formed of a more educated 
segment with 8.8 years of education. Moreover they predominantly were born in the 
western regions. It is seen that pensioners, private sector employees and students are 
slightly higher than the average of Turkey in this cluster. Another feature that attracts 
attention of this cluster is the higher percentage of people that live in luxury condos and 
apartments than the ones that live in traditional houses or slums. 
 While the percentage of unveiled women in Turkey is 27 %, 21 % among 
traditional conservatives and 14 % among religious conservatives; the fact that 52 % of 
the people in this cluster do not veil is remarkable. The ones wear turbans or burkas 
form only 2 % of the cluster.  
 In moderns cluster, which draws a similar profile to the distribution based on 
country regarding the ethnical identity, sect profile indicates a difference. 12 % of the 
cluster states that they are Alevis. As a matter of fact, 84 % of the participants who 
stated that they are Alevis take place in this cluster. In the meanwhile the ones in this 
cluster have been those who fulfill the religious requirements the least. 
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4.3.1.2. Traditional Conservatives 
 
 32.8 % of the society takes place in this cluster. In the traditional conservatives 
cluster, education score is the closest to the country average of 7.8 years with 7.5 years. 
Farmers and artisans are above Turkey‟s average while public officers and high level 
employees are under the average in this cluster. 
 Considering veiling, religiousness and monthly income, this cluster is very 
similar to overall Turkey. It is ethnically homogenous; 95 % of the people in this cluster 
define themselves as Turkish while country average is 87 %. 
 57 % of this cluster lives in traditional individual houses and the members of this 
cluster are the ones which lives in rural areas the most with 23 % while 30 % lives in 
apartments at urban districts. Therefore, this cluster draws a different profile compared 
to the country average and shows that it also has a traditional structure geographically. 
 
4.3.1.3. Religious Conservatives 
 
 36.5 % of the society constitutes this cluster. The one-thirds of this cluster, 
whose education score is the lowest with 7.2 years, was born in eastern regions which is 
the highest rank among the clusters. While a quarter of this cluster lives in Istanbul, 14 
% of it is located in Southeastern Anatolia. 
 While artisans and farmers are slightly higher, it can be seen that the students are 
less. Monthly income is almost the same with the average of Turkey. The veiled women 
constitute the highest percentage among all clusters with 74 % while only 14 % of the 
cluster is not veiled.  
 Percentage of the Kurdish population arises as 18 % in this cluster while the 
ratio is 12 % on Turkey average. 65 % of the people who define themselves as Kurdish 
are categorized under 65 %. On the other hand, Turks are distributed equally in clusters. 
  The ones who define themselves as the most religious have identified 
themselves as “a religious person that tries to meet all requirements of religion” or 
“meeting all requirements of religion” or Islamist in other words. 
 
 
 167 
 
4.3.2. Political Agenda and Polarization 
 
 Based on the findings of Study A, the profiles of these clusters would be 
understood clearer based on the perception of the participants on recent political 
developments. They would be expected to reflect their values while evaluating these 
developments. However, their strictness in attitudes will provide the information on the 
depth of polarization. 
 The profiles of these clusters can be understood through analyzing how their 
members perceive the current political developments. There are the answers of 
individuals from these clusters in the Graphics A-16, A-17, A-18 and A-19. 
 In all four questions, it is seen that moderns and religious conservatives provided 
almost completely opposite answers while traditional conservatives assumed a more 
moderate attitude. 
 While 71 % of moderns believe that government punishes its opposers through 
this case, 84 % of religious conservatives defend that government‟s goal is to fight with 
illegal networks. Correspondingly, when the government‟s relation with the judiciary 
institutions is taken into consideration, 80 % of moderns claim that government 
restraints prosecutors and judges while 77 % of religious conservatives think that 
government does not interfere with the judiciary affairs. While 88 % of religious 
conservatives support the amendments on the constitution, 73 % of the moderns are 
against the amendments. Religious conservatives consider military coup and moderns 
consider religious reactionism as a higher threat, but indication of the military coup as a 
higher threat by 17 % more by the religious conservatives compared to what the 
moderns have said for religious reactionism being a threat is remarkable.  
 A more different picture is observed when questions regarding AKP and 
democratic values, which include long term evaluations, are analyzed on the basis of 
three different clusters. 
 In all five questions on Graphics A-20, A-21, A-22, A-23 and A-24, it is seen 
that moderns and religious conservatives gave almost completely opposite answers. 
Even though the traditional conservatives approach moderately, they are the strictest 
group about military‟s seizure of power and political parties‟ closure when necessary. 
 168 
 
 While 72 % of moderns agree that religious reactionism has increased during 
AKP term, only 40 % of traditional conservatives and 8 % of religious conservatives 
share this opinion. The participants who think that important reforms were made during 
AKP term are 28 % of moderns, 49 % of traditional conservatives and 83 % of religious 
conservatives. The ones that are anxious about the establishment of Shari‟a rule are 70 
% of moderns, 46 % of traditional conservatives and 11 % of religious conservatives. 
 Study C has important findings on satisfaction from the current AKP 
government. It is asked if the subjects were satisfied about the implementations of 
current AKP government. Subject 1 mentions that AKP is doing a good job, but she 
adds “However, promotion of religious values at the term of AKP government makes 
me uncomfortable. While religion was never discussed at my home before, it became a 
daily subject recently.” On the other hand, Subject 2 states: 
“I am very satisfied about its implementations; that is why I voted for it. I am especially 
satisfied with their positive attitude towards innovative ideas, efforts to solve problems and 
progress in domestic and international politics. Only the rapid transformations in Turkey‟s 
agenda and bad reactions against AKP for these implementations were challenging, it 
would be better if implementations were done gradually.” 
Here, the difference between the two perceptions is obvious. It is clear that Subject 1 
appreciates the implementations, but she is also uncomfortable with the prominence of 
religion in the political agenda while Subject 2 is very satisfied with the 
implementations. Depending on the answers, it can be said that this question directly 
corresponds to the findings of Graphic A-21. 
 The participants who share the opinion that military can seize the power when 
necessary are 53 % of traditional conservatives, 48 % of moderns and 18 % of religious 
conservatives. 75 % of traditional conservatives, 64 % of moderns and 35 % of religious 
conservatives share the opinion that parties can be closed when necessary. 
 As it is seen, there are serious differences between the three social clusters 
regarding the opinions and ideas on current politics; in this case it should be 
investigated if there is a bloc behavior that affects the perceptions and opinions of these 
social clusters. 
 The political index that was created by evaluation of answers of the nine 
questions was explained at the beginning of this part. As it was mentioned, a rise in the 
score of AKP points out an increase on the opinions in favor of AKP.  
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 In the light of this information, as it is seen on Graphic A-25, there is a 
polarization tendency between all three social clusters on current politics. There is a 
very different answer weave between moderns, traditional conservatives and religious 
conservatives from each other on nine questions regarding current politics. This graphic 
shows us that there are social bases of the polarization. In this case, it should be 
determined if the differentiations in social life create this polarization and which type of 
values bear polarization potential. Therefore, the next part will study what kind of a 
differentiation there is on the values which were asked in the questions of Study A and 
some habits and preferences of daily life.  
  
4.4. BASES OF SOCIAL POLARIZATION   
 
 The analyses of Study A which were done until here point out that the 
differentiation on opinions and thoughts upon current politics indicate a political and 
social polarization. It is important to comprehend how deep is this political and social 
polarization and how much of the members of these clusters are radicalized irreversibly 
in order to perceive the political atmosphere.   
 It is natural that there are different social clusters that think differently, share 
different values and lifestyles. But strict ideological contrast of these clusters to each 
other, reluctance of living in a common space and mutual impatience shows that there is 
a serious and dangerous polarization in the society. If the public debates and political 
agenda are followed, it can be seen that polarization is multidimensional. 
 
4.4.1. An Overview on Different Identities 
 
 When different identities are taken into account in the Turkish society, the most 
problematic issues arise on the bases of Alevism and religious faith. In this part of the 
thesis, affects of the polarization based on different identities will be analyzed.  
 One of the identities which is exposed to discrimination the most is the Alevi 
society. Alevis are a religious group which combines Anatolian folk Shi‟ism and 
Sufism.
380
  They form approximately 15 % of the population in Turkey. Although it 
                                                 
380 “Alevi”, 30.06.2013, Wikipedia, Acc. 26.07.2013 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alevi 
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derives from the same roots with Arab Alawites, they have too little in common. Alevis 
insist on their difference from Sunni Islam and they always manifested this dissimilarity 
through their social and political marginalization within Ottoman and Turkish societies, 
rituals, social practices and worldview strongly shaped by Twelver Shiite mythology, 
Sufism, as well as various non-Islamic traditions throughout the history.
381
 
 Although Alevi sect is told to be the real Turkish Muslimhood and is seen as 
assurance of laicism by some intellectuals, Alevis are generally seen as aberrant by the 
Sunni majority in Turkey. Therefore, it was never considered as a determiner in Turkish 
politics. Every year some politicians join Alevi festivals and give solidarity messages, 
but those messages are generally neglected in time. However, statements of some 
Turkish politicians at the election time in 1998 with the anxiety of obtaining Alevi votes 
raised Sunni-Alevi tension and deepened disintegration of the society. Turkish state, 
which accepted Sunni Islam as the main valid religion in politics along its history, made 
an unexpected turn and praised Alevism for the first time in 1998. While this move was 
seen as the result of liberalization in politics by some circles, it actually marked 
Alevism‟s acceptance as an alternative religious trend in Turkish politics against Sunni 
Islam‟s excel and endeavor for creating a new type of national Islam. Although this was 
a good progress for Alevi rights, it was definitely a democracy breach and was against 
basics of laicism as it was praising a value of the society against others.  
 In this case, political subjects forgot that they also represent the Sunni society 
and discriminated them. Despite the past 15 years, it is possible to say that Turkish 
society is still being led with the same political mentality and politicians do not see any 
inconvenience on polarizing the society through stating their opinion on such topics that 
should be studied and discussed by the historians, theologians and anthropologists 
which are really experienced on this subject. Discussing such kind of subjects and 
discriminating specific religious values is totally against the ideals of a laic state as 
laicism aims the division of religion and state affairs. 
 It is correct that there are different perceptions of religion, if societies all around 
the world are researched, it can clearly be seen that religious traditions vary and are 
practiced differently in each country. After all, Muslimhood means a more complex, 
practical, live form of Islam religion that became culture in time according to the needs 
                                                 
381 Markus Dressler, Religio-Secular Metamorphoses: The Re-Making of Turkish Alevism, Journal of the   American 
Academy of Religion, June 2008, Vol. 76, Is. 2,  p.p. 280–311 
 171 
 
of different societies while Islam means only the religion itself. There are many types of 
Muslimhood while there is only one Islam. Islam is only and holy while Muslimhood is 
worldly and diverse.
382
 Under these circumstances it would be more correct to say that 
there is a Turkish Muslimhood rather than an only Turkish Islam.  As the roots of 
Alevism were formed within Turkish culture and history, it can indeed be considered as 
a type of Turkish Muslimhood, along with Sunni Islam. 
 Graphic A-26 shows that those who consider that state should support different 
religious faiths form the three-fourths (11.1 % „absolutely yes‟, 64.1 % „yes‟) of the 
participants. Moreover, 67.8 % of the society agrees that state should support Alevis to 
live their culture and religion freely.  While the participants are generally positive 
towards having a daughter/son-in-law from a different sect, the society is more tolerant 
towards having a veiled daughter-in-law than having a daughter/son-in-law from a 
different sect. While 32.7 % of the respondents are not tolerant towards a different sect, 
19.4 % are not tolerant towards having a veiled daughter-in-law. 
 If these questions are analyzed based on different demographic features in order 
to understand different attitudes, gender and age do not show any difference. In other 
words, women and men, young and old answer these questions with very small 
variations while Alevi and Kurdish participants demonstrate a more tolerant and liberal 
attitude. Other two important elements which make a difference and attract attention are 
education level and political party preference. As expected, tolerance increases as 
education level increases. 
 Graphic A-27 shows the difference between the answers of participants from 
different education levels compared to the country averages. Zero axis represents 
country average, “minus” side represents the participants which responded these 
propositions as “incorrect”; “plus” side demonstrates the ones responded as “correct”. 
The main finding of the graphic is the rise of tolerance level as the education level rises. 
 Graphic A-28 demonstrates the differences according to the political 
partisanship the same way. While CHP partisans are relatively tolerant, MHP partisans 
and more strictly AKP partisans demonstrate a more conservative profile.   
 As different perception of religious faith constitutes one of the main elements of 
polarization; participants of Study C were asked what they think about the people who 
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do not practice religion and identify themselves as Muslims. Subject 1 responds this 
question as: 
“If you would speak about this to a fanatic person, they would probably claim that you need 
to meet the obligations if you are Muslim. In my opinion this is all about the inner system 
of the individuals, you should live as you feel. Even if Islamic values are imposed by force, 
if forced person is not happy with practicing religion, then it has no meaning. If the people 
want, they can adopt the religious way of life, but they should not force others. I am against 
the neighborhood pressure.” 
Subsequently, the same question is asked to Subject 2 and her answer is as in the 
following: 
“People‟s religious orientations should not interest anyone else as long as they do not 
interfere with the others‟ liberties. Personally I do not consider this while approaching 
people. I think meeting religious requirements is something between the person and their 
God, but people should not hurt each other‟s feelings. Recently there are not that much, but 
still there are people insulting veiled women or in the opposite, the women wear revealing 
dresses. I think those should not happen. The most important thing is to respect people 
because they are human.” 
When their opinions are taken into account, it is seen that both participants agree that 
nobody should force the other. However, Subject 1‟s perception about the radical 
Islamists is remarkable. When this point of view is thought together with the findings in 
Chapter 3
383
, it is easy to understand what worries her about the totalitarian tendencies 
of fanatics. 
 Upon the answers above, it is asked if they feel restrained from other political 
groups in the society corresponding to the anxiety of Subject 1. Subject 2 responds this 
question as “There were some circles that strived for disintegrating the society and 
restrict the freedom of opinion in the past, but I believe these circles could not hang on 
during AKP term; now I do not feel any pressure.” while Subject 1 states: 
“I felt my family pushed me to be Kemalist. For example, my family supports CHP and 
they still blench when their opinion about Kurds is asked; I also was grown up with this 
idea. Now I feel the pressure about Islamic values from the society. I think these constraints 
are an outcome of the political system.” 
Once more again the opposite perceptions of both subjects are visible in their answers. 
Subject 2 mentions that she felt restrained by some circles which strived for 
disintegrating the society. However, if this answer is analyzed carefully by taking the 
political opinion of Subject 2 and the events previously handled in Chapter 3 such as 
February 28 period and closure case of AKP, it is clearly seen that the circles which 
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Subject 2 mentions are the laic circles that were worried about prominence of Islamic 
values. In other words, the military, laic journalists and other laic circles are in target of 
this response. On the other hand, Subject 1 defends that there are issues significant to 
each term. She mentions that while she has felt restrained by her family about different 
ethnicities before, at the present day she feels restrained by the Islamist groups who 
want to impose a monotype Islam understanding on the society. 
 
4.4.2. State Governance 
 
 According to Study A, interesting findings arise on the questions about state 
administration. Only 2 % of the participants are against democracy. Graphic A-29 
shows that 66.6 % of the participants responded „yes‟ to “country should be governed 
by democracy in any condition” proposition while 25.7 % of the participants think that 
this proposition is absolutely correct. However, in the meanwhile 38.5 % of the 
participants agree that “military can seize the government when necessary” while 57.1 
% think that “political parties should be closed when necessary”.  
 When these three findings are considered altogether, it is seen that some of the 
values that can be called as democratic get gradually politicized under current 
conditions of the country and become ideas more than values. As a matter of fact, the 
variations in these questions are directly connected to the answers related to “political 
preference”. CHP and MHP electorates approve the seizure of the government by 
military and closure of political parties with a considerably higher score compared to 
the country average.  
 According to the statistics in Graphic A-29, 55.2 % of the participants think that 
important reforms were made while 38.1 % think that religious reactionism was 
increased when the questions intend to evaluate AKP term are taken into account. 
 When the difference between these two questions is taken into consideration, it 
is seen that as the education level, quality of habitat and level of income rise, percentage 
of the participants who think that religious reactionism got increased at AKP term 
increases accordingly. When political preferences are taken into consideration, it is 
naturally observed that AKP and the opposite bloc have completely opposite opinions. 
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 The participants that are anxious about establishment of Shari‟a rule are 40.6 % 
of the participants while the percentage of the participants who are anxious about the 
impossibility of their child to get the desired education is 65.8 %. The most significant 
element that explains the different opinions in responses is the preferences on political 
parties.   
 Graphic A-30 shows the difference of answers from the country average based 
on party partisanship. Zero axis represents the country average, negative side shows the 
participants who responded „no‟ to these propositions with a higher rate than the 
country average and positive side shows the participants who responded „yes‟ with a 
higher rate than the country average. The main indication of the graphic is how the 
AKP, CHP and MHP electorates differentiate as a bloc. 
 This question was asked to see if the participants are satisfied with the current 
AKP government. As we see from the graphic, 84.38 % of the participants are not 
happy with the government. It is certain that the last events affected government‟s 
reputation such as prime minister Tayyip Erdoğan‟s fierce attitude against people that 
were concerned about the implements against laicism, government‟s ambition to take 
revenge from the military and trials on former military officials, government‟s attitude 
towards Syrian civil war, abatement of action about Madımak Hotel victims, legislation 
of the code letting imam-hatip graduates to be admitted in the faculties other than 
theology faculties, arrest of journalists, legislation of the code letting the trade of 
forestry lands, conceal of the case about 25 victims of an explosion in a military base, 
terrorism and economical conditions.  
 
4.4.3. Debates on Religion and Laicism 
 
 Study A presents that a division into half is observed on the responds to 
questions which are related to religion and laicism. When the findings of the study are 
considered, Graphic A-31 indicates that 53.4 % of the participants think that religious 
education should be compulsory at schools while 30.1 % are against this proposition. 
On the other hand, rate of the respondents which agree that females in primary and 
secondary education should not veil themselves is 49.6 %. 49.1 % of participants have a 
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positive approach towards veiling liberty of public officers while 39.3 % has a negative 
approach.  
 In the light of the above mentioned findings, their opinion about veiling in 
public space is asked to the subjects of Study C. Subject 1 responds this question as: 
“It is a religious symbol. I was not used to see that many people with religious outfit before. 
Because I am a former CHP supporter, I have a different state of mind and that is why this 
situation really affected me. I even started to dream of covered women. I believe veiling 
should be a personal choice. There are two important things; first of all constitution should 
be studied in order to determine limits of freedom and secondly the practices in the western 
countries should be reviewed.  For instance we can give an example; think of a veiled 
psychologist, her patient might want to consult an issue about sexuality; psychologist‟s 
orientation according to her religious values can lead the patient in a wrong way. If the 
psychologist does not use her position to impose her thoughts, then it is OK; but certainty 
of this or objectivity of the education that is given by a veiled teacher is polemical. I cannot 
be sure how this would orient a child.” 
Response of Subject 2 to the same question is as in the following: 
“Turban or headscarf; you know there was a meaning conflict about that which was created 
by the groups whom suggested the political Islam definition; but for me it is absolutely not 
a political symbol. Prayer rug or bead can be religious materials but headscarf is a dressing 
style for the women to conceal their charm. I am not against headscarf, because in the end 
the public area is a civilian area, people should be more tolerant towards that. I do not feel 
uncomfortable about the symbols that individuals bear as long as they do not make others 
uncomfortable.” 
Polarization between two subjects is again visible on their responses to this question. 
While Subject 1 answers in a negative way, Subject 2 answers positively. Subject 1 
gives remarkable examples on the topic about a psychologist and a teacher to support 
her idea. If this is analyzed deeper, the inferences of Subject 1 really make sense as not 
everybody would feel comfortable with the evidence of religious values in public space 
and in the last analysis; turban is a style which carries the religious identity of a person 
to the public space. In spite of that, Subject 2 mentions that veiling is a right and 
everybody should be free to use it. However Subject 2 does not mention the possible 
social outcomes of the situation. But, it is also true that banning it would not help for the 
resolution of the issues regarding it. 
 According to the Graphic A-32, when the demographic clusters which explain 
the different attitudes in these questions are considered, it is seen that responds in laic 
character increase as education level rises.  
 However, the most important indicator stands out as political preference also in 
these questions. This time, AKP and MHP forms a bloc in these hypotheses while CHP 
stands alone in the opposite side. 
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 In Graphics A-32 and A-33, positive and negative differentiations are seen 
compared to the country average. In Graphic A-32, CHP electorate differentiates from 
the country average through responding negatively to three hypotheses about laicism 
while the other parties demonstrated positive attitude.  
 On the other hand, according to the findings of Study B, it is seen on Graphic B-
15 while 58.13 % of the participants think that using religious symbols is inappropriate 
in public space, 32.50 % are not against it. When this graphic is analyzed along with 
Graphic B-8, it can be presumed that also some CHP electorates tolerate veiling in 
public space. 
  Graphic B-10 is about opinions of the participants about laicism and secularism. 
Even though laicism and secularism are accepted to be the same in English, there is a 
slight meaning distinction between them in Turkish. Secularism means the separation of 
state and religious affairs from each other. In secularism, state does not have a policy 
towards religion which assures freedom of religious activities, it is equally distant from 
all faiths and it does not have an institution for organizing religious activities, instead all 
faiths have their chambers to organize their activities. This system is more likely the one 
that currently USA accepts. On the other hand laicism is a system originates from 
France. Laicism also means distinction of state and religious affairs, but slightly in the 
advantage of the state. In other words, state can keep religion under pressure in a laic 
system and shape it according to its needs. In laicism religion is under state‟s control 
and eventually become a political tool which allows only the religious activities that the 
state desires, it has an unofficial religious policy such as Sunni Islam in Turkey and 
religious institutions are under administration of an institution such as Presidency of 
Religious Affairs in Turkey. This system was a part of Turkish political system during 
its entire history. Even though the distribution is balanced in this graphic, those who 
believe that laicism is a better system are the 54.38 % of participants. This shows that 
the majority is anxious about the prominence of religious values and wants a strict 
control over religion. 
 Graphic B-9 shows that 79.38 % of the participants believe in Islam. However, it 
is very interesting to see 15 % of the participants define themselves as non-believers. 
According to Graphic B-21, 45 % of the participants of Study B state that they practice 
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religion partially while 38.75 % do not practice at all. Only 16.25 % of the participants 
mention that they practice religion. 
 Considering the findings of Graphics B-9 and B-21, participants of Study C are 
asked if they practice religion. Subject 1 answers as: 
“This is also another thing that I question. I try to meet some of the requirements from time 
to time. I believe in Islam, but if you ask what kind of a Muslim I am, I can say that I 
filtered the religious values and built up a belief system by myself. I am not a very religious 
person in terms of obligations, but I like to see faithful people. Faith is a good thing. I also 
follow a faith, but I believe everyone should be free on what to believe.” 
Subject 2 answers to the same question as: 
“I try to meet religious requirements as much as I can, but of course I cannot claim that I do 
everything perfectly. It is a bit difficult for a person to say where they see themselves in 
terms of religion, I think only God can decide that. As currently we are in the month of 
Ramadan, fasting is required and I try to perform as much as my health allows me. I also 
try to meet the other requirements depending on my timetable, but we are not in this world 
only for religion; social life and business life are also important.” 
When the answers are analyzed, it is seen that Subject 1 answers the question in a laic 
nature by saying that she adapted the religion according to her worldview while Subject 
2 does not make concessions to the integrity of Islam. Even so, Subject 2 presents a 
moderate nature by mentioning that religion is not the only objective in life. 
  As the objective of this thesis is to see the depth of polarization in society, if 
they think that Islam plays a disintegrating role in Turkish social life is asked to the 
subjects of Study C. Subject 1 answers the question as “Actually I think it does. I can 
feel there are the separatist acts, but I do not know how to explain it precisely.” while 
Subject 2 responds as in the following: 
“I believe both segments should not avoid speaking about the current situation of Turkish 
society. The reluctant individuals should probably be hesitating as a result of their lack of 
knowledge. However, now there is rather a relieved ambiance in Turkey; that is why 
everyone is free to discuss their thoughts. Objective of the circles who introduced political 
Islam twenty years ago was to establish a ground for conflicts and distract the current 
harmony. Because conservative people were shown as religious extremists and this way 
impossibility of execution of a democratic system tried to be proven by some circles; this is 
a result of the struggle for political power. This is not the case at the present day, but this 
separatist perspective was attempted to be imposed in the past. Right now there are not 
separatist thoughts; everyone can discuss their opinions freely.” 
It is seen that while Subject 1 thinks that there is a polarization and feels uncomfortable 
about it, Subject 2 mentions that this can be only resolved by reconciliation of both 
segments of society. However, Subject 2 once more blames the concerned circles about 
the prominence of Islam in social life. As her thoughts about reflection of conservative 
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people as extremists cannot be completely ignored as it is known that the conservative 
circles were marginalized by some circles that wanted to use the current controversy for 
their political interests, it is a fact that the current political situation is the same with 
twenty years ago as the current government and AKP supporters gradually otherized the 
other segments of the society and blamed them with being communist or deviant. 
   
4.4.4. Debates on Political Islam 
 
 Graphic B-12 analyzes what the participants of Study B think about political 
Islam. Therefore, all answers are designed to give a clear understanding of what they 
vote for. Even though, this question might have been perceived a little biased or 
offensive by some circles due to its nature, it was necessary in order to understand 
participants‟ perception on political Islam. The most important finding is the perception 
of participants about politicians. 40 % of the participants claim that political Islam is a 
system which politicians implemented in order to orient the society. This means that 
majority of the participants do not trust politicians and they think political Islam is a 
false definition which was imposed by them in order to orient people for their interest. 
21.88 % of the participants think that political Islam is a system which was developed 
by the Western societies. This should also be considered along with USA‟s moderate 
Islam project for Middle East which caused rapid transformations in many countries. 
13.75 % of the participants think that it is a secular set of ordinances which are 
implemented in a democratic system by a conservative party. This mostly states the 
current situation in Turkey considering AKP‟s conservative nature and the changes 
which they implemented in the democratic system during the last 11 years. 12.50 % of 
the participants think that it is basically a system that follows Shari‟a rules such as in 
Iran. The least participants with 11.88 % think that political Islam is a local solidarity 
network that was implemented by the Islamist movement in order to transform the 
masses and give them a voice in national area while this should have been the most 
accurate answer under normal circumstances. Because when RP term is analyzed in 
1990‟s it is clearly seen that party organization was really being the voice of 
conservative people by providing them the opportunity to be represented, educate 
themselves and work in solidarity organizations. As this term really has significance for 
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political Islam and as it was maybe the first time the religious conservatives were able 
to show themselves, this could be considered as a more accurate answer. However, as it 
is seen that the majority agree that it is a false system which was implemented by the 
politicians. 
 Based on the information above, opinions of the participants of Study C are 
asked about political Islam. Subject 1 answers this question as in the following:  
I would say it is an idea that the West imposed or it is a method of politicians to abuse 
religious values. There is a global tendency towards right. Actually, usage of Islam as a 
political tool in Turkey is reasonable as Turkey has a Muslim majority. I think it is a set of 
rules that are implemented by a conservative party. 
When the same question is asked to Subject 2, she responds as: 
I am against the statement of political Islam, because I do not believe the existence of such 
kind of a concept. This is a long subject that should be discussed; I think political Islam is a 
statement that was suggested by orientalists, people that does not want to see the success 
that conservative understanding sustains under democracy and people do not want to 
acknowledge this order to raise tension. I am against political Islam. 
Subject 1 considers political Islam as a system that is imposed by the West and a tool 
that is used by the politicians to orient people. Besides, she connects the emergence of 
political Islam to the global politics in the world agenda. On the other hand, Subject 2 
mentions she believes that it is a statement which was suggested by orientalists. Upon 
that it is asked if it was a term suggested by some interest groups. Subject 2 responds 
this question as: 
It is not exactly what I wanted to say. This is an assertion that arose in the recent past when 
Turkey is taken into consideration. When we think of the political parties in power and the 
conditions of the period, I believe political Islam is a statement which was suggested by the 
circles that ignore the advance of conservativism to raise tension in the society. 
Thus, she once more implies that this system was implemented by the concerned laic 
circles which did not want to see Islam‟s harmony with democracy and wanted to 
disintegrate the society. 
 Followingly, subjects of study C are asked if they see political Islam as a threat 
for Turkey. Subject 2 answers “Right now it is not capable of generating a threat for 
Turkey. Such kinds of statements were made in the past, as democracy culture advances 
and the system settles people see that Turkey will sustain a democratic system; so 
political Islam is far from being a threat.” while Subject 1 answers as in the following: 
I am suspicious on it. I do not like the prominence of Islamic values. For example when I 
think about establishment of mosques at the universities, prohibition of abortion, etc., I 
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think the Islamic values are promoted and this worries me because there are also people that 
do not follow any faith. Of course the conservatives also have rights; it is important that 
they live according to their beliefs but in this sense prohibiting abortion is pointless for non-
believers. I am not against veiled people, but their freedom ends where mine starts. 
However, most religious conservative people do not agree on that. Nevertheless, I support 
the secularist model like in the USA which has an equal distance to all religions, but not the 
laic model in Turkey which basically has control over religion. 
The answers given to this question also shows the polarization between two subjects. 
While Subject 2 thinks that political Islam is far from presenting a threat, Subject 1 
mentions that she is uncomfortable with rise of political Islam because of the 
totalitarianism of Islamists/religious conservatives. Upon the answer of Subject 2, it is 
also asked what she thinks about the Islamist solidarity network.  She mentions that 
until now, the conservative people were not that much visible, this actually had been an 
opportunity for them to come together and defend their ideas. 
 Graphic B-16 shows that 70 % of the participants think that Islamism constitutes 
a threat for Turkey while 22.50 % does not agree that hypothesis. Again, when this 
question is paired with question number 8, we can presume that some CHP electorates 
either do not think Islamism is a threat or they are ensure about it. Moreover, Graphic 
B-19 shows that 84.38 % of the participants of Study B think that Islam causes conflict 
in Turkish society. 
 In the light of the above mentioned information, this time subjects of Study C 
are asked what do they think about Shari‟a. Subject 1 responds to this question as “I 
think Shari‟a is the last step in transformation to an Islamist state. It is not possible to 
speak about an Islamist state without Shari‟a rules. For instance Sudan; it is an Islam 
republic which is governed through Shari‟a. I hope such a thing would not happen in 
Turkey.” while subject 2 responds as “I do not envisage anything about an Islamic state; 
therefore I do not see the need of a state which is ruled through Shari‟a. This is not an 
option in Turkey anymore; as we see the citizens of countries which are ruled by an 
Islamist order also want to live their faith in a democratic system. I think the epoch of 
such extreme thoughts has ended.” It is seen that both subjects are against Shari‟a 
concept. 
 Followingly, their opinion about Islamist parties in political system is asked to 
the subjects of Study C. Subject 1 answers that all kinds of opinions should be 
represented in the parliament while Subject 2 answers as in the following: 
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“For example, SP promotes religious values but we still cannot claim that it is an Islamist 
party; I also do not think they have a different agenda about the political system. In other 
countries Islamist parties might have emerged because of the conditions in their society but 
they have nothing to compare with the parties in Turkey. As religious faith is an individual 
space, a person‟s religious belief only interests oneself. In an epoch that the states based on 
religion disappear one by one, I do not think that Islamist parties are necessary. 
Nevertheless, I believe that various parties to defend various opinions should take place in 
the political system. Besides, also the political and social environment of the country should 
also be evaluated. It is important to know how and what do the Christian parties represent 
in the countries they are located and what they promise to their supporters. That is why this 
should be evaluated more comprehensively.” 
It is seen that while Subject 1 is tolerant about representation of any idea at the 
parliament, Subject 2 mentions that she does not think Islamist parties are necessary, but 
also defends that different opinions should be represented at the parliament. However, 
answer of Subject 2 regarding that religion is a personal space is remarkable. Also 
Subject 2‟s perception about SP shows her different understanding of Islamism.  
 Upon these answers, their opinion was asked about why Islamism started to 
attract that much interest in the last years. Subject 1 answers this question as: 
“When the Republic of Turkey was formed, a more homogenous nationalist structure was 
desired. For this reason also Kurdish people felt the same pressure that Islamists felt; 
progress of an Islamist ideology was not desired. CHP ignored that the country has a 
Muslim majority and there is a group which consider Islamic values as important. Actually 
Islamist community felt excluded, because they felt their rights were neglected. The reason 
of their current organization is to reclaim their rights back.” 
When the same question is asked to Subject 2, she responds as in the following: 
“It would be more accurate to interpret this as conservative people, not as political Islam. 
First of all I do not think AKP is an Islamist party; it is a conservative democrat party 
which is also stated by the party organization. A trust was built between AKP and the 
people; therefore it was elected three terms in a row. Ten years ago everything was more 
complicated, more different; the economical situation was extremely challenging that 
Kemal Derviş was invited from USA and even he was not successful. AKP made a great 
progress concerning rights and freedom and implemented its election promises. That is why 
AKP attracts that much attention.” 
Subject 1 thinks that the reason of the rise of political Islam is the decline in Kemalist 
ideology while Subject 2 defends that it is the achievements of AKP. However, Subject 
2 underlines that AKP is not an Islamist party; it is a conservative democrat party. This 
evaluation reflects the same state of mind with Yalçın Akdoğan as it was mentioned 
above. 
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4.4.5. Social Habits and Lifestyles 
 
 When responses to the questions about daily life are taken into account, findings 
show that the activities and preferences that are considered to be modern based on the 
sociology of industrial society are actually lower than expected in the society. Almost 
all demographic differentiations cause different behaviors in these spheres according to 
the results. According to Graphic A-34, the participants that have never eaten out are 
21.1 % while the ones ate out before are 19.1 %. It is seen that the participants which go 
to cinema or theater occasionally are 24.1 % while the ones which never go are 37.6 %. 
The participants never celebrate New Year are 49.5 % while the ones celebrate 
occasionally are 14.3 %; the ones never apply make-up are 36.6 % while the ones apply 
occasionally are 19 %.  
 The rate of enjoying these activities is directly proportional with education and 
income level when Graphic A-35 is taken into account. The actuality increases while 
passing from the rural to metropolis, but the rate decreases to the rural levels among the 
participants that live in the slums. Graphic A-35 shows the differences based on country 
averages on negative and positive aspects. The differences are seen clearer depending 
on the age and education level, rural/urban/metropolis distinction and conditions of the 
settlement on the graphic.  
 According to Graphic B-22, 44.38 % of the participants of Study B believe that 
social environment has the highest influence on lifestyle. While family takes place in 
the second place with 30.63 %, 12.50 % of participants mentioned that economy affects 
lifestyle. A few of participants think that media, school and friends can affect lifestyle 
while no one agrees that migration is a determiner of lifestyle. 
 Upon the findings above, subjects of Study C are asked about their opinion on 
what is influential on spreading Islamic lifestyle. Subject 1 answers the question as: 
“I think the people are influenced by the society and their family. If I should give an 
example from my family, I see my mother‟s side tends to Islamic values recently. For 
example while my mother was consuming alcohol in the past, she started to practice 
religion and stopped consuming alcohol. Besides, one of my friends from the university 
who was not using a headscarf suddenly decided to cover her head and completely changed 
her life style; another friend decided to veil after a traffic accident. Apart from that, of 
course family influences people‟s decisions. In my circle of acquaintances I see a tendency 
to the right wing, but I do not know what the exact reason is.” 
Subject 2‟s answer to the same question is as in the following: 
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“If we keep the people that do not let the women in their household to go out, as this is 
related to the mentality of people rather than religion itself, seeing more veiled women in 
the daily life could be considered as an outcome of abolishing the strict rules in public 
space against the conservative women. Those kinds of restrictions are vexatious as 
headscarf is not a style only Muslim women prefer. People that follow different faiths all 
around the world use it without encountering strict restrictions. I do not think the number of 
veiled women increased, but I think they are more visible in the social life after the 
abolishment of restrictions.” 
Subject 1 mentions that the family and the society are influential on spreading the 
Islamic lifestyle. On the other hand, Subject 2 mentions that Islamic lifestyle has not 
spread; instead the people who have embraced Islamic values became visible after the 
abolishment of restrictions. Subject 2‟s thoughts about the restricting the women are 
also remarkable. She mentions that repressing the women is not particular to religion, 
but the mentality.  
 
4.4.6. Polarization Axes 
  
 When the questions analyzed above are grouped and the responses that social 
clusters have given to this group of questions are studied, very important finding arise 
about differentiation and polarization in the society.  
 Axis scores changing between 0 and 100 are provided to each of the participants 
depending on their responses and calculated the average scores of the three social 
clusters on all three axes in Study A. Graphic A-36 indicates the average global score of 
all respondents with three clusters indicating average of each individual.  
 As it is seen in the graphic, while the laicism and tolerance scores of moderns 
are remarkably high, their score on status quo axes is above both 50 and Turkey 
average. This cluster represents the society which is reasonably open minded and 
modern, embraces a laic lifestyle, but has an attitude towards keeping the status-quo 
through military coup or closure of political parties against some threats they perceive.
 Traditional conservatives take the rearmost position on tolerance axis, middle on 
laicism axis and foremost position on status-quo axes. In another words it can be said 
that they do not have a specific problem with laicism, basically they are against changes 
in status-quo and provision of freedoms to different identities because of overprotecting 
their traditions.  
 184 
 
 The third cluster, which is named as religious conservatives, demonstrates an 
attitude that does not pay attention to status-quo, does not stand against the actions 
which could cause transformations in politics and defend freedoms of different 
identities; but the subjects of this cluster display an attitude against the laic lifestyle.
 The social clusters and the axis which were subject to polarization were handled 
above. However, how much the members of these clusters are radicalized and 
agglomerated to the extremes of the axes is a more important question.  First of all, 
when distribution of the participants‟ scores is taken into account on laicism, tolerance 
and status-quo axes; a normal distribution is seen at all three. The vertical axes at 
Graphic A-37 correspond to the distribution percentages of respondents and the 
population density at each score.  Graphic A-37 shows distribution of averages in all 
three axes by acknowledging the society as monotype. A normal distribution at laicism 
axes is seen. Despite the differentiation of the society on tolerance axis, there is a slight 
tendency towards tolerance. Bell-curve excels on status-quo axis. 
 However when these bell-curves are presented for each cluster, some clusters 
relatively incline to one side of the axes as it could be expected. If Graphic A-38 is 
taken into account, the differences and polarization between clusters can clearly be seen. 
As a smooth Turkey distribution is seen on laicism axis, it is seen that each cluster 
shows a bell-curve like distribution, but they gather in different groups from country 
average if it is analyzed in three clusters. While almost entire group of religious 
conservatives accumulate to the anti-laic side of the axis, traditional conservatives group 
accumulates to the middle and moderns group accumulates to the laic axes of the 
graphic. It is possible to indicate that all three groups have different attitudes towards 
laicism. 
 Keeping the information above in mind, opinion of the subjects of Study C is 
asked. Subject 1 answers the question as in the following: 
“I think AKP follows a policy which is based on seizing the Presidency of Religious 
Affairs. Most of the conservatives say they are secularists not laics, at this point I think 
presence of the presidency should be questioned. We do not know the future program of 
AKP, maybe merging Presidency of Religious Affairs to a ministry is in their agenda. Then 
there is a possibility for the president to use this entity according to the needs. Thus, AKP 
can orient the religion and state affairs as they wish. If they want to transform to an Islam 
state, this would also be a step for it. If this is the case, they can start to follow an Islamist 
policy through assigning a caliphate. In this case it would be an entity to serve for the ones 
in the power. I think the state should not have a policy on religion.” 
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On the other hand, Subject 2 mentions: 
“We always hear about laicism and secularism, the people are more conscious on that 
recently. Turkey is a laic state at present. When we investigate secularism seems to be a 
more flexible concept, eventually while laicism is a political concept, secularism is more 
sociological; that is why people might see secularism more suitable as it is flexible; but 
until the recent past, laicism was perceived differently, because of the suppression of laic 
system, they were standing against it. But during AKP term, laic system has settled better; 
because there is no intervention to the faith, they are more comfortable. Therefore, I do not 
see any issues about laicism and I hope the orientalists are also convinced about the new 
laicism perception.” 
Once more a polarization between two subjects is seen in these answers. Subject 1 
claims that AKP is following a policy in order to seize the control of Presidency of 
Religious Affairs to dictate its own religion policy; therefore she finds secularism a 
more sensible idea as it would not let the state to have an official religion policy. On the 
other hand, Subject 2 also emphasizes that secularism is a suitable system. However, 
she adds that concept of laicism has changed in the last years and it does not have the 
same repressive nature as before. These answers clearly show that the concept of 
laicism indeed is trying to be changed in the recent years by the current government. 
But, this is a quite dangerous attempt as it would damage integrity of the country in long 
term. It is once more clear that Subject 1 is uncomfortable with the developments as she 
has a laic perception while religious conservative Subject 2 interprets the developments 
in a positive way. This shows that both sides perceive the developments according to 
their political preferences.  
 The bell-curve at tolerance axis on Graphic A-39 inclines more to the positive 
side of the axis. In other words, it is tolerant to different identities in society and their 
freedom to live as they desire. But, when it is investigated through dividing it based on 
clusters, it is seen that moderns and religious conservatives show a similar character to 
the country average; correspondingly traditional conservatives are closed to repressive 
and different identities. On the other hand, inexistence of concentrations in neither end 
of the axis and peak of the axis relatively near the middle shows that the radicalization 
is not that deep yet as the other axes while the difference in this axis still bears a 
polarization risk. Graphic B-18 also shows that the polarization about tolerance is not 
that deep yet. According to Graphic B-18, 91.25 % of the participants say that they can 
be friends with people from different opinions. This means that the participants are 
mainly discontent about political situation rather than the social situation in the country. 
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On the other hand, Graphic B-24 shows that 57.50 % of participants do not think that 
the society is tolerant towards different opinions while 23.13 % thinks it is and 19.38 % 
do not have a certain idea on that. This means that more than half of the participants do 
not feel comfortable in social life. 
 In order to understand how the tolerance is perceived by the society, opinions of 
the subjects of Study C are asked what they think about the relation of people from 
different political or religious opinions towards each other. Subject 1 states “For 
example in Toplum Gönüllüleri Vakfı (Society Volunteers Foundation) liberal and 
conservative people are working together and give messages of unity, these people work 
side by side; but of course I do not know how integrated they are. It is about people‟s 
point of view, if they tolerate they can live together.” while Subject 2 responds as in the 
following: 
“I think the people shall approach each other humanly, differences are not important. If a 
person approaches impolitely to me because of my political view while I approach them 
humanly, I would get frustrated. I think the people should not be prejudiced. This is what I 
strive for, I have friends from different faiths around me, but I respect their choices. I think 
this should not affect interpersonal relationships.”  
According to the findings, there is a general perception that if people tolerate each other, 
it is possible to live together. However, it is also a fact that both segments have 
extremists. Therefore, reconciliation of these extremist circles is the key element on 
reassuring the social reconciliation. Both segments should leave their totalitarian 
tendencies apart and understand each other in order to reach a peaceful conclusion. 
Politicians also have responsibility to initiate the social dialogue by overcoming their 
differences and start to work for reconciliation. As it was handled before, Islamists and 
religious conservatives has always blamed laic circles for their failures and when they 
seized the majority, they declared their legitimacy and begun a social engineering to 
form an Islamic society. However, it is very insincere to force the people to fit in one 
mold and speak about the freedoms. This is completely the same thing what was done in 
the first years of the republican regime which the Islamists roughly criticize. Current 
AKP government has a tendency to blame and suppress who are not sharing the same 
ideology with them which constitutes an obstacle in front of the reconciliation of the 
society. Therefore, political parties should stop conducting a biased policy and urgently 
address the polarization of society. 
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 Lastly, if the status-quo axis on Graphic A-40 is analyzed, it is seen that 
moderns and traditional conservatives stand slightly at more positive side of the axis, 
correspondingly the majority of religious conservatives stand above the country 
average, this way they form a very contrast profile to the other two clusters, with other 
words we can say that religious conservatives are more tolerant to some political 
transformations.  
 Graphics A-37, A-38 and A-40 show that there are differentiations in values on 
laicism, tolerance and political transformation subjects in social lifestyle clusters.  
 On the other hand, Graphic A-23 presents that 71.88 % of the participants of 
Study B feel that they are restrained by the participants while only 23.13 % say that they 
feel completely free. This means more than half of the participants feel constrained by 
the others. 
 The analysis about social clusters show that there is a difference between 
lifestyles of the society and this differentiation bears a potential to get rougher. But 
again analyses show that the current polarization is formed by the political preferences, 
debates that come into question through AKP and opinion about AKP. Then, the 
situation is related to values represented by AKP, negotiation policy it follows towards 
its addressee and the attitude of AKP‟s counterpart parties. But still the matter is based 
on politics, political actors and political style. 
 Moreover, this is the outcome of political ground, a society that changes with its 
agendas, styles and daily life. Therefore first the evolving life should be taken into 
consideration calmly and the society which transformed in the last thirty years, its 
expectations, demands, anxieties and frustrations should be analyzed. We can only then 
evaluate the political actors and styles in the society. 
 Nevertheless, the society is not monolithic and the society is not monotype. 
Therefore the monotypic citizen concept and the modernism perception at the last 
century should also be questioned. 
 Ultimately, poles are elements, clusters and citizens of the same society. The 
ones we differentiate are eventually our companions. 
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4.5. SOCIAL UPRISING AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
 As a result of the gradual polarizing in the society, the government‟s repressive 
practices are being protested by the groups which are especially formed of Kemalist laic 
circles. In this part, some of these protests will be handled on the basis of freedom of 
opinion, human rights and social uprising. 
 
4.5.1. Freedom of Opinion 
 
 According to Graphic B-20, 52.50 % of the participants do not think that the 
media supports liberal thought. This perception should be related to the government‟s 
strict policies on media corporations, actions against freedom of opinion, arrest of 
journalists and suspicious confiscation of some media corporations and their transfer to 
the companies known as close to the government. But considering % 47.51 of the 
participants are either natural or think that media assists liberal thoughts, we can say 
that the respondents a divided into half about the role of media. 
 Graphic B-14 shows that 85 % of the participants agree that Islamic approach in 
politics does not assure freedoms. This proves that participants see Islam as an 
autocratic element in politics. 
 In the light of the findings above, subjects of Study C were asked if they think 
media plays a role in spreading liberal thoughts. Subject 1 thinks that media plays a role 
on spreading liberal thoughts, but she believes that media is not independent in Turkey. 
Followingly, Subject 1 is asked if she is tolerant to liberal thoughts and answers:  
“I support liberal thoughts. I am working in human rights area, but I worry about the 
definition of freedom. The boundaries of freedom are disputable. There is constitution 
which all subjects including the state itself should respect. Prominence of Islam worries me; 
that is why I ask myself about the boundaries of freedom. In this sense I share the anxiety 
of the majority of laic society.” 
It is seen that Subject 1 is mentions that she is worried about the definition of freedom. 
It is seem that the subject is not satisfied with prominence of Islam. 
When Subject 2 was asked if she thinks the media plays a role in spreading liberal 
thoughts, she answers as in the following: 
“Indeed. Now, door-to-door promotion is outdated, internet and the TV has replaced it; that 
is why media plays an important role on spreading liberal thoughts. Also social media 
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encourages people to state their ideas freely. Media is also important in Turkey for the same 
reasons; we have seen that media caused great transformations on the opinions of people, 
but of course it should be used consciously. Because if media gets under influence of an 
authority and tries to orient people in an obsessive manner, it becomes misleading. But 
media gets more liberal each day in Turkey which is pleasing.” 
When the two answers are compared, again a polarization stands out. While Subject 1 
believes that media is not independent in Turkey, Subject 2 states that media is getting 
more independent each day in Turkey. It is again seen that both subjects have given 
their answers under influence of their political though. 
 However, the proofs show that Turkey is still very backward on the 
independence of journalists. According to the recent reports there are still 76 journalists 
in prison for opposing to the government. Most of them were arrested under Ergenekon 
Case. 
 
4.5.2. Women Rights 
 
 Moderate Islamists which are not fundamentals attribute importance to the 
women and see them as individuals. Women‟s opportunity to have a voice in today‟s 
Islamist organizations shows that. For example AKP has a women‟s branch and they 
formed a women‟s rights commission in the parliament. 
 Islamists‟ obsession is to separate genders in society rather than imprisoning 
women at home.
384
 Sometimes, attempts of implementing such rules in Turkish society 
come into question and they get negative reactions. Islamist SP‟s “pink metrobus” 
proposition in 2012 was one of such projects. SP collected 60,000 signatures from the 
ladies that were wishing to travel in safety and directed a proposition to the mayor of 
Istanbul, Kadir Topbaş. This demand occupied country‟s agenda for some time and was 
rejected by the mayor due to negative reactions from the society.
385
 
 The status of women is another issue. Some women wear European-style 
clothes, work outside their home, go to hotels, discos, and beach resorts, and share 
housework with their husbands. Some women use the scarf traditionally and obey their 
husbands‟ or fathers‟ rules. They spend most of their time on housework and taking care 
                                                 
384 op. cit. Roy, 81-82 
385 “ Pembe Metobüs İmzaları Tamam” (The signatures are Done for the Pink Metrobus), 12.06.2012, Milliyet, 
20.07.2013 http://gundem.milliyet.com.tr/pembe-metrobus-imzalari-tamam/gundem/gundemdetay/12.06.2012/ 
1552793/default.htm 
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of their children. Other women are conservative Muslims and wear burqas, but their 
numbers are relatively low. According to the constitution, males and females have equal 
rights and gender discrimination is prohibited. Since now, one woman prime minister, 
many women ministers, and many women in took place in Turkish parliament
386
. 
 Considering the women‟s role in society subjects of Study C are asked about 
their opinion on the role of women in Islam. Subject 1 responds as: 
“Actually now Islamic feminism has started, now we see that veiled women also have a 
voice, they run their own businesses and join political activities. Even though the 
importance of women is increasing, it is possible to say that women still lag behind 
especially in rural areas of Muslim countries while they have the same rights with men in 
urban life.” 
Subject 2‟s response on this question is: 
 “Heaven is under mothers‟ feet.” idiom means a lot. A politician, a beggar or a soldier are 
all begotten by a mother; that is why women are very important in Islam. It is also written 
in the Farewell Sermon of Mohammed that the women were entrusted to men by God; this 
is also very elucidative. Unfortunately there are still places where women are neglected 
because they are weaker, such as Afghanistan; it is not possible to speak about women 
rights there. This is because of the oppressive regimes but in Islam as a religion, it is not 
possible to say the women are ignored. I suspect the faith of those who mistreat women; 
because in our religion no one should limit the freedom of others and men should pay 
attention to women. Some men‟s desire about suppression of women is an issue related to 
lack of education. I think the men who mistreat women are either uneducated or mentally 
unbalanced. Nevertheless, place of women is very important in Turkish society; women 
have a voice in important platforms. For example while the number of women deputies was 
48 in the past, this number has increased to 78 at the present day in Turkish parliament; this 
is a very good progress. Moreover, the implementations on women rights are very 
successful; shelter is given to the women suffering from maltreatment, financial aid is given 
for the women that lost their husbands. Considering that women also take place in 
important tasks at the present day, we can say that importance given to the women is 
thriving. One of the other alluring sides of AKP is its respect to women and youth. I hope 
the number of maltreating people to women will decrease soon.”  
When the results are analyzed it is seen both subjects agree that the importance of 
women gradually increased in the last years. Islamic feminism observation of Subject 1 
is remarkable. On the other hand, Subject 2 thinks that women were always important in 
Islam, but as superstitions became prominent as a result of arbitrary practices on 
religion, it was perceived in an incorrect way. However, even though Subject 2 
mentions that there are good implementations and AKP gives importance to the women, 
there are still incidents that women get exposed to and result under the circumstances of 
the male-dominated society. 
  
                                                 
386 ibid., p. 678 
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4.5.3. Social Uprising and Results of Social Polarization 
 
 Results of the polarization led to an uprising against the state recently. Two most 
important of those were the Republic Protests in 2007 and Gezi Park Protests in 2013. 
 The Republic Protests were the peaceful mass rallies that were organized before 
the presidential elections in 2007 against the presidency candidature of Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan or another person that had National Opinion background. Erdoğan‟s opposers 
accuse him with having a secret agenda, which he denies.  
  Millions of people had participated in the meetings which were organized in 
April and May of 2007 in principal cities of Turkey and emphasized their concern for 
laicism. The first protests were organized two weeks before the elections in Ankara on 
14
th
 of April, fifth and the last one was organized in Izmir on 13
th
 of May. Protesters 
carried banners of Atatürk and shouted anti-Islamist slogans in order to show their 
ambition to protect the laic and Kemalist nature of Turkey. The most significant slogan 
shouted was “Turkey is laic, it will remain laic forever”.387  
 BBC mentions a protester expressed that she was scared about the developments 
and did not want an Islamic regime in Turkey. She carried on indicating that she was 
keen on protecting the laic state and that is why she was there.
388
  Even though some 
reforms were made by AKP, its attempts such as criminalizing adultery and abortion, 
restricting consumption of alcoholic beverages and appointing the people from Islamist 
ideology to key locations of the civil institutions caused an inconvenience for the laic 
society.  
 The then President Ahmet Necdet Sezer warned that the Islamism threat was the 
highest ever in Turkish history a day before the first rally in Ankara. CHP and other 
opposition parties requested a snap election and the president to be assigned by the new 
party, but they were not successful on convincing AKP and AKP was very insistent on 
not announcing its candidate till the last minute.
389
 
                                                 
387 “Huge Rally for Turkish Secularism”, 29.04.2007, BBC, Acc. 18.08.2013 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6604643.stm 
388 loc. cit. 
389 loc. cit.  
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 On April 12
th
, 2007 the then President of General Staff expressed his thoughts 
by saying “I hope the election of a president who is committed to republican values, 
unitary form of the laic democratic state not only in words but also in action.”390  
 Police raided the headquarters of the Nokta Magazine on April 13
th
, 2007 and 
seized the computers of the newspaper. The raid happened after the magazine published 
the journals that were claimed to belong to the president of Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği, 
retired general Şener Eruygur, which comprised coup d‟etat plans against AKP 
government and alleged Turkish Armed Forces with being connected to the powers that 
initiated the Republic Protests in order to create a social conflict and seeing these 
conflicts as psychological wars against the political power.
391
 Moreover, the general 
coordinator of the magazine wrote in his article that today there was not a direct threat 
of a coup d‟etat, but it would be naivety to believe that the organized social protests 
were completely civil. Speaker of the parliament, Bülent Arınç, called the protests as 
provocation, but this was perceived as a contra-propaganda by some.
392
 Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan also criticized the protester with being mounted troops which were not aware 
of what was going on and exaggerating their number.
393
 While the protests were seen as 
a democratic right by some deputies, some others criticized them with being pro-coup. 
Some pro-AKP journalists accused the protests with being a scenario of Ergenekon and 
the participants as pro-Ergenekon. 
 However, in conclusion AKP won the elections with a higher rate than the 
previous and Abdullah Gül from AKP was elected as the president. The election results 
were evaluated as the protests were not embraced by a wide segment of the population. 
 The other incident was the Gezi Park Protest which just started from a group of 
people that rose against decision of the government to build a shopping mall to the 
principal park in the city despite court decision against project.
394
 It also drew 
opposition as Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan wanted to build the new shopping 
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mall in the shape of an old military barracks that was demolished in 1940‟s from the 
same place and hosted a reactionist uprising during the last period of Ottoman Empire. 
In September 16
th
, 2011, Taksim Pedastrianization Project was ratified by Istanbul 
Metropolitan Municipality.
395
 However, the fact that this project was envisioning 
construction of a building on the current park area dragged too much negative attention 
from public and NGO‟s. As a result, NGO called Taksim Solidarity Network was 
formed and organized several activities to raise their voices. Excavations at the park 
started on October 4
th
, 2012.
396
 In April 2013, Gezi Park Festival was organized for 
dragging attention to the situation. Following the entrance of excavation machines in the 
park on May 27
th
, 2013, news spread quickly through social media and some activists 
went to the park to prevent excavation work of municipality. Protesters tried to stop the 
machines and were successful for the moment; however they faced police‟s strong 
intervention.
397
 Following the incident, people started to flow into the park and stayed 
there overnight to protect trees for a possible second attack of the municipality. On 29
th
 
of May the police attacked the protesters at the park at 5 o‟clock in the morning. Prime 
minister emphasized that they were decisive about building the mall despite strong 
opposition from the public. On 30
th
 of May, police made a second attack which 
ascended incidents to a higher level, but retracted eventually leaving the park to the 
protesters on 1
st
 of June.
398
 Protests came to an end after the police raid to the park on 
June 15
th
, 2013 where all camping equipments were seized by the police. Following the 
incident, protests carried on a weak nature ceasing by the end of August.
399
 However, 
since that time, protests carry on a partial and inconstant basis. 
 Even though Gezi Park excavations was the prominent reason for the protests, 
AKP‟s regulations regarding abortion, alcohol consumption, internet usage, press 
freedom and bold speeches about Atatürk have also been the factors that escalated the 
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situation.
400
 According to the sources of Ministry of Internal Affairs, 2.5 million people 
participated in the protests in 79 provinces of Turkey and many others supported the 
activists through social media which turned into protests against the AKP 
government.
401
 6 civilians and a police officer lost their lives while 8163 people were 
injured in the course of events.
402
 Police was criticized for using excessive force against 
protesters by responding with teargas and water cannons.   
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CONCLUSIONS 
  
 Turkish Islam interpretation in historical course is quite problematic in many 
dimensions. The actual and historical dimensions of these problems should be handled 
in a way that is clarified on the ideological perceptions and attitudes. The current 
scientific and intellectual atmosphere in Turkey, should raise serious opinions on how 
the Islam was perceived by the Turks since now and how it will be perceived in the 
future. This only will be possible through conducting objective scientific researches at 
educational institutions. Such kind of a scientific study seems to be as a must for 
enabling the Turkish people to live in peace. 
  The Islamism in Abdülhamid 2nd period was a sheer reaction against Ottoman 
Islam and that is why it is a modernist ideology in its roots. Therefore, it should be 
classified under modernist ideologies in the Turkish history despite its anti-western 
attitude. On the other hand, Ottoman Islam is an issue that would provide practical and 
scientific advantages and should be evaluated in terms of the past and the future of 
Islam in Turkey together with Turkish political and intellectual history. Ottoman 
historians should involve themselves on this subject. 
 Islamic world should avoid denying the West in order to assure the social 
compromise. They have to do this in the future even if they do not do it at the present 
day. As a matter of fact, the efforts of the current political power which comes from a 
modernist Islam tradition to make Turkey, that was established over the Ottoman 
legacy, a member of EU is a fact that should be investigated very well. Manifestation of 
a country which bears a Muslim majority with a union that can be characterized as a 
Christian political union is a very important and historical milestone for the Islamic 
world that was observed for the first time in history. This is also an event to be analyzed 
by putting religious reactionist-modernist rhetoric not only by the Islamist Turkish 
intellectuals, but also laic intellectuals.  
 Therefore, what should be done to provide this is to take evolution and dynamics 
of the Western world, Islamic world and Turkey into consideration and take an attitude 
according to that. It is possible to understand the concerns of the Islamist intellectuals 
who lived in the 19
th
 and the beginnings of 20
th
 centuries as being the people who lived 
the consequences of Western imperialism; but there is no need for carrying on such kind 
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of an attitude at the present day. Yet, Islam had realized its cultural moves in its 
classical period by not hanging up on the surrounding cultures but by absorbing them. It 
has the same capacity at the present day, and also the West which considers the Islam 
world as consisting of only some terrorist circles that show themselves as the groups 
that act in the name of Islam can also recognize the Islamic world with its real identity 
and benefit from Islam‟s wealth in case this can be realized. In other words, both 
cultures are dependent on each other. A dialogue between Islamist intellectuals that aim 
to resolve current issues and glorify the humanity rather than running behind a project 
such as an intercultural dialogue between religions which is unclear and can mean many 
positive or negative meanings and aims clearly to transform Islam to an understanding 
similar with Christianity by moderating and overpowering it would definitely be a more 
realistic approach.  
 Thus, handling Islamic thought in terms of universal dimension would be for 
Turkey‟s advantage while focusing on domestic issues and issues of Islamic world 
which would lead the way for the Western world to recognize the values of Islamic 
world.  It would be more advantageous if Western intellectuals could put their 
Islamophobia aside that increased following the September 11 incidents and abandon 
their otherizing attitude against the Islamic world.  
 September 11 incidents did not only cause a Muslim hostility in the West, but 
also a serious interest and learning effort towards the Islamic world. Thus, this event 
would contribute to extend the tendency of acknowledging tolerance and diversity also 
to the groups which were historically otherized by the West. It will be more difficult to 
turn the authentic identity into a tool of imposition through exaggerating the importance 
of different identities. The identity politics such as Islamism that marked the recent past 
are still up-to-date. Acting with an Islamic sensibility based on human rights and 
freedoms is not something that will get disappeared as long as there are the Muslim 
communities in the world. Even though the same thing is also valid for the different 
identities, at the present day these identities were successful in finding themselves a 
place in the global politics. However, Islamist identity still remains as the opposite 
culture in the basis of clash of civilizations. While Islamism was already seen as an 
extremist opposite civilization, September 11 incidents has strengthened this perception 
even more and transformed the Islamic world to the disadvantageous civilization of the 
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bipolar world. On the other hand, it can be said that this polarization is not a clash of 
civilizations but a part of an extensive hegemony project which is tried to be legitimized 
through the terrorism subtext. Even though there might be also circles that would settle 
with the clash of civilizations thesis, the liberal tendencies would rise as it happens in 
Turkey at the present day and the perception that Islam bears liberal features would be 
accepted in time.  
 Islamists oppose to the modern state because of its central economical and 
political organization model. This attitude is also a feature of the other modern 
ideologies that defend the civil society.  It was supposed that modern state would bring 
wealth to the society in the past and the major element of the social welfare state was 
the nation. But following the rise of globalization, trust towards the state declined, 
national unity lost its significance, a search for alternative identities has started and 
Islamism could fit itself very good in the center of this argument. 
 It would not be incorrect to claim that Islam is being reproduced as a periphery 
popular opposing culture as a reaction and alternative against the laic westernist identity 
of the center at the present day. The social circles which form grassroots of the right 
wing conservative parties are commonly these circles which embrace this identity. The 
Islamic rhetoric of these parties which frequently are interpreted as swerving from 
laicism or using religion as a political tool, verbalize the expectations of the circles 
which should normally be answered by the government even though the requests are not 
shared by the party cadres and are verbalized only with the concern of obtaining 
political power.  
 Along with this, the 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 generations who migrated to the principle urban 
areas, show efforts to be arbiters of the future of Turkey by taking part in many spheres 
of public space such as economy, politics, bureaucracy, higher education and getting 
organized in politics and economics. This sociological fact which is perceived as 
religious reactionism by the laic circles is nothing more than refilling the place of Islam 
which was by-passed during the westernization process. This silent majority which was 
forced to settle with what the republic offered during the single-party period; look 
decisive on raising their voice, stepping out of the mosque and demand their cultural 
rights. This majority has left the mosque and entered all in sectors of the public space. 
The struggle between these circles and the laic elite is the struggle for not relinquishing 
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the rights which the Islamists gained. If this struggle would not fall into the trap of 
fanaticism and corruption, it is clear that it will make an important contribution to 
democratization.  
 It is obvious that the opposing society started to reproduce the popular Islamic 
culture at the present day. However, it is a fact that that this culture is considerably less 
quality than the Ottoman period. Turkish Muslimhood presently demonstrates its 
villager identity in every sphere. However, the recent developments show that the 
quality of popular Islam increases gradually parallel to the economical, political and 
intellectual development of urbanizing Muslim society. 
 At the present day, there is still a society that wants to keep Islam out of scope in 
the modernization programs intended for the future of Turkey. The mistake of the 
Kemalist elite lies herein. Even though Kemalism became successful in the period it 
emerged, it could not keep this success and lost its sustainability in the changing global 
conditions. Kemalism rightfully kept Islam responsible of what devastated Ottoman 
Empire became; founded the republic which adopted positive values by terminating 
Islam‟s political, social and cultural existence and declared itself as the official 
ideology. However its precluding attitude against Islam‟s conservative manner, 
transformed into an ideological struggle that necessitates the reconciliation of both 
sides. At the end of this struggle it will be possible to see a Turkey that absorbed 
democratic values. 
 Turkish Muslimhood exhibits an attitude which could still not settle accounts 
with its past and became yoked to it because of not having enough rational knowledge 
on it, and still searches for a consolation in the golden era of Islam which it sanctified 
through several tales. The inferiority complex that it felt towards the technological and 
social superiority of the West, have transformed into hostility against it. These attitudes 
make Turkish Muslimhood utopian and unoriginal. In case of coming over its complex, 
Turkish Muslimhood can reflect a very healthy, tolerant and original Islam image to the 
Western world by using its historical and strategic advantages. But, in order to do this, it 
has to accept that Islam is a religion which was also sent to be lived in a materialistic 
world and provide a rational worldview.  
 There is also the role of lack of knowledge on Islam along with the ideological 
impositions at the base of the Kemalism-Islam conflict in Turkey which predominantly 
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bears a Muslim identity. It is often seen that this lack of knowledge creates gaps also on 
scientific and intellectual life together with political life. It became ordinary to see that 
these gaps often cause serious situations that periodically rise after 1950‟s and can 
endanger the social compromise in the debates which are based on Islam, are held 
among political circles and media and are devoid of a scientific base, in ideological 
publications and the incidents in the recent past. Islam which is debated between 
Kemalist and Islamist intellectuals on ideological and reactionist platforms in Turkey 
usually aggregate on some conflictive topics such as Shari‟a that prevents to see the big 
picture and this proves how both sides are incompetent on what they debate on. The 
current radical laic and radical Islamist ideologies prevent the state, politicians and 
intellectuals to steer for enlightenment. Islam‟s master by all segments of the society, 
but especially the politicians, intellectuals and bureaucrats, is extremely necessary and 
urgent. Otherwise the dichotomies and conflicts that are caused by them will never 
come to an end. 
 The incorrect historical perception which was formed as an outcome of the 
accumulation that congregated under the effect of political and social crises during the 
centuries since the foundation of Islam is the greatest diffraction in the evolution course 
of the Islamic societies because of the social conscious conflict it has created. This 
incorrect perception arises as the most basic factor which affects all spheres of the social 
and political life. This incorrect historical perspective comes in the first place of the 
reasons which make some people to see Islam as a personal passive belief, some others 
as a habit which is limited with worshipping and some others to perceive as a political 
ideology. What causes the societies to be confused about Islam‟s place in social life and 
in the globalizing world is this lack of perspective. As this lack of knowledge carries on, 
a deformed Islam understanding holds Islamic world as a captive. Thus, formation of a 
healthy historical perspective would make an important contribution in resolution of the 
social and political problems caused by this incorrect historical perception. In this sense, 
investigations should be done in order to understand the real message that Prophet 
Mohammed gave 1400 years ago and interpret the message according to the conditions 
of the present day. This investigation which should be done by the Islamic scientists 
rather than the ordinary Muslim society would enable the society to see what type of 
distortions that was applied to the real message along the centuries.  
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 Islamism should not be perceived only as the rise of Islamic values. Even though 
this is a part of the decline of modernism, Islamism should be handled as a tool of 
legitimizing the political struggle. This determination is accurate both for 19
th
 century 
Ottoman and 20
th
 century Turkish Islamism. 19
th
 century Islamism was an outcome of 
the legitimization pursuit of Ottoman Empire against the social conflicts of the period. 
Following this period, nationalism was the rising ideology and Islam‟s political 
character remained to be seen as a legitimization tool. At the present day Islamism rose 
once more to legitimize a post-nationalist identity politics.  
 19
th
 century Islamist reformism reidentified Islam in order to transform it 
according to the needs of the modern society. However, this interference resulted with a 
total elimination of Islam from the social and cultural life. Islamist reformism was a 
reconciliation movement which led to nationalism and acknowledgement of nation-
state. The usage of Islamist ideology as a political mobilization tool at the present day 
was an outcome of the modernist political approach and formation of the nation-state. 
However, when the modern social welfare state model of the West declined, Islam was 
once more seen as an alternative legitimacy tool.  
 The social base of political Islam in Turkey is a vertical bloc which nestles 
different socio-economic categories. While the intentions of these different segments 
vary from each other, the main point that they are united is anti-Kemalism and the 
desire to arise as an alternative to it. Thus, RP became successful on gathering these 
different clusters under the same roof and arising as a strong opposition movement 
against the status-quo. It is possible to group RP‟s social base in three clusters: the 
SME‟s whose interests were conflicting with the large industries in the principal cities, 
rural originated, university graduate periphery elements of the professional middle class 
that bore a conservative characteristic and recently urbanized periphery elements of the 
workers class who were marginalized because of the lack of employment guarantee. 
 Each of these groups developed in numbers and in terms of social and 
economical power. This kind of opposing ideologies gained strength as a result of 
decline of the social welfare state model as a result of globalization and postmodernism. 
Thus, decrease of the protective policies has made the repressive side of the nation state 
more visible and opened the way for the critics against Kemalism. As the global capital 
strengthened the capital class and professionals in the periphery, Islamist movement 
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arose with its radical rhetoric against westernization project and successfully promoted 
itself as the architect of this process to the circles whose dependency decreased to 
westernization project in 1990‟s.  
 Growth of RP was an unexpected event for the Kemalists as Islamism was 
identified with traditionalism and religious reactionism according to modernist theory, 
but instead of disappearing it rose directly proportional to the rise of capitalism in 
Turkey and gained strength especially in the urban areas. The perspective which 
supposed RP‟s ideology as religious reactionist was missing the perspective that its 
radicalism was representing the need of change in the country. RP undertook the 
objective to protect the civil society against the state and had an alternative attitude in 
many subjects. It successfully played upon the disappointment of that westernization 
project, which was already not feasible, caused. It was convincing that RP provided 
radical alternatives but the method it followed in order to draw more electorates to the 
party by claiming that it was the real protector of laic values was very incredible. RP‟s 
successes showed how much the laic political powers were incompetent to meet the 
demands of the society. 
 It is usually believed that how much the society participates in the political 
process that less it radicalizes. But in Turkey, apparently the repression brought 
moderation. A political tendency that promoted itself as an alternative to the central 
politics, ended up with sharing the same repressive values with the others. It is 
challenging to understand how a party can be democratic in an undemocratic system. 
Turkish political life shows that being in for an election has a moderator effect on non-
central movements. Islamist parties were considerably successful in election 
competitions. This shows that Islamist parties can only be as democratic as the current 
political system enables it as sharing the same cultural environment with all other 
political elements.  
 Political culture of Turkey is shared by all elements in the society including the 
Islamists. RP was also a part of the same political system. While other parties were 
being closed RP stood idly by their closure and thus it also was not supported in its 
closure process despite almost begging to the other parties. Therefore, Islamist 
movement tried to embrace a more democratic attitude after RP‟s closure, but it failed 
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to show its sincerity by not supporting the democratic demonstrations against the state-
mafia cooperation.  
 RP‟s strategy was not based on democracy but on seizing the state 
administration. RP and FP approached the political rights subject in an opportunist and 
discriminative attitude. They both wanted the rights for their grassroots and thus failed 
to form a common language in order to contribute extension of democratic rights; 
instead, they focused on seizing the governmental institution through political games.  
 Even though it was extensively promoted that Islam and democracy were 
compatible by RP, it failed to contribute the development of democratic values as it 
followed a biased policy. In order to evaluate how democratic was RP, the lack of 
democratic awareness in Turkish political culture should be evaluated rather than 
Islam‟s own values.   
 Increasing cultural otherization and discriminative approach that became evident 
in each sphere of social life polarizes the society by marginalizing them in laic-anti-laic, 
urban-rural, modern-traditional, liberal-conservative and westernist-Islamist axes 
gradually taking the shape of a class conflict.
403
 These dichotomies orient the state 
politics, bureaucracy and education according to the tendency of political powers and 
flare up conflicts from time to time. 
 At that point, state blames the foreign focuses for the identity crisis that it cannot 
resolve and demonstrates a self-contradictory. This situation causes the state to lose 
prestige inside and outside its borders and is the prognosticator of a blocked system.   
 Turkey, which gained its independence out of an invaded empire, set off 
claiming to form a new and classless society. But placement of Kemalism, which denied 
its past and established its system on laicism, to the space that fell vacant from Islam by 
itself caused Kemalism to be perceived almost as a new religion. Thus, Kemalist elite 
cadres assumed that Islam could easily get removed out of people‟s lives forever after 
reducing it to a conscientious level. 
 As a matter of fact, Kemalism eliminated Islam from state politics and legal 
system by leaving only the areas of social ethics, faith and worship which were also 
                                                 
403 op. cit., Ocak, p. 145 
 203 
 
strictly taken under state control.
404
 This resulted with the continuation of conflicts 
increasingly especially after 1960‟s.  
 Author Ahmet Yaşar Ocak states that Turkey made some mistakes in its politics 
which eventually were effective on the mentioned dichotomy: 
 Turkey assumed that it could transform the multi-ethnic society that was living in 
Anatolia for a long time to a classless and united nation that did not allow ethnical 
distinction. Nevertheless, the ethnical and class conflicts started at 1960 and 
intensified at 1980‟s showed that this was not accomplished. Ironically Turkish 
politicians kept foreign powers responsible of the situation instead of accepting 
their fault. 
 Turkey did not think that some of its neighbors, which were parts of an empire that 
it ruled once upon a time, could have complex against itself and this situation could 
become an issue in the future. Instead Turkey ignored the past and preferred to base 
its future politics on peace in the homeland and the world. It made all the 
arrangements to be a part of the West because it was seeing its future there. But 
many issues emerged in the republican period such as Cyprus conflict, Armenian 
conflict and crisis with Bulgaria showed that Turkey was mistaken about its 
expectations and it was necessary to confront and resolve these issues.  
 Turkey thought communism would never come to an end and disregarded the 
reality that it has cognates in the Central Asia. But it faced the truth with the 
collapse of communism. 
 Thus, Turkey was mistaken about the world it inhabited and was puzzled with the 
emergence of issues one after another. Incompetency of politicians caused them to 
lose control of the situation and paved the way for foreign intervention even in 
smallest issues.  
 Turkey‟s first issue was Cyprus issue in 1960 and it still could not get resolved. 
 Armenian issue came into the agenda in 1973 and Turkish Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs refused the responsibility by claiming that it was Ottoman Empire‟s issue. 
But eventually Turkey had to take the responsibility which remained unresolved 
since then. 
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 The Kurdish issue broke out in 1984 and it still occupies the agenda. The political 
power usually evaded this issue by ridiculous arguments and tried to provide a 
resolution through several military interventions. 
 In 1996, this time an issue concerning the religious beliefs of Alevis broke out and 
with the set of Madımak Hotel on fire by the Islamists, the conflict between Alevis 
and Sunnis was carried to a new dimension. Also in this issue, the political circles 
did not show a notable existence.
405
 
 Turkey was deprived of a scientific perspective because of the politicians that 
did not have enough knowledge and strategic skills during these conflicts. On the 
contrary, it was seen how knowledgeable the West was. Unfortunately this point of 
view still continues. Because the state could not resolve issues with scientific methods, 
issues dragged the state into their trajectory.
406
 
 In this context, Kemalism-Islamism conflict blocks Turkey off from developing. 
This conflict that influences every aspect of life resembles a conflict of two religions. 
This problem should be resolved as soon as possible before confronting more conflicts. 
In this frame Atatürk‟s personality should be separated from the Kemalist ideology and 
the practices during the single-party period following Atatürk‟s death should be 
handled. This situation should be avoided from turning to an unnecessary Atatürk 
hostility. Both Islamists and laics should criticize opinions of each other respectfully 
and should not violate the freedom of opinion. 
 In order to resolve the current situation, high culture (Kemalist, laic, modern, 
urban) circles should remember that Kemalism is not a religion to compete with Islam; 
accept that it should exist along with Islam and it can be criticized. Likewise, low 
culture (Islamist, anti-laic, traditional, rural) circles should accept that faith in Islam and 
Islam state are different and should understand how much the states which used Islam 
as an ideology suffered recently. Beside all those, serious scientific researches about 
both ideologies should be supported and people‟s access to objective resources should 
be provided by the elimination of corrupted information. 
 
 
                                                 
405 op. cit., Ocak, p. 150 
406 ibid., 152 
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ANNEXES 
GLOSSARY 
 
Abant Platform: It is a platform that was founded in 1998 and it is supported by the Association of Journalists and 
Writers. It was named after Abant, a place renowned for its lake between Bolu mountains in Turkey. Its agenda can 
include any actual and cultural subjects that would bring a solution to any kind of questions in the society. It is a 
national platform, however it also has international organizations on its agenda. Intellectuals organize meetings to 
discuss global and national issues and brainstorm ion their resolutions. 
Abdullah Gül: (born 29 October 1950) He is the 11th and current President of Turkey, serving since 28 August 
2007. He previously served for four months as Prime Minister from 2002 to 2003, and as Minister of Foreign 
Affairs from 2003 to 2007. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's nomination of Gül as a presidential candidate 
drew strong and highly vocal opposition from ardent supporters of secularism in Turkey.  In May 2007, Gül's first bid 
for presidency was blocked by the Constitutional Court, due to concern over views Gül expressed during his Welfare 
Party years. However, following the parliamentary elections in July of the same year, which were won by the Justice 
and Development Party with 46.6% of the popular vote, he was eventually elected President on 28 August 2007 and 
becoming the first president of Islamist background in the modern history of Turkey.  
Abdurrahman Dilipak: (Born 1949) He is Radical Islamic author and columnist for the radical Islamic newspaper 
Yeni Akid. 
Abdülhamit the 2nd: (22 September 1842 – 10 February 1918) He was the 99th caliph of Islam and the 34th sultan 
of the Ottoman Empire. He was the last Sultan to exert effective control over the Ottoman Empire.  He oversaw a 
period of decline in the power and extent of the Empire, ruling from 31 August 1876 until he was deposed on 27 
April 1909.  
Ahmet Yaşar Ocak: (Born 1952) Historian and author. Professor, Department of History at Hacettepe University. 
Ali Bardakoğlu:  (Born 1952) He is the former president of Presidency of Religious Affairs and as such the 
highest Islamic authority in Turkey. He is well known in Turkey and Europe as a moderate Islamic leader. He met 
with Pope Benedict XVI on November 28, 2006 in Ankara to help further interfaith dialog between Catholics and 
Muslims. 
Ali Bulaç: (Born 1951), Sociologist, theologian, journalist, writer and Islamic author. he graduated from Istanbul‟s 
Higher Islamic Institute in 1975 and from the Department of Sociology at the Istanbul University‟s Faculty of 
Literature in 1980. he wrote a translation in Turkish of the Qur‟an, He is renowned for his researches on 
Contemporary Islamic world, problems of opinions and social changes and innovations. In the books he wrote, he 
expresses the attitudes that muslim people need to adopt in the modern world.  
Ali Yaşar Sarıbay: (Born 1952) Political scientist and sociologist. Professor of Political and Social Sciences at 
Uludag University. 
ANAP: The Motherland Party, (Turkish: Anavatan Partisi, abbreviated as ANAVATAN (formerly ANAP) is 
a political party in Turkey. It was founded in 1983 by Turgut Özal.[1] It was merged to Democratic Party in October 
2009. In September 2011, the party was re-established. Its president is İbrahim Çelebi. The ANAP was considered 
a centre-right nationalist party which supported restrictions on the role that government can play in the economy, 
which favoured private capital and enterprise, and which allowed for some public expressions of religion. In the 
National Assembly on 6 November 1983, the Populist Party and the Motherland party were allowed to run for office. 
The ANAP won 212 of the 450 available seats and Turgut Özal, the leader of the party, became the Prime 
Minister. The ANAP maintained a majority in the government of Turkey from 1983 until 1991. Turgut Özal held the 
position of Prime Minister from 1983 to 1989, then President from 1989 to 1993. 
AKP: The Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi), known in Turkey by its Turkish acronym, 
AKP, was formed by a group of reformist politicians with roots in the Islamic movement. Its most prominent leaders 
are Abdullah Gül and Tayyip R. Erdoǧan. Founded in 2001 by members of a number of existing parties, the party 
won a landslide victory in the 2002 election, winning over two-thirds of parliamentary seats.  
Alevism: Alevism (Alevîlik) is a religious group combining Anatolian folk Shi'ism with Sufi elements such as those 
of the Bektashi tariqa, with some schools drawing influence from Tengrism and/or Zoroastrianism. Believers live 
almost entirely in Turkey, with minorities in Albania, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Crimea, Croatia, Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, 
Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Tatarstan, Vojvodina, and the Turkish Diaspora. Alevis are among 
larger Turkish, Turkmen, Tatar, Azeri, Zaza and Kurdish sub-ethnic communities. Alevism is also a group identity 
which is variously interpreted as cultural (emphasizing special traditions of poetry, music and dance), humanistic 
and/or political - whether leftist or Kemalist. 
AP: The Justice Party (Adalet Partisi, AP) was a Turkish political party prominent in the 1960s and 1970s. A 
descendant of the Democrat Party, the AP was dominated by Süleyman Demirel, who served six times as prime 
minister, and was in office at the time of the military coup on September 12, 1980. Along with all other political 
parties in Turkey, the justice Party was suppressed in the immediate aftermath of the coup. It was subsequently 
reestablished as the True Path Party in 1983. Justice Party was moderate right-wing party. It 
advocated Kemalist principles and Western-style democracy and economic system. It strongly supported membership 
in NATO and close relations with the United States. 
 217 
 
Bediüzzaman Said Nursi: (1878 – March 23, 1960), commonly known as Bediüzzaman (Badi' al-Zaman), which 
means "The Wonder of the Age"  was a Sunni Muslim theologian who wrote the Risale-i Nur Collection, a body 
of Qur'anic commentary exceeding six thousand pages. Believing that modern science and logic was the way of the 
future, he advocated teaching religious sciences in secular schools and modern sciences in religious schools. Nursi 
inspired a faith movement that has played a vital role in the revival of Islam in Turkey and now numbers several 
millions of followers world wide. 
Bülent Ecevit: (28 May 1925 – 5 November 2006) was a Turkish politician, poet, writer, scholar, and journalist, who 
was the leader of Republican People's Party (CHP), later of the Democratic Left Party (DSP) and five-time Prime 
Minister of Turkey. Following the 1980 coup led by General Kenan Evren , Ecevit was incarcerated and suspended 
from active politics for life along with the other political leaders of the time. A referendum in 1987 lifted his ban 
from politics, and he became the chairman of the Democratic Left Party (Turkish: Demokratik Sol Parti, DSP). 
Ecevit's government undertook a number of reforms aimed at stabilizing the Turkish economy in preparation for 
accession negotiations with the European Union. He also translated the great ancient Sanskrit poem. 
Cemal Gürsel: (1895–1966), He was a Turkish army officer, and the fourth President of Turkey. He fought in World 
War I and in most of the military campaigns during the war of independence (1920-1923). Gürsel remained in the 
army and in 1958 became commander of Turkish ground forces. A popular army figure, he led the coup of May, 
1960, which overthrew Prime Minister Adnan Menderes (see also Turkey). Gürsel resisted attempts to continue 
military rule and was elected president of the republic in 1961. Because of illness, he was succeeded as president by 
Cevdet Sunay in Mar., 1966, and died in September. 
CHP: The Republican People's Party (Turkish: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP) is a Kemalist, social liberal and social 
democratic political party in Turkey. It is the oldest political party of Turkey and is currently Main Opposition in 
the Grand National Assembly. The Republican People's Party describes itself as "a modern social-democratic party, 
which is faithful to founding principles and values of the Republic of Turkey. Also the party is cited as "the founding 
party of modern Turkey". During the interim "multi-party periods" in between the military coups of 1960, 1971, and 
1980, CHP is regarded as being social-democratic (member of the Socialist International),[9] state 
nationalistic and secular/laicist. The party's logo consists of the Six Arrows, which represent the foundational 
principles of Kemalist Ideology: republicanism, nationalism, statism, populism, laïcité, and revolutionism. 
CHP, along with all other political parties of the time, was closed down for a brief period by the military coup of 
1980. An inheritor party which still participates in Turkish democratic life, was established in 1984, as 
the Democratic Left Party by the former leader of CHP, Bülent Ecevit. CHP was finally reestablished with its original 
name on 9 September 1992, with the participation of a majority of its previous members of the pre-1980 period. 
At the elections held on June 12, 2011, CHP was able to increase the number & the percentage of voters to 
11.155.972 & 25,98% respectively. Analysts attributed the increase to a change both in leadership after Kemal 
Kılıçdaroğlu became the leader as well as focusing on the social issues during the elections campaign. 
Compulsory Religious Education: Intended for the restoration of the Imam Hatip schools, the compulsory religious 
education was constituted within the 4+4+4 educational system.  
Clientelism: The favoring of one person or group over others with equal claims; partiality. 
ÇYDD: The Association for Supporting Contemporary Life (est.1989)  is a non-governmental organization, working 
voluntarily with its competencies and experience, aiming to protect Atatürk‟s principles and revolutions, to reach 
contemporary society via contemporary education for contemporary people and to carry Turkey above the 
contemporary civilization level. 
DP: The Democratic Party ( Turkish : Demokrat Parti , DP for short) was a Turkish moderately right wing political 
party, and the country's third legal opposition party, after the Liberal Republican Party (Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası) 
established by Ali Fethi Okyar in 1930, and the National Development Party (Milli Kalkınma Partisi) established by 
Nuri Demirağ in 1945. Founded and led by Celal Bayar , it was the first of the opposition parties to rise to power, de-
seating the Republican People's Party during the national elections of 1950 and ending Turkey's one party era.  
DSP: Democratic Left Party (Turkish: Demokratik Sol Parti - DSP) is a Turkishpolitical party founded on November 
14, 1985, by Rahşan Ecevit. It was a minor party until it won 76 parliamentary seats in the December 1995 elections.  
DYP: Right Path Party (Turkish: Doğru Yol Partisi or DYP) is a centre-right, conservative Turkish political party, 
established by Suleyman Demirel in 1983.  It succeeded thehistorical Democratic Party and the Justice Party - two 
parties with similar ideologies which were closed by military coup regimes. There have been four DYP governments 
since its foundation; one led by Demirel, the other three by Turkey's first woman prime minister, Tansu Çiller. 
Remained outside the parliament in 2007 and the next elections. 
Fellow Countrymanship: Citizens collectively. It defines the relation between citizens of the same nation. It is 
mostly used to define the feeling of belonging to the same geographical location with other citizens of one‟s nation. 
FP: Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi) is founded in 1998. Short-lived successor to the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) in 
Turkey. Became the leading opposition party. Led by Recai Kutan. Proclaimed a softer Islamic profile than Refah, 
emphasizing Turkey's Islamic traditions and culture; this change was symbolized by the appointment of three non-
Islamist, non-hijab-wearing women to the party's executive board. Favored full integration with the West to ensure 
civilian rule and democracy in Turkey. Fared well in the 1998 municipal elections and proved successful in providing 
social services. Came in third in the 1999 parliamentary elections. Accused of being an illegal Islamic organization 
and was banned in 2001, making it the sixteenth political party to be outlawed in Turkey since 1983. 
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Graham Fuller: He is an American author and political analyst who specialized in Islamic extremism.  He was 
formerly vice-chair of the National Intelligence Council who  also served as Station Chief in Kabuk for the CIA. He 
is the author of a number of books, including The Future of Political Islam 
Haldun Gülalp: Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations at Yıldız Technical 
University 
İP: Workers' Party (Turkish: İşçi Partisi ) is political party in Turkey led by Doğu Perinçek. They are known as 
"Aydınlıkçılar" (Clarifiers) due to their daily newspaper "Aydınlık" (Clarity) that has a circulation of 63.000. 
Workers' Party is established in 1992. The İP traditionally combined Maoist rhetoric with a hardline Kemalism. They 
admire the founder of the Turkish republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (who is considered a "left-wing bourgeois 
democratic revolutionary" by most of the party members) as much as they admire Marxist revolutionary leaders such 
as Lenin, Mao Zedong and Fidel Castro. According to them, separatism became a tool of US imperialism in breaking 
national markets in the Third World in post- Cold War conditions. 
İmam-Hatip Schools: Imam Hatip school (Turkish: İmam Hatip Lisesi, 'hatip' coming from Arabic 'khatib', 
meaning the one who delivers the "khutba" (Friday sermon) is a secondary education institution. As the name 
suggests, they were originally founded in lieu of a vocational school to train government employed imams; 
after madrasas in Turkey were abolished by the Unification of Education Act (Turkish: Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu) as 
a part of Atatürk's reforms. 
İskender Paşa Community: This community depends on the Halidiye branch of the Naqshbandi Tariqah and it 
started when its leader Mehmet Zahid Kotku was assigned as an imam in the mosque called Iskender Pasha. Today 
this Sufistic movement is still alive under the leadership of Muharrem Nurettin Cosan. 
Some of the important polticians that were followers of this movement are Necmettin Erbakan, Turgut Özal, Recai 
Kutan, Korkut Özal, Cevat Ayhan, Ahmet Tekdal, Akif Gülle, Hasan Hüseyin Ceylan, Temel Karamollaoğlu, Nevzat 
Yalçıntaş. 
İsmet İnönü: 24 September 1884 – 25 December 1973) was a Turkish Army General, the Prime Minister, 
and second President of Turkey. In 1938, the Republican People's Party gave him the title of "Milli Şef" (National 
Chief). When the 1934 Surname Law was adopted, Mustafa Kemal gave him a surname delivered from İnönü, where 
he commanded the forces of Army of Grand National Assembly as the Minister of the Chief of the General Staff 
(Erkân-ı Harbiye-i Umumiye Reis Vekili) during the Greco-Turkish War of 1919–1922. After the War of 
Independence was won, Ismet Pasha was appointed as the chief negotiator of the Turkish delegation, both for the 
Armistice of Mudanya and for the Treaty of Lausanne. He became famous for his resolve and stubbornness in 
defending Turkey's demands while conceding very little to the other side at the negotiating table. After the death of 
Atatürk, İnönü was viewed as the most appropriate candidate to succeed him, and was elected the second President of 
the Republic of Turkey and enjoyed the official title of "Milli Şef", i.e. "National Chief". As prime minister (1923-24, 
1925-37) he ably seconded the reforms of Atatürk, whom he succeeded (1938) as president of the republic. Inönü 
instituted free general elections for the first time in 1950; his party was defeated, and he was succeeded by Celal 
Bayar. After a military coup (1960; see Turkey ) and the promulgation of a new constitution, Inönü's Republican 
People's party won a parliamentary plurality in the elections of 1961. 
İsmet Özel: (Born 19 September, 1944) is a Turkish poet and scholar. Özel's songs of freedom derived its content 
from socialism but their structure and symbolism reflected the tastes of the Second New Generation movement in 
Turkish poetry. In the 1970s, Özel developed a mystic and Islamist view which shocked his leftist audience. 
Kadir Topbaş: (Born 8 January 1945) He is a Turkish architect, right-wing regional politician and the current mayor 
of Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality in Turkey. He entered politics as member of the religious oriented Milli 
Selamet Partisi (MSP) and became mayor of Beyoğlu district in İstanbul, where he lives. In the 2004 regional 
elections, Kadir Topbaş ran for the post of mayor of İstanbul from the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) and won. 
Kemalism: Kemalism, also known as Atatürkism (Turkish: Kemalizm, Atatürkçülük, Atatürkçü düşünce), or the Six 
Arrows (Turkish: Altı ok), is the founding ideology of Turkey. Kemalism defines a sweeping political, social, cultural 
and religious reforms in which all Turkish citizens were declared equal without reference to religion in creating a 
secular, national, unitary state from Ottoman Empire (empire of Faith). Kemalism is emerged in part from within the 
tradition of Comtean scientific positivism in the Turkish context, it creates the political futures according to human, 
rather than divine design, so it embodies "secular" and "modern" properties in the fulfillment of many political goals 
(individual freedom, citizen equality, rational and accountable education and governing structures) of the European 
modernity in Muslim context. It is the political ideology established by the first president and the founding father 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. 
Kenan Evren: (Born 17 July 1917) He was the seventh President of Turkey from 1980 to 1989. He assumed the post 
by leading the 1980 military coup. He professed great admiration for the founder of Turkey, Kemal Atatürk , however 
he shut down many institutions founded by Atatürk and is often accused of deforming the country's legal system 
against Atatürk's principles. During his military regime, many people were tortured and executed due to their political 
beliefs. After Bülent Ecevit's death, he expressed remorse over the arrest of political leaders after the 12 September 
coup,[8] but defended the coup itself and the 35 executions.[12] Civilian resentment exists, and there have been 
demands for his being called to account, following the Ergenekon investigation. 
Laicism: French secularity, in French, laïcité  is a concept denoting the absence of religious involvement in 
government affairs as well as absence of government involvement in religious affairs. In Turkey, a strong stance of 
secularism has held sway since Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's Turkish revolution in the early 20th century. On March 3, 
1924 Turkey removed the caliphate system and all religious influence from the state. Sunni Islam, the majority 
 219 
 
religion, is now controlled by the Turkish government through the Department of Religious Affairs, and is state-
funded while other religions or sects have independence on religious affairs. Islamic views which are deemed 
political are censored in accordance with the principle of secularism. 
Mesut Yılmaz: (Born 6 November 1947) He is a Turkish politician. He was the leader of the Motherland 
Party (Turkish: Anavatan Partisi, ANAP) from 1991 to 2002, and served three times as Prime Minister of Turkey. His 
first two prime-ministerial terms lasted just months (in 1991 and 1996), while the third ran from June 1997 to January 
1999. The first was brought to an end by defeat in the 1991 elections, the latter two by the breakdown of Yılmaz's 
coalition governments. 
MHP: The Nationalist Movement Party (also translated as 'Nationalist Action Party') (Turkish: Milliyetçi Hareket 
Partisi, abbreviated to MHP), is a far-right political party in Turkey. In 1965, nationalist politician Alparslan 
Türkeş gained control of the conservative rural Republican Villagers National Party and on 8–9 February 1969, 
Türkeş changed the name of the party to the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). The party later was reformed in 
1983 under the name of the Conservative Party. After 1985, however, the name was changed to the Nationalist Task 
Party then back again to its former name in 1992. In the 2011 elections, the party is headed by Devlet Bahçeli and has 
52 deputies. 
Military Coup of 1960: The coup of May, 27th (Turkish: 27 Mayıs Darbesi) was the first coup d'état in Turkey, 
staged by a group of Turkish military officers acting outside the Staff Chiefs' chain of command, against the 
democratically elected government of the Democrat Party on 27 May 1960. The junta forced 235 generals and more 
than 3000 other commissioned officers to retirement; purged more than 500 judges and public prosecutors, and 1400 
university faculty members; put the chief of the General Staff, the president, the prime minister and other members of 
the administration under arrest,  followed by the appointment of the chief of the Army Staff, general Cemal Gürsel, as 
president, prime minister and the minister of defense. 
MNP: National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi, MNP) was an Islamist political party in Turkey, which adopted 
the National View (Milli Görüş) ideology. It was founded on 26 January 1970 by Necmettin Erbakan. It was closed 
down on 20 May 1971 by the authorities on the grounds, that it violated the Constitution, specifically the articles 
dealing with secularism. It was succeeded by the National Salvation Party (MSP) established in October 1972. 
MSP: The National Salvation Party (Turkish: Millî Selâmet Partisi, MSP) was an Islamist political party 
in Turkey founded on 11 October 1972 as the successor of the banned National Order Party (Millî Nizam Partisi, 
MNP). The party was led by Necmettin Erbakan. The party grew more popular, in 1973 elections it gained 11.8% of 
votes and was granted 48 seats in the Turkish Grand National Assembly, in 1977 elections it gained 8.56% of votes 
and won 24 seats. In 1974 it formed the coalition government with the secularist Republican People's Party (CHP) 
of Bülent Ecevit. MSP was closed down after the 1980 military coup. It was succeeded by the Welfare Party (RP), 
which was founded in 1983. 
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk: Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (1881 Thessaloniki – 10 November 1938 Istanbul) was the 
founder and first President of the Republic of Turkey. He was a division commander during the Battle of Gallipoli in 
1915 and was instrumental in preventing the partition of Anatolia and Eastern Thrace through his political and 
military leadership in the Turkish War of Independence. The successful anti-imperialist resistance drove out the 
various Allied occupying forces, and ultimately led to the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923. Ataturk 
then instituted reforms in the political, economic and cultural aspects of life in Turkey, which led to the creation of a 
democratic secular nation-state guided by educational and scientific progress. Atatürk is internationally known as an 
outstanding statesman, soldier, commander, reformer, and nation-builder who introduced many reforms with the aim 
of founding a new secular democratic and modern republic after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. As a visionary, 
revolutionary figure, and political thinker, he strove to set Turkey on a path from which Turks today vow not to stray 
(this path included a series of political, legal, cultural, social and economic reforms, such as the emancipation of 
women, change in dress and alphabet). Ataturk's legacy and principles are deeply embedded in the Turkish national 
consciousness, while the results of his reform and modernization movement are firmly rooted in all realms and 
dimensions of life in Turkey.  
Mustafa Özel: (Born 1956) Columnist and Professor of Management at İstanbul Şehir University. 
MÜSİAD: MÜSİAD (The Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen), an Islamically-oriented 
business association, is a group which must be studied within the context of both the business associations that 
constitute an essential element of civil society and the Islamic movements in Turkey. Founded in 1990. 
National View: Millî Görüş (literally English: National Vision). In 1969 the Turkish Islamist politician Necmettin 
Erbakan published a manifesto that he gave the title Millî Görüş. That emphasizes the moral and spiritual strength of 
Islamic faith (Iman) and explains the Muslim world's decline as a result of its imitation of Western values (such 
as secularism) and inappropriate use of Western technology. 
Naqshbandi Tariqah: Naqshbandi (an-Naqshbandiyyah, Nakşibendi, Naksibendi, Naksbandi) is the major spiritual 
order of Sunni Islam Sufism. It is the only Sufi way that traces its spiritual lineage to the Islamic prophet Muhammad, 
through Abu Bakr, the first Caliph and Muhammad's companion. Some Naqshbandi orders trace their lineage 
through Ali, Muhammad's cousin, son-in-law and the fourth Caliph, in keeping with most other Sufi paths.  
Necmettin Erbakan: (29 October 1926 – 27 February 2011) Influential Islamist politician who became Turkish 
prime minister from 1996 until 1997. He was pressured by the military to step down as prime minister and later 
banned from politics by the constitutional court. He was found guilty of financial irregularities in spending of party 
funds. 
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Nur Community: Nurism, is an islamic movement that started in the beginning of 20th century, depending on the 
thoughts and philosophy of Said Nursi which he mentioned in Risale-i Nur. Said Nursi defined his followers as Nur 
Disciples and Nurists.   
Nureddin Yıldız: (Born 1952) Radical Islamic author. 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: (Born 26 February 1954) He is the 25th and current Prime Minister of Turkey, in office 
since 2003. He is also the chairman of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), which holds a majority of the 
seats in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. He was served as Mayor of Istanbul from 1994 to 1998. He was 
established the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2001.  
RP:  The Welfare Party(Refah Partisi, RP) was an Islamist political party in Turkey (1984 – 1998). After the 
reopening of political life in 1983, the third pro-Islamic party, Refah Partisi (RP), was established in March 1984 
under the leadership of Ahmet Tekdal. Following a referendum the same year, the restitution of political rights to 
party leaders was accepted. This encouraged Erbakan, who once more assumed the leadership of RP. Erbakan 
became prime minister in 1996. However, his controversial visits to Libya, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Iran led the 
military to exert pressure for the resignation of the RP coalition government in June 1997. The Constitutional Court 
banned the party in February 1998 on grounds of antisecular policies. 
Samuel P. Huntington: (April 18, 1927 - December 24,2008) He was a political scientist renowned for his analysis 
of the relationship between the military and the civil government, defending that the central political actors of the 
21st century will be civilizations, not the nation-states. 
SME: Small and medium enterprises or small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs, small and medium-sized 
businesses,  The abbreviation "SME" is used in the European Union and by international organizations such as 
the World Bank, the United Nations and the World Trade Organization (WTO). Small enterprises outnumber large 
companies by a wide margin and also employ many more people. SMEs are also said to be responsible for driving 
innovation and competition in many economic sectors. 
SP: The Felicity Party (Turkish: Saadet Partisi) is a Turkish political party founded in 2001. It is mainly supported by 
conservative Muslims in Turkey. 
It was founded on 20 July 2001 after the Virtue Party (FP) was banned by the Constitutional Court. While the party's 
reformist wing formed the Justice and Development Party (AKP), the hardliners founded the Felicity Party. Although 
an Islamist party, its policy platform covers the whole span of political issues in Turkey. The Felicity Party's policy 
platform is based strongly around Erbakan's ideas and philosophy. 
Süleyman Demirel: (Born 1 November 1924) He is a Turkish politician who served as Prime Minister of Turkey 
seven times. Following the military coup of September 12, 1980, he was banned from involvement in active politics 
for ten years. The September 6, 1987 referandum returned Demirel to active politics. Despite being banned from 
active politics for seven years, Demirel managed to form seven governments during his political career that spans 
three decades. He was the ninth President of Turkey from 1993 to 2000. 
The Constitutional Court of Turkey: The Constitutional Court of Turkey (Turkish: Anayasa Mahkemesi) is the 
highest legal body for constitutional review in Turkey. It "examines the constitutionality, in respect of both form and 
substance, of laws, decrees having the force of law, and the Rules of Procedure of the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly" (Article 148 of the Turkish Constitution). When necessary, it also functions as the Supreme Criminal 
Court (Turkish: Yüce Divan) to hear any cases raised about the President of the Republic, members of the Council of 
Ministers, or presidents and members of the high courts. 
The Greater Middle East Project: The Greater Middle East is a political term coined by the Bush administration to 
denote various countries, pertaining to the Muslim world, specifically Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
Various Central Asian countries are sometimes also included. Some speakers may use the term to denote areas with 
significant Muslim majorities, but this usage is not universal. The Greater Middle East is sometimes referred to as 
"The New Middle East", or "The Great Middle East Project" 
The Gülen Movement: The Gülen movement is a transnational religious and social movement led by Turkish 
Islamic scholar Fethullah Gülen. The movement has attracted supporters and critics in Turkey, Central Asia and 
increasingly in other parts of the World. The movement is active in education (with private schools in over 140 
countries) and interfaith dialogue; and has substantial investments in media, finance, and for–profit health 
clinics. The movement has been described as a "pacifist, modern-minded Islam, often praised as a contrast to more 
extreme Salafism." The movement has no official name but it is usually called simply as Hizmet (The Service) by its 
followers and is known euphemistically as Cemaat (The Community / Assembly) to the broader public in Turkey. 
The Imperial Edict of Reorganization: The Hatt-i Sharif (Hatt-ı Şerif) of the Gülhane (Imperial Edict of the Rose 
House) or Tanzimât Fermânı (Imperial Edict of Reorganization) was an 1839 proclamation 
by Ottoman Sultan Abdülmecid I that launched the Tanzimât period of reforms and reorganization. The proclamation 
was issued at the behest of reformist Grand Vizier Mustafa Reshid Pasha. It promised reforms such as the abolition 
of tax farming, reform of conscription, and guarantee of rights to all Ottoman citizens regardless of religion or ethnic 
group. The goal of the decree was to help modernize the empire militarily and socially so that it could compete with 
the Great Powers of Europe. It also was hoped the reforms would win over the disaffected parts of the empire, 
especially in the Ottoman controlled parts of Europe, which were largely Christian. 
The Edict of Gülhane was never fully implemented. At the end of the Crimean War, the Western powers pressured 
Turkey to undertake further reforms, mainly to deprive the Russians, with whom peace negotiations were then under 
way, of any further pretense for intervention in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire. The result of these 
pressures was the proclamation of the Hatti Humaym (Imperial Rescript) of 18 February 1856. 
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The Imperial Reform Edict: Islâhat Fermânı (Ottoman Turkish:  Islâhat Hatt-ı Hümâyûnu) (The Imperial Islâhat 
Firmân, The Imperial Reform Edict, or The Rescript of Reform) was a February 18, 1856 edict of the Ottoman 
government and part of the Tanzimat reforms. The decree from Sultan Abdülmecid I promised equality in education, 
government appointments, and administration of justice to all regardless of creed. 
The Ministry of National Education: The Ministry of National Education (Turkish: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı) is a 
government ministry of the Republic of Turkey, responsible for the supervision of public and private educational 
system, agreements and authorizations under a national curriculum. 
The National Security Council: The National Security Council (Turkish: Milli Güvenlik Kurulu, MGK) comprises 
the Chief of Staff, select members of the Council of Ministers, and the President of the Republic (who is also the 
Commander-in-chief). Like the national security councils of other countries, the MGK develops the national security 
policy. 
The Sivas Massacre: The Sivas massacre (Turkish: Sivas Katliamı, Madımak Katliamı) refers to the events of July 
2, 1993 which resulted in the killing of 35 people, mostly Alevi intellectuals, and two hotel employees. Two people 
from the mob also died. The victims, who had gathered for a cultural festival in Sivas, Turkey, were killed when a 
mob of Salafists set fire to the hotel where the Alevi group had assembled. 
The Susurluk Scandal: The Susurluk scandal was a scandal involving the close relationship between the Turkish 
government, the armed forces, and organized crime. The scandal surfaced with a car crash on 3 November 1996, 
near Susurluk, in the province of Balıkesir. The victims included the deputy chief of the Istanbul Police Department, 
a Member of Parliament who led a powerful Kurdish clan, and the leader of the Grey Wolves (who was a contract 
killer on Interpol's red list). 
The Turkish War of Independence: The Turkish War of Independence (Turkish: İstiklâl Harbi, literally meaning 
"Independence War" or Kurtuluş Savaşı, literally meaning "Liberation War;" May 19, 1919 – July 24, 1923) was a 
war waged by Turkish nationalists against the Allies, after the country was occupied following the Ottoman Empire's 
defeat in World War I. The Turkish National Movement (Kuva-yi Milliye) in Anatolia culminated in the formation of 
a new Grand National Assembly (GNA) by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his colleagues. After the end of the Turkish-
Armenian, Franco-Turkish,Greco-Turkish wars, the Treaty of Sèvres was abandoned and the Treaty of Lausanne was 
signed in July 1923. The Allies left Anatolia and Eastern Thrace and the Grand National Assembly of Turkey decided 
the establishment of a Republic in Turkey which was declared on October 29, 1923. With the establishment of the 
Turkish National Movement, the partitioning of the Ottoman Empire and the abolition of the sultanate, the Ottoman 
era and the Empire came to an end, and with Atatürk's reforms the Turks created a modern, secular nation-state on the 
political front. 
The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey: The Union of Chambers and Commodity 
Exchanges of Turkey (Turkish: Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği, TOBB for short) is a confederation of all local 
chambers of commerce, industry and maritime as well as commodity exchanges inTurkey. The union was founded on 
March 8, 1950 as an umbrella organization in Ankara as the country's highest legal entity representing the private 
sector. 
The Young Ottomans (Neo-Ottomans): The Young Ottomans (Turkish: Genç Osmanlılar) were a secret society 
established in 1865 by a group of Ottoman Turkish intellectuals dissatisfied with the Tanzimat reforms. Young 
Ottomans sought to transform the Ottoman society by preserving the empire, revitalizing Islam and modernizing 
along the European traditions. Among the prominent members of this society were writers and publicists İbrahim 
Şinasi, Namik Kemal, Ali Suavi, Ziya Pasha and Agah Efendi. 
TSK: The Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) (Turkish: Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri (TSK)) are the military forces of 
the Republic of Turkey. They consist of the Army, the Navy (including naval aviation and naval infantry), and 
the Air Force. TheGendarmerie and the Coast Guard, both of which have law enforcement and military functions, 
operate as components of the internal security forces in peacetime, and are subordinate to the Ministry of Interior. In 
wartime, they are subordinate to the Army and Navy. The President of Turkey is the military's overall head. 
Turgut Özal: (13 October 1927 – 17 April 1993) He was Prime Minister of Turkey (1983–1989) and President of 
Turkey (1989–1993). As Prime Minister, he transformed the economy of Turkey by paving the way for the 
privatization of many state enterprises. Under the military regime of 1980-1983, Turgut Özal began to direct Turkey's 
economy toward the free market. That process was accelerated after he became prime minister in 1983 and president 
in 1989. By the time of his death in 1993, Turkey's economy and society had been transformed almost beyond 
recognition. Özal was appointed Demirel's economic adviser in November 1979 and given the task of implementing a 
packet of tough monetary measures. The program, a radical departure from earlier policies, was designed to create a 
new economy based on exports rather than the home market. The lira was devalued 30 percent on top of the 43 
percent devaluation in 1979, prices were allowed to rise sharply; and wages were tightly controlled, leading to a wave 
of strikes. The "law of the market" was to prevail so that only the large and efficient enterprises would survive and be 
competitive. He died of a heart attack in Istanbul in 1993. 
Turkism: Pan-Turkism is a movement that emerged in 1880s among the Turkic intellectuals of the Russian 
Empire and Ottoman Empire, with the aim of cultural and political unification of all Turkic peoples 
TÜSİAD: Turkish Industry and Business Association (Turkish: Türk Sanayicileri ve İşadamları Derneği, TÜSİAD) 
is the top business association of Turkey. Founded in 1971, TUSIAD is an independent, non-governmental 
organization dedicated to promoting public welfare through private enterprise. TUSIAD supports independent 
research and policy discussions on important social and economic issues in Turkey and abroad. 
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POLARIZATION IN POLITICS AND THE SOCIETY 
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Graphic A-12: Expectations and Perceptions of Life Based on Political Party Preference 
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Graphic A-14: Polarization Based on Ethnic Identities
 
 
Graphic A-15: Polarization Based on Political Preferences 
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Graphic A-25: Polarization Based on Political Identities 
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Graphic A-28: Attitude towards Different Identities Based on Political Partisanship 
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Graphic A-30: Attitude Based on Political Adherence in Comparison to Country Average 
 
 
 
 
 
Graphic A-32: Attitude towards Laicism Based on Education 
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Graphic A-33: Attitude towards Laicism Based on Political Preference 
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Graphic A-36: Polarization Axes in Clusters 
 
Graphic A-37: Polarization Based on Laicism, Tolerance and Status Quo Axes 
 
Graphic A-38: Polarization Based on Laicism Axis 
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Graphic A-39: Polarization Based on Tolerance Axis 
 
Graphic A-40: Polarization Based on Status Quo Axis 
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POLITICAL OPINION 
 
 
 
 
0
20
40
60
80
< 29 30-44 45-59 60 >
56
35%
25
16%
69
43% 10
6%
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
P
e
rs
o
n
s
Graphic B-1: How old are you?
105
66%
55
34%
Graphic B-2: Gender
Male Female
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
26
16% 12
8%
66
41%
12
8%
6
4%
38
24%
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
P
e
rs
o
n
s
Graphic B-3: Occupation
 237 
 
 
 
 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
Primary 
School
Middle School High School Higher 
Education
None
0 0
11
7%
149
93%
0N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
P
e
rs
o
n
s
Graphic B-4: Education Level
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Religious 
Education
Vocational 
Education
Social 
Sciences
Sciences Arts None
1
1%
29
18%
76
48%
42
26% 3
2%
9
6%N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
P
e
rs
o
n
s
Graphic B-5: Study
147
92%
11
7%
2
1%
Graphic B-6: Type of School
State School Private School None
 238 
 
 
 
 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
Metropole City Town Village Abroad
133
81%
7
4%
2
1%
2
1%
16
10%N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
P
e
rs
o
n
s
Graphic B-7: Where do you live?
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
AKP CHP MHP BDP SP Other
9
6%
115
72%
15
9%
3
2%
2
1% 16
10%
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
P
e
rs
o
n
s
Graphic B-8: Which party did you vote at the last elections?
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Graphic B-9: Which religious faith do you follow?
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Graphic  B-12: What does political Islam mean to you?
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Survey Report for Assessment of Political Opinion 
 
Basic Information about Survey  
 
 The survey consists of 24 multiple choice questions on various topics related to demographic features of the 
participants and political Islam. All data was collected and processed by www.esurveyspro.com. Even though basic 
statistical data of the participants was collected and processed, unfortunately I was unable to prepare a crosstab report 
as my free account did not allow me to retrieve such kind of information. Considering the survey was conducted 
between 13.07.2012 and 02.08.2012, some data may have altered due to the social changes in Turkey during the last 
one year. The response option of survey was set to anonymous multiple answers in order to protect participant‟s 
privacy and provide convenience for those who respond in a multi-user environment. Survey was responded by 160 
people that allow us to analyze the Turkish society roughly through a 10 % standard deviation if solely the quantity of 
participants is taken into consideration. The survey was prepared and run only in Turkish at the beginning; English 
legends were added after the survey was closed. All questions were designed as mandatory; therefore none of the 24 
questions were skipped by participants. 
 As this report was submitted through social media and emails, the prerequisites to respond were having 
access to a computer, having internet connection, owning account on social media or having email address as well as 
being literate. Besides, participants who shared their opinion were mainly the group which is dissatisfied with the 
political environment in Turkey and mainly the people that identify themselves as laic social democrats whose 
political preference is predominantly CHP. Therefore we cannot consider this report as 100 % accurate to the reality 
of Turkish society.  
 I believe it is also important to state that before I discovered this website, I attempted to organize this 
survey in paper format based on one-on-one meetings. However approximately only 20 % of the people which I 
requested a one-on-one meeting accepted my request. As there was not enough data to use from the meetings that I 
could make, I decided that an online poll could be more trustworthy. Therefore, from this incident we can assume 
that 80 % of the participants in a small seaside holiday village that consists of 83 housings and approximately 166 
individuals (if we suppose that each house has 2 inhabitants) in northwestern Turkey where the majority of 
population are holidaymakers from different regions preferred not to share their political opinion with an alien. 
Moreover, their attitude also may be related to their reluctance for discussing politics during their holiday season.  
 
Analysis Based on Responses 
 
1. In the first question we are able to collect demographical data based on the age of participants. We can see 
the majority of the responses come from the people between 45 and 59. This range forms the 43.13 % of 
the participants. The second group is the young individuals under 29 which form 35 % of the participants. 
While the participants between 30 and 44 form 15.63 %, the participants above 60 % are only 6.25 %. We 
can see that the most concerned segments about political Islam are the young people under 29 and middle 
aged people between 45 and 59. 
2. Majority of the participants are male which form 65 % of our participants.  
3. Majority of the participants are employees and form 41.25 %. Pensioners follow employees by 23.75 % 
and students by 16.25 %. The lowest groups are self-employed people, unemployed and employers. Under 
those circumstances it is seen that employees are the most dissatisfied group from the current political 
situation. 
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4. The higher education graduates are above board participants with 93.13 % while only 6.88 % is are high 
school graduates which means that the participants are highly educated elite circles. It is interesting to see 
there are no participants who did not complete 8 years of compulsory curriculum. 
5. 47.50 % of the participants have completed a course on social sciences while 26.25 % completed sciences 
and 18.13 % completed vocational education. It is remarkable to see that there is only 1 person that 
completed a religious curriculum among 160 people. This question was important to see how many of the 
participants were graduated from the laic schools.  
6. Majority of the participants have attended a state school with a 91.88 % score, while only 6.88 % attended 
private school and 1.25 % did not attend either. This means that the majority attended the same monotype 
state schools with a strict laic education. 
7. 83.13 % of the participants participated in the survey from metropolises such as Istanbul, Izmir or Ankara 
while only 1.25 % participated from villages and towns. According to the statistics, the participant group is 
highly urbanized. 
8. As we see in the statistics, the majority is formed by social democrat CHP. We can count several reasons 
for the predominance of social democrats; 
 Education level – Based on several other reports, we can see that the majority of people who define 
themselves as social democrats are educated, elite circles. Therefore they are open about sharing their 
opinions in such platforms.  
 Satisfaction – As the majority of social democrats consider political Islam as a threat, they usually 
tend to actively participate to online polls in order to emphasize their dissatisfaction. 
 Avidity – Generally conservative people tend to hide their political opinion in such kind of polls 
because of their distrust. The reason of this distrust can be the oppressive political atmosphere 
throughout the entire Turkish history. Since childhood, the participants is programmed for not to 
discuss politics in public space. Besides, considering AKP is a conservative party; conservative 
circles may not see the benefit of participating in such kind of a survey as they do not have anything 
to complain about. 
 Circles – As the survey was conducted through social media and emails, the responders consisted of 
my circles and their circles. Therefore, diversity of the responders was restricted. 
 Besides this information, we can see that other parties form 10 % of the responders while 9.38 % voted for 
other parties, 9.38 % voted for MHP and only 5.63 % was voted for AKP. 
9. We see that 79.38 % of the participants believe in Islam. However, it is very interesting to see 15 % of the 
participants are non-believers. 
10. Graphic B-10 is about opinions of the participants about laicism and secularism. Even though laicism and 
secularism are accepted to be the same in English, there is a slight meaning distinction between them in 
Turkish. Secularism means the separation of state and religious affairs from each other. In secularism, state 
does not have a policy towards religion which assures freedom of religious activities, it is equally distant 
from all faiths and it does not have an institution for organizing religious activities, instead all faiths have 
their chambers to organize their activities. This system is more likely the one that currently USA accepts. 
On the other hand laicism is a system originates from France. Laicism also means distinction of state and 
religious affairs, but slightly in the advantage of the state. In other words, state can keep religion under 
pressure in a laic system and shape it according to its needs. In laicism religion is under state‟s control and 
eventually become a political tool which allows only the religious activities that the state desires, it has an 
unofficial religious policy such as Sunni Islam in Turkey and religious institutions are under 
 246 
 
administration of an institution such as Presidency of Religious Affairs in Turkey. This system was a part 
of Turkish political system during its entire history.. Even though the distribution is balanced in this 
graphic, those who believe that laicism is a better system are the 54.38 % of participants. This shows that 
the majority is anxious about the prominence of religious values and wants a strict control over religion. 
11. It is seen that 36.88 % of the participants define themselves as democrats while 30 % claim that they are 
socialists according to Graphic B-11. It is strange to see that liberalists only form 15 % of the participants. 
On the other hand religious conservatives form the smallest cluster with 3.75 % probably because of the 
previous evaluations made. When this question is analyzed along with question number 8, is seen that 
there are different perspectives in each political group. According to the statistics it can be presumed that 
especially CHP shelters liberal, socialist and democrat groups within it. 
12. Graphic B-12 analyzes what the participants of Study B think about political Islam. Therefore, all answers 
are designed to give a clear understanding of what they vote for. Even though, this question might have 
been perceived a little biased or offensive by some circles due to its nature, it was necessary in order to 
understand participants‟ perception on political Islam. The most important finding is the perception of 
participants about politicians. 40 % of the participants claim that political Islam is a system which 
politicians implemented in order to orient the society. This means that majority of the participants do not 
trust politicians and they think political Islam is a false definition which was imposed by them in order to 
orient people for their interest. 21.88 % of the participants think that political Islam is a system which was 
developed by the Western societies. This should also be considered along with USA‟s moderate Islam 
project for Middle East which caused rapid transformations in many countries. 13.75 % of the participants 
think that it is a secular set of ordinances which are implemented in a democratic system by a conservative 
party. This mostly states the current situation in Turkey considering AKP‟s conservative nature and the 
changes which they implemented in the democratic system during the last 11 years. 12.50 % of the 
participants think that it is basically a system that follows Shari‟a rules such as in Iran. The least 
participants with 11.88 % think that political Islam is a local solidarity network that was implemented by 
the Islamist movement in order to transform the masses and give them a voice in national area while this 
should have been the most accurate answer under normal circumstances. Because when RP term is 
analyzed in 1990‟s it is clearly seen that party organization was really being the voice of conservative 
people by providing them the opportunity to be represented, educate themselves and work in solidarity 
organizations. As this term really has significance for political Islam and as it was maybe the first time the 
religious conservatives were able to show themselves, this could be considered as a more accurate answer. 
However, as it is seen that the majority agree that it is a false system which was implemented by the 
politicians. 
13. Objective of Graphic B-13 is to see if the participants of Study B are satisfied with the current AKP 
government. As we see from the graphic, 84.38 % of the participants are not happy with the government. It 
is certain that the recent polarization affected government‟s reputation such as prime minister Tayyip 
Erdoğan‟s fierce attitude against people that were concerned about the implementations against laicism, 
government‟s towards military officials and Ergenekon Case, government‟s attitude towards Syrian civil 
war, abatement of action about Madımak Hotel victims, legislation of the code letting imam-hatip 
graduates to be admitted in the faculties other than theology faculties, arrest of journalists, legislation of 
the code letting the trade of forestry lands and economical conditions.  
14. Graphic B-14 shows that 85 % of the participants agree that Islamic approach in politics does not assure 
freedoms. This proves that participants see Islam as an autocratic element in politics. 
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15. It is seen on Graphic B-15 while 58.13 % of the participants think that using religious symbols is 
inappropriate in public space, 32.50 % are not against it. When this graphic is analyzed along with Graphic 
B-8, it can be presumed that also some CHP electorates tolerate veiling in public space. 
16. Graphic B-16 shows that 70 % of the participants think that Islamism constitutes a threat for Turkey while 
22.50 % does not agree that hypothesis. Again, when this question is paired with question number 8, we 
can presume that some CHP electorates either do not think Islamism is a threat or they are ensure about it. 
Moreover, Graphic B-16 shows that 84.38 % of the participants of Study B think that Islam causes conflict 
in Turkish society. 
17. Graphic B-17 shows that 53.13 % of the participants of Study B state that they do not participate in 
political activities while 43.75 % participate. This shows that the participants are almost divided in half on 
participating in political activities. 
18. Graphic B-18 also shows that the polarization about tolerance is not that deep yet. According to Graphic 
B-18, 91.25 % of the participants say that they can be friends with people from different opinions. This 
means that the participants are mainly discontent about political situation rather than the social situation in 
the country.  
19. Graphic B-19 shows that 84.38 % of the participants of Study B think that Islam causes conflict in Turkish 
society. 
20. According to Graphic B-20, 52.50 % of the participants do not think that the media supports liberal 
thought. This perception should be related to the government‟s strict policies on media corporations, 
actions against freedom of opinion, arrest of journalists and suspicious confiscation of some media 
corporations and their transfer to the companies known as close to the government. But considering % 
47.51 of the participants are either natural or think that media assists liberal thoughts, we can say that the 
respondents a divided into half about the role of media. 
21. According to Graphic B-21, 45 % of the participants of Study B state that they practice religion partially 
while 38.75 % do not practice at all. Only 16.25 % of the participants mention that they practice religion. 
22. According to Graphic B-22, 44.38 % of the participants of Study B believe that social environment has the 
highest influence on lifestyle. While family takes place in the second place with 30.63 %, 12.50 % of 
participants mentioned that economy affects lifestyle. A few of participants think that media, school and 
friends can affect lifestyle while no one agrees that migration is a determiner of lifestyle. 
23. On the other hand, Graphic A-23 presents that 71.88 % of the participants of Study B feel that they are 
restrained by the participants while only 23.13 % say that they feel completely free. This means more than 
half of the participants feel constrained by the others. 
24. Graphic B-24 shows that 57.50 % of participants do not think that the society is tolerant towards different 
opinions while 23.13 % thinks it is and 19.38 % do not have a certain idea on that. This means that more 
than half of the participants do not feel comfortable in social life. 
 
Analysis Summary 
 
 Majority of the participants in the survey consist of middle aged, urban, democrat, Muslim males between 
45 and 59 who are graduated from a public higher education institution on social sciences and work as employees. 
Almost three quarters of the participants are CHP electorates that are not satisfied with the current AKP government. 
Majority believe that religion should be under control of the state. A major part of the participants consider that 
political Islam is a system that politicians implemented in order to orient the participants in their interest. More than 
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three fourths of participants do not think that Islam in politics does not assure freedoms while more than half of the 
participants do not want to see religious items in public space. A major part of the participants think that Islamism is 
a threat for Turkey. Majority have never participated in political activities. Almost all participants say that they make 
friends from different opinions, but in the meanwhile they think that Islam causes conflict in Turkish participants. 
Half of the participants think that media does not assist liberal thought. Majority partially practices their religion, 
thinks that their freedom is restricted by the participants which is not tolerant. A major part of the participants think 
that social environment is the most important factor in influencing lifestyle. 
 
STUDY C 
SUBJECT 1 
 
Interviewer: Today‟s topic is political Islam and I will get your opinions on it. 
Participant: Of course. 
Interviewer: First of all I would like to know your name if you do not mind. 
Participant: Ş. 
Interviewer: How old are you Ş.? 
Participant: 26 
Interviewer: What is your occupation? 
Participant: I am currently studying. I am assigned in a master‟s program. 
Interviewer: At which institution? 
Participant: At Istanbul University in Istanbul Researches Department. 
Interviewer: What is your research about? 
Participant: I write a thesis about immigration. 
Interviewer: Which university did you graduate from? 
Participant: From International Relations Department of Uludağ University.  
Interviewer: Which kind of schools did you attend first? 
Participant: I went to state schools. 
Interviewer: Did you ever attend a private school or an imam-hatip school? 
Participant: I have always studied at public schools, but at high school I attended an English-weighted high school. 
Interviewer: Where did you attend to school? 
Participant: I went to school in Istanbul. 
Interviewer: In which city were you born? 
Participant: I was born in Istanbul. 
Interviewer: Where are you originally from? 
Participant: My mother is from Hopa, Artvin; my father‟s father is from Greece but my father was born in Istanbul. 
Interviewer: You said your mother is from Hopa; do you have any Georgian ancestry? 
Participant: They are not Georgian, but they came from Georgia through population exchange after the 
establishment of Turkey. 
Interviewer: Do you join political activities? 
Participant: We always supported CHP as a family, so I was raised with the ideology of Atatürk since my childhood. 
I did not join political activities that much during the university period, I went to the meetings of CHP for a few times 
in Ankara. After my graduation, I joined the Atatürkist Thought Association‟s activities, but apart from that I was not 
very into the politics. 
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Interviewer: Did you join to the youth branch of any party? 
Participant: No, after the university I just worked in the youth branch of the Atatürkist Thought Association. It was 
an association, was not a political party. But I do not think the association is that neutral; even though they do not 
have an organic link with CHP they are still linked in a way. 
Interviewer: Which political ideology do you support? 
Participant: There was a big impact of my family in determining my ideology. We were supporting CHP and 
Kemalist ideology. For example when I was at the university I was staying in the university dormitories, at first my 
father did not want to send me there, because he was concerned that I would veil myself as a result of being affected 
by the main atmosphere there. He thought the religious fanatics there might influence me and we argued about this 
several times. These incidents have a major influence on determining my ideology. However, when I joined the 
association after the university, I realized that I was not Kemalist. I think it is incorrect to sanctify his ideology. 
Respecting his thought and sanctifying his ideology are different things. 
Interviewer: Which party did you vote at elections? 
Participant: I voted for CHP at the last elections, but next time I will not participate in elections. 
Interviewer: Are you tolerant to liberal thoughts? 
Participant: I support liberal thoughts. I am working in human rights area, but I worry about the definition of 
freedom. The boundaries of freedom are disputable. There is constitution which all subjects including the state itself 
should respect. Prominence of Islam worries me; that is why I ask myself about the boundaries of freedom. In this 
sense I share the anxiety of the majority of laic society. 
Interviewer: Where do you see yourself in the sense of religious belief, do you practice religion? 
Participant: This is also another thing that I question. I try to meet some of the requirements from time to time. I 
believe in Islam, but if you ask what kind of a Muslim I am, I can say that I filtered the religious values and built up a 
belief system by myself. I am not a very religious person in terms of obligations, but I like to see faithful people. 
Faith is a good thing. I also follow a faith, but I believe everyone should be free on what to believe. 
Interviewer: What do you think about political Islam; how would you define it? 
Participant: I would say it is an idea that the West imposed or it is a method of politicians to abuse religious values. 
There is a global tendency towards right. Actually, usage of Islam as a political tool in Turkey is reasonable as 
Turkey has a Muslim majority. I think it is a set of rules that are implemented by a conservative party.  
Interviewer: What do you think about the solidarity network that is supported by the conservative society? 
Participant: Until now, the conservative people were not that much visible, this actually was an opportunity for them 
to come together and defend their ideas. 
Interviewer: Do you think political Islam presents a threat?  
Participant: I am suspicious on it. I do not like the prominence of Islamic values. For example when I think about 
establishment of mosques at the universities, prohibition of abortion, etc., I think the Islamic values are promoted and 
this worries me because there are also people that do not follow any faith. Of course the conservatives also have 
rights; it is important that they live according to their beliefs but in this sense prohibiting abortion is pointless for 
non-believers. I am not against veiled people, but their freedom ends where mine starts. However, most religious 
conservative people do not agree on that. Nevertheless, I support the secularist model like in the USA which has an 
equal distance to all religions, but not the laic model in Turkey which basically has control over religion.   
Interviewer: Do you think that Turkey is imposed to be a model for the region by external powers? 
Participant: I think this is more like a conspiracy theory; I do not want to think this deep. 
Interviewer: What do you think about Arab Spring; do you think it was a civil uprising? 
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Participant: Such kind of incidents do not arise beyond the desire of the West. For instance, Mubarak was supported 
by USA; but at the point that he completed his mission, he was overthrown and manifestations started followingly. 
For this reason, I suspect the incidents are only for democracy. 
Interviewer: What do you think about the practices of the current government; are you content? 
Participant: I think they do a good job. But on the other hand promotion of religious values at the term of AKP 
government makes me uncomfortable. While religion was never discussed at my home before, it became a daily 
subject recently. 
Interviewer: What do you think about the people fitting the Islamic values according to themselves such as the ladies 
covering their hair but wearing a revealing dress? 
Participant: After a point, religious values transformed into political tools and values lost their significance. 
Promotion of religious values by a political party is bothersome.  
Interviewer: What do you think about religious communities?  
Participant: I am against communities; I think associations are more creditable. 
Interviewer: What do you think about veiling at public space? 
Participant: It is a religious symbol. I was not used to see that many people with religious outfit before. Because I 
am a former CHP supporter, I have a different state of mind and that is why this really affected me. I even started to 
dream of covered women. I believe veiling should be a personal choice. There are two important things; first of all 
constitution should be studied in order to determine limits of freedom and secondly the practices in the western 
countries should be reviewed.  For instance we can give an example; think of a veiled psychologist, her patient might 
want to consult an issue about sexuality; psychologist‟s orientation according to her religious values can lead the 
patient in a wrong way. If the psychologist does not use her position to impose her thoughts, then it is OK; but 
certainty of this or objectivity of the education that is given by a veiled teacher is polemical. I cannot be sure how this 
would orient a child. 
Interviewer: What do you think about Shari‟a? 
Participant: I think Shari‟a is the last step in transformation to an Islamist state. It is not possible to speak about an 
Islamist state without Shari‟a rules. For instance Sudan; it is an Islam republic which is governed through Shari‟a. I 
hope such a thing would not happen in Turkey.  
Interviewer: What do you think about secularism or laicism? 
Participant: I think AKP follows a policy which is based on seizing the Presidency of Religious Affairs. Most of the 
conservatives say they are secularists not laics, at this point I think presence of the presidency should be questioned. 
We do not know the future program of AKP, maybe merging Presidency of Religious Affairs to a ministry is in their 
agenda. Then there is a possibility for the president to use this entity according to the needs. Thus, AKP can orient the 
religion and state affairs as they wish. If they want to transform to an Islam state, this would also be a step for it. If 
this is the case, they can starts to follow an Islamist policy through assigning a caliphate. In this case it would be an 
entity to serve for the ones in the power. I think the state should not have a policy on religion. 
Interviewer: What do you think on corruption in politics? 
Participant: Almost all parties do that. But, when Islam is used as a political tool, it loses its significance. When the 
organizations such as Deniz Feneri which are based on Islamic values do corruption it frustrates me. Recently we 
started to see the reality and realized that such parties and organizations are actually not that innocent.  
Interviewer: What do you think about the people consider themselves as Muslims but do not practice religion? 
Participant: If you would speak about this to a fanatic person, they would probably claim that you need to meet the 
obligations if you are Muslim. In my opinion this is all about the inner system of the individuals, you should live as 
you feel. Even if Islamic values are imposed by force, if forced person is not happy with practicing religion, then it 
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has no meaning. If the people want, they can adopt the religious way of life, but they should not force others. I am 
against the neighborhood pressure. 
Interviewer: What do you think about committing sins? (i.e. consuming alcohol) 
Participant: It is up to my decision; even if I drink alcohol I drink it for myself, this should not interest anyone. 
Interviewer: Why do you think political Islam started to attract so much interest? 
Participant: When the Republic of Turkey was formed, a more homogenous nationalist structure was desired. For 
this reason also Kurdish people felt the same pressure that Islamists felt; progress of an Islamist ideology was not 
desired. CHP ignored that the country has a Muslim majority and there is a group which consider Islamic values as 
important. Actually Islamist community felt excluded, because they felt their rights were neglected. The reason of 
their current organization is to reclaim their rights back. 
Interviewer: What do you think about existence of Islamist parties in the political system?  
Participant: I think there should be parties from all thoughts. 
Interviewer: Do you think Islam plays a disintegrating role in Turkish social life? 
Participant: Actually I think it does. I can feel there are the separatist acts, but I do not know how to explain it 
precisely. 
Interviewer: Do you think the media plays a role in spreading liberal thoughts? 
Participant: Yes, but we should also consider how independent the media is. I do not think media is independent in 
Turkey. 
Interviewer: Do you think media is effective globally? 
Participant: Yes, indeed it is. 
Interviewer: What do you think about women‟s situation in Islam?  
Participant: Actually now Islamic feminism has started, now we see that veiled women also have a voice, they run 
their own businesses and join political activities. Even though the importance of women is increasing, it is possible to 
say that women still lag behind especially in rural areas of Muslim countries while they have the same rights with 
men in urban life.  
Interviewer: Which factors are influential on spreading Islamic lifestyle?  
Participant: I think the people are influenced by the society and their family. If I should give an example from my 
family, I see my mother‟s side tends to Islamic values recently. For example while my mother was consuming 
alcohol in the past, she started to practice religion and stopped consuming alcohol. Besides, one of my friends from 
the university who was not using a headscarf suddenly decided to cover her head and completely changed her life 
style; another friend decided to veil after a traffic accident. Apart from that, of course family influences people‟s 
decisions. In my circle of acquaintances I see a tendency to the right wing, but I do not know what the exact reason is.  
Interviewer: What do you think about the relation of people from different political or religious opinions towards 
each other? 
Participant: For example in Toplum Gönüllüleri Vakfı (Society Volunteers Foundation) liberal and conservative 
people are working together and give messages of unity, these people work side by side; but of course I do not know 
how integrated they are. It is about people‟s point of view, if they tolerate they can live together. 
Interviewer: Do you feel any restraint from different political groups? 
Participant: I felt my family pushed me to be Kemalist. For example, my family supports CHP and they still blench 
when their opinion about Kurds is asked; I also was grown up with this idea. Now I feel the pressure about Islamic 
values from the society. I think these constraints are an outcome of the political system. 
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SUBJECT 2 
 
Interviewer: The topic of today‟s interview will be about political Islam for my master‟s thesis. First of all, can I 
learn your name? 
Participant: Of course, it is T. 
Interviewer: How old are you? 
Participant: 27 
Interviewer: What is your occupation? 
Participant: I am a German teacher; I give lessons to the high school and secondary school students. 
Interviewer: What education do you have? 
Participant: I did not do an extra research following the university; I carry on my profession. 
Interviewer: Which schools did you attend? 
Participant: I completed my compulsory curriculum and graduated from Marmara University followingly. 
Interviewer: Did you attend imam-hatip schools? 
Participant: No. 
Interviewer: Where do you live? 
Participant: I live in Istanbul as a part of the crowded city life. 
Interviewer: Where are your parents from? 
Participant: My parents are also from Istanbul. 
Interviewer: Do you perform political activities? 
Participant: I think I have a lot to do in this area and therefore I perform political activities. I worked on several 
platforms. 
Interviewer: Which political ideology do you support? 
Participant: I define myself as a democrat indeed. My parents are a bit conservative in family life, but they are also 
democrats as a political ideology. 
Interviewer: Where do you see yourself in the sense of religious belief, do you practice religion? 
Participant: I try to meet religious requirements as much as I can, but of course I cannot claim that I do everything 
perfectly. It is a bit difficult for a person to say where they see themselves in terms of religion, I think only God can 
decide that. As currently we are in the month of Ramadan, fasting is required and I try to perform as much as my 
health allows me. I also try to meet the other requirements depending on my timetable, but we are not in this world 
only for religion; social life and business life are also important. 
Interviewer: What do you think about political Islam; how would you define it? 
Participant: I am against the statement of political Islam, because I do not believe the existence of such kind of a 
concept. This is a long subject that should be discussed; I think political Islam is a statement that was suggested by 
orientalists, people that does not want to see the success that conservative understanding sustains under democracy 
and people do not want to acknowledge this order to raise tension. I am against political Islam. 
Interviewer: Do you think political Islam is a statement that some interest groups suggested to keep maintain their 
benefits? 
Participant: It is not exactly what I wanted to say. This is an assertion that arose in the recent past when Turkey is 
taken into consideration. When we think of the political parties in power and the conditions of the period, I believe 
political Islam is a statement which was suggested by the circles that ignore the advance of conservativism to raise 
tension in the society. 
Interviewer: Do you think political Islam is a threat for Turkey? 
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Participant: Right now it is not capable of generating a threat for Turkey. Such kind of statements were made in the 
past, as democracy culture advances and the system settles people see that Turkey will sustain a democratic system; 
so political Islam is far from being a threat. 
Interviewer: Do you think that Turkey is imposed to be a model for the region by external powers? 
Participant: I do not think that external powers has an influence on that, this situation is peculiar to Turkey. Turkey 
is an example country where the people following different faiths live together in a democratic and laic system. The 
messages, which our prime-minister gave in his visits to Middle East in the recent past, show that Turkey is 
ascending as an example country. The struggle of the people in other countries shows that. I absolutely do not think 
that the external powers have an influence on that, because Turkey is an independent country and it progresses in a 
good way. Therefore it does not need orientation. 
Interviewer: Which party did you vote for in the last elections? 
Participant: I think the people should express their political attitude freely. I voted for AKP in the last elections. 
Interviewer: What do you think about the current AKP government? 
Participant: I am very satisfied about its implementations; that is why I voted for it. I am especially satisfied with 
their positive attitude towards innovative ideas, efforts to solve problems and progress in domestic and international 
politics. Only the rapid transformations in Turkey‟s agenda and bad reactions against AKP for these implementations 
were challenging, it would be better if implementations were done gradually. 
Interviewer: What do you think about the usage of religious items in the public space and do you think headscarf is 
also a religious item? 
Participant: Turban or headscarf, you know there was a meaning conflict about that which was created by the groups 
whom suggested the political Islam definition; but for me it is absolutely not a political symbol. Prayer rug or bead 
can be religious materials but headscarf is a dressing style for the women to conceal their charm. I am not against 
headscarf, because in the end the public area is a civilian area, people should be more tolerant towards that. I do not 
feel uncomfortable about the symbols that individuals bear as long as they do not make others uncomfortable. 
Interviewer: What do you think about the people that adjust Islamic values to their style? (i.e. the ladies cover their 
hair but wear revealing dresses) 
Participant: I think dressing is also a preference; everyone has the right to dress according to their taste regardless 
being veiled or not. That is why; I tolerate and do not feel uncomfortable about it. 
Interviewer: What do you think about Shari‟a? 
Participant: I do not envisage anything about an Islamic state; therefore I do not see the need of a state which is 
ruled through Shari‟a. This is not an option in Turkey anymore; as we see the citizens of countries which are ruled by 
an Islamist order also want to live their faith in a democratic system. I think the epoch of such extreme thoughts has 
ended. 
Interviewer: What do you think about secularism or laicism? 
Participant: We always hear about laicism and secularism, the people are more conscious on that recently. Turkey is 
a laic state at present. When we investigate secularism seems to be a more flexible concept, eventually while laicism 
is a political concept, secularism is more sociological; that is why people might see secularism more suitable as it is 
flexible; but until the recent past, laicism was perceived differently, because of the suppression of laic system, they 
were standing against it. But during AKP term, laic system has settled better; because there is no intervention to the 
faith, they are more comfortable. Therefore, I do not see any issues about laicism and I hope the orientalists are also 
convinced about the new laicism perception. 
Interviewer: What do you think about corruption in politics? 
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Participant: As any citizen I am also against corruption. It was a higher threat before AKP term and we lived the 
consequences of that all together. During the term of current government, there are implementations to prevent this. 
That is why I do not see corruption as a threat anymore. Eventually corruption is something I always stand against, no 
one should use their positions for interests. This is also something that is related to the personality of the people; it is 
something not related to the ideology but mentality. People should think about the consequences of their actions, this 
is a civic responsibility. 
Interviewer: What do you think about the people consider themselves as Muslims but do not practice religion? 
Participant: People‟s religious orientations should not interest anyone else as long as they do not interfere with the 
others‟ liberties. Personally I do not consider this while approaching people. I think meeting religious requirements is 
something between the person and their God, but people should not hurt each other‟s feelings. Recently there are not 
that much, but still there are people insulting veiled women or in the opposite, the women wear revealing dresses. I 
think those should not happen. The most important thing is to respect people because they are human. 
Interviewer: Why do you think political Islam started to attract so much interest? 
Participant: It would be more accurate to interpret this as conservative people, not as political Islam. First of all I do 
not think AKP is an Islamist party; it is a conservative democrat party which is also stated by the party organization. 
A trust was built between AKP and the people; therefore it was elected three terms in a row. Ten years ago 
everything was more complicated, more different; the economical situation was extremely challenging that Kemal 
Derviş was invited from USA and even he was not successful. AKP made a great progress concerning rights and 
freedom and implemented its election promises. That is why AKP attracts that much attention. 
Interviewer: What do you think about existence of Islamist parties in the political system? 
Participant: For example, SP promotes religious values but we still cannot claim that it is an Islamist party; I also do 
not think they have a different agenda about the political system. In other countries Islamist parties might have 
emerged because of the conditions in their society but they have nothing to compare with the parties in Turkey. As 
religious faith is an individual space, a person‟s religious belief only interests oneself. In an epoch that the states 
based on religion disappear one by one, I do not think that Islamist parties are necessary. Nevertheless, I believe that 
various parties to defend various opinions should take place in the political system. Besides, also the political and 
social environment of the country should also be evaluated. It is important to know how and what do the Christian 
parties represent in the countries they are located and what they promise to their supporters. That is why this should 
be evaluated more comprehensively. 
Interviewer: Do you think Islam plays a disintegrating role in Turkish social life? 
Participant: I believe both segments should not avoid speaking about the current situation of Turkish society. The 
reluctant individuals should probably be hesitating as a result of their lack of knowledge. However, now there is 
rather a relieved ambiance in Turkey; that is why everyone is free to discuss their thoughts. Objective of the circles 
who introduced political Islam twenty years ago was to establish a ground for conflicts and distract the current 
harmony. Because conservative people were shown as religious extremists and this way impossibility of execution of 
a democratic system tried to be proven by some circles; this is a result of the struggle for political power. This is not 
the case at the present day, but this separatist perspective was attempted to be imposed in the past. Right now there 
are not separatist thoughts; everyone can discuss their opinions freely. 
Interviewer: Do you think the media plays a role in spreading liberal thoughts? 
Participant: Indeed. Now, door-to-door promotion is outdated, internet and the TV has replaced it; that is why media 
plays an important role on spreading liberal thoughts. Also social media encourages people to state their ideas freely. 
Media is also important in Turkey for the same reasons; we have seen that media caused great transformations on the 
opinions of people, but of course it should be used consciously. Because if media gets under influence of an authority 
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and tries to orient people in an obsessive manner, it becomes misleading. But media gets more liberal each day in 
Turkey which is pleasing. 
Interviewer: What do you think about women‟s situation in Islam? 
Participant: “Heaven is under mothers‟ feet.” idiom means a lot. A politician, a beggar or a soldier are all begotten 
by a mother; that is why women are very important in Islam. It is also written in the Farewell Sermon of Mohammed 
that the women were entrusted to men by God; this is also very elucidative. Unfortunately there are still places where 
women are neglected because they are weaker, such as Afghanistan; it is not possible to speak about women rights 
there. This is because of the oppressive regimes but in Islam as a religion, it is not possible to say the women are 
ignored. I suspect the faith of those who mistreat women; because in our religion no one should limit the freedom of 
others and men should pay attention to women. Some men‟s desire about suppression of women is an issue related to 
lack of education. I think the men who mistreat women are either uneducated or mentally unbalanced. Nevertheless, 
place of women is very important in Turkish society; women have a voice in important platforms. For example while 
the number of women deputies was 48 in the past, this number increased to 78 at the present day in Turkish 
parliament; this is a very good progress. Moreover, the implementations on women rights are very successful; shelter 
is given to the women suffering from maltreatment, financial aid is given for the women that lost their husbands. 
Considering that women also take place in important tasks at the present day, we can say that importance given to the 
women is thriving. One of the other alluring sides of AKP is its respect to women and youth. I hope the number of 
maltreating people to women will decrease soon.  
Interviewer: Which factors are influential on spreading Islamic lifestyle? 
Participant: If we keep the people that do not let the women in their household to go out, as this is related to the 
mentality of people rather than religion itself, seeing more veiled women in the daily life could be considered as an 
outcome of abolishing the strict rules in public space against the conservative women. Those kinds of restrictions are 
vexatious as headscarf is not a style only Muslim women prefer. People that follow different faiths all around the 
world use it without encountering strict restrictions. I do not think the number of veiled women increased, but I think 
they are more visible in the social life after the abolishment of restrictions.  
Interviewer: What do you think about the relation of people from different political or religious opinions towards 
each other? 
Participant: I think the people shall approach each other humanly, differences are not important. If a person 
approaches impolitely to me because of my political view while I approach them humanly, I would get frustrated. I 
think the people should not be prejudiced. This is what I strive for, I have friends from different faiths around me, but 
I respect their choices. I think this should not affect interpersonal relationships.  
Interviewer: Do you feel any restraint from different political groups? 
Participant: There were some circles that strived for disintegrating the society and restrict the freedom of opinion in 
the past, but I believe these circles could not hang on during AKP term; now I do not feel any pressure. 
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